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ABSTRACT 
!
This study specially addresses the economic aspects of the privatization programme 
in Libya. The main objectives of this study are to explore the effectiveness of the 
privatization programme in the industrial companies; to evaluate the privatization 
effects on firm performance in the industrial companies; and to identify the important 
obstacles that hinder the privatization programme. The firms’ performances were  
evaluated using both primary and secondary data analyses. Questionnaires were used 
to collect primary data. Secondary data were collected from the financial reports of 
the selected privatized firms for the period 2002-2010. Two econometric analyses; 
mean comparison and traditional panel models were employed in the empirical 
analysis. In the mean comparison analysis, the performances of state-owned 
enterprises were examined. For traditional panel analysis, the fixed effects model and 
the random effects model were employed to analyze the effect of the privatization 
programme on firm performances. Modelling of the traditional panel models 
involved two dependent variables (operational efficiency and profitability level) and 
six independent variables (productivity, ownership structure, employment, capital, 
privatization and liquidity). The results of the field survey show that managers and 
workers were in favour of the privatization programme and privatization in Libya has 
faced minor difficulties. The results of the mean comparison analysis indicate a 
significant difference of mean values in pre-privatization and post-privatization. The 
mean values of profitability level, operating efficiency, capital, ownership structure 
and productivity in the post-privatization are higher than in pre-privatization. The 
mean value of employment in  post-privatization is lower than in pre-privatization. 
The results of panel analysis show that privatization and employment have positive 
and significant effects on operational efficiency and the profitability level of 
privatized firms; ownership structure has significantly improved privatized firms’ 
efficiency, but has no effect on profitability level; and liquidity has no statistically 
significant effect on privatized firm’s operating efficiency and profitability level. The 
privatization programme in Libya has improved the performance and the working 
conditions of privatized firms.!!
!
Keywords: privatization and performance. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Kajian ini memberi tumpuan kepada aspek ekonomi program penswastaan di Libya. 
Objektif utama kajian ini adalah untuk mengkaji keberkesanan program penswastaan 
di syarikat-syarikat perindustrian; menilai kesan penswastaan ke atas prestasi firma 
di syarikat-syarikat perindustrian; dan mengenal pasti halangan-halangan penting 
yang menghalang program penswastaan. Prestasi firma dinilai menggunakan analisis 
data primer dan sekunder. Data primer dikumpul menggunakan kaedah kajian 
lapangan. Kaedah soal selidik pula digunakan untuk mengumpul data primer. Data 
sekunder dikumpulkan daripada laporan kewangan syarikat-syarikat terpilih bagi 
tempoh 2002-2010. Dua analisis ekonometrik; perbandingan min dan model panel 
tradisional digunakan dalam analisis empirik. Dalam analisis perbandingan min, 
prestasi 13 buah firma yang diswastakan telah dikaji. Bagi analisis panel tradisional, 
model kesan tetap dan model kesan rawak digunakan untuk menganalisis kesan 
program penswastaan ke atas prestasi firma. Pemodelan model panel tradisional 
melibatkan dua pemboleh ubah bersandar (kecekapan operasi dan tingkat 
keuntungan) dan enam pemboleh ubah bebas (produktiviti, struktur pemilikan, guna 
tenaga, modal, penswastaan dan kecairan). Keputusan kajian lapangan menunjukkan 
bahawa pengurus dan pekerja bersetuju dengan program penswastaan dan 
penswastaan di Libya menghadapi kesulitan yang kecil. Keputusan analisis 
perbandingan min menunjukkan perbezaan yang signifikan antara nilai min pra-
penswastaan dan pasca-penswastaan. Nilai min bagi tingkat keuntungan, kecekapan 
operasi, modal, struktur pemilikan, produktiviti semasa pasca-penswastaan adalah 
lebih tinggi daripada pra-penswastaan. Nilai min guna tenaga semasa pasca-
penswastaan adalah lebih rendah daripada pra-penswastaan. Keputusan analisis 
menunjukkan bahawa penswastaan dan guna tenaga mempunyai kesan positif yang 
signifikan terhadap keberkesanan operasi dan tingkat keuntungan firma yang 
diswastakan; struktur pemilikan meningkatkan kecekapan firma yang diswastakan, 
tetapi tidak memberi kesan ke atas tingkat keuntungan; dan kecairan tidak memberi 
kesan yang signifikan secara statistik ke atas kecekapan operasi dan tingkat 
keuntungan firma yang diswastakan. Program penswastaan di Libya telah 
meningkatkan prestasi dan keadaan kerja firma yang diswastakan. 
 Kata Kunci: penswastaan dan Prestasi. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
!
INTRODUCTION 
!
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter introduces the research agenda of this study. It outlines the background 
of the study, statement of problem, research questions, research objectives, 
significant of the study, scope of the study and organization of the remaining 
chapters. 
 
 1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
!
Libya occupies a total area of about 1,759,540 km2 of the North African continent, 
dispersal from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to the borders of the Republics of 
Chad and Niger in the south, and the Egyptian border and the Sudan in the east to the 
borders of Tunisia and Algeria in the west. According to Central Intelligence Agency  
(CIA), based on the census on Jun 2013, the total population of Libya is 6,002,347 
people; the annual growth rate of population is around 4.5 percent, one of the highest 
population growth rates in the world (CIA, 2013).  
 
The Libyan economy is heavily dependent on the hydrocarbon industry, which, 
according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), accounted for over 95 percent 
of export earnings; an estimated 85-90 percent of fiscal revenues; and over 70 
! ! ! !
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percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2008 (Khaled, et al., 
2010). 
 
It means that Libya’s economy is heavily dependent on revenues from natural 
resources with an oil sector that provides nearly all of its export earnings and 
constitutes more than two-thirds of GDP. This lack of diversification, however, 
means that its economic growth depends on the international oil market. Due to 
economic progress, the World Bank (WB) classifies Libya as an upper middle-
income developing country. Its economy is dominated by the oil and gas industries, 
through which it has been, transformed from a poor, largely agricultural economy in 
the early 1960s to one of Africa’s wealthiest (Abidar & Laytimi, 2005). It has the 
highest income per capita of the developing countries in the Mediterranean region 
(Table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1 
Per Capita Incomes in Mediterranean Developing Countries 
 
            COUNTRY GDP per capita  (PPP US$) 
Libya 10.335 
Turkey 8.407 
Tunisia 8.371 
Algeria 7.062 
Lebanon  5.584 
Jordan 5.530 
Morocco 4.555 
Egypt 4.337 
Syria 3.808 
Source: Abidar and Laytimi, (2005). 
 
Both public sector and private sector are important in the economic development of 
Libya, but the public sector is considered as the dominant sector in Libya. The main 
reason is it is responsible for expediting the development of the national economy; 
! ! ! !
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Libya’s development strategies have been characterized by the dominance of the 
public sector as the major agent of growth. Meanwhile, the private sector was 
relegated to a subsidiary role mainly with regard to agriculture and small services.  
 
In regard to public sector, it can be classified into two categories, pure public agency 
and state owned enterprises (SOEs).  Pure public agency is responsible in performing 
the administrative matters. Meanwhile, SOEs run the specific business for the sake of 
the Libya government. In particular, the performance of the public sector is affected 
by multiple shortcomings due to lack of administrative, organizational and, training 
efficiencies in this sector. In addition, the limitation of funds for development also 
contributes to such shortcomings and the large number of workers without the right 
skills. There is no dispute that this unemployed energy represents a waste of a part of 
the society’s resources, which is supposed to be directed and exploited in full for the 
economic and social development purposes. 
 
SOEs also are not able to perform their activities to achieve high profit to the 
government due to low performance, low productivity and inefficiency. In addition, 
Libya has encountered the throes of major changes, which will result from economic 
reforms and a shift in government’s approach to development. However, despite vast 
hydrocarbons resources, the country faces great challenges, which the government 
needs to address. Therefore, the Libyan government has decided to privatize SOEs. 
 
Privatization, in particular, is a way of economic reformation and transformation. It 
is expected to improve the Libyan economy’s competence capacity through 
increasing the role of privatization on the public enterprises performance in 
! ! ! !
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implementation of economic development process. Libya, like many developing 
countries, has tried to implement a privatization prograame to overcome the 
problems of public enterprises sector such as lack of incentives (e.g., completion) 
and control mechanisms (e.g., communications/reporting systems). The most 
important goal is to increase the performance of Libyan firms to facilitate the role of 
the private sector to stimulate economic growth and therefore be able to increase the 
prosperity of the whole community (Moneer, 2005).    
 
Many countries either less developed or developed countries adapted the 
privatization programme to reform their economies, but there is an apparent and clear 
difference between the privatization programmes in these countries. The differences 
are due to some factors and motives. Different in the motive with regard to selling of 
the public investments in the industrial countries from those in the less advanced 
countries. In the industrial countries, this motive comes in the form of search for 
projects management of efficient administrators to release the best use of the 
resources.   
 
However the main aim of the privatization in the developed countries is to dispose of 
the losing projects where such projects are heavily burdened with complete set of 
state owned projects, which are poor in quality and efficiency, which result in 
exhaustion of the resources and requirements. That is looking at the sale of the public 
investments as a way of reducing those burdens, and difference in the political and 
economic environment in those two groups of countries to a large extent with regard 
to legal system and the restrictions imposed on prices production inputs. 
 
! ! ! !
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In comparison to the developed nations, the developing nations are experiencing a 
more difficult reform path that seems to be largely unsuccessful. This is because 
many of the developing nations do not possess effective institutional and corporate 
governance structures and their laws that govern ownership rights are lacking. In 
addition, although privatization is much needed in such countries, there is the notable 
lack of qualified executives who are capable of overseeing the reform process, which 
adds to the challenge of bringing about the privatization process (Zahra, 2000).  
 
Moreover, owing to the lack of budgetary resources to facilitate contingent liabilities 
of the firms, privatization is elusive. Added to this, according to Karatas (2001), the 
lack of transparency in laying down the SOEs market value prior to sale and the 
drawing up of certain deals could add to privatization failure. Moreover, local 
opinion may have been exacerbating things further in that the locals may perceive 
privatization as loss of resources to foreigners and loss of independence because of 
the considerable involvement of the donor agencies in the implementation of 
institutional structures for privatization in many African nations (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 
2002). 
 
The policy of privatization, however, and what it means for the state to refrain from 
ownership and management of economic projects have raised a broad and 
comprehensive effect and dispute. Libya is among those countries, which have faced 
such difficulties, especially at the beginning of privatization programme. However, 
the global trend and the successful attempts of some privatized projects in most of 
world states left a strong trend which cannot be resisted any more, nevertheless, 
useless to stand in its way, even impossible to stop it, but otherwise, it is better to 
! ! ! !
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find the right path to benefit from it and from the successful trials in this trend. This 
is more fruitful and useful for some Arab and foreign countries which their economic 
environments have some similarities.  
 
In consideration of those events and causes, Libya started to think seriously to solve 
the economic problems. As a result, privatization policy in Libya has been 
implemented since 2003 in accordance with the law No. 198/1430 (2000) which was 
discussed by the General People’s Committee. For implementing this policy, General 
Board of Transfer of Public Companies (GBOT) had been established in the same 
year. Libya worked to explore the effect of the privatization program on the firm 
performance, and requirements for success, is not intended to the vital task of repeat 
of the experience that has been in some industrial enterprises before, which failed to 
secure its performance, and did not follow the policies supportive, which led to the 
deterioration of institutions and drop the efficiency of production and productivity. 
 
The government of Libya focused more on the Libyan Industrial Sector (LIS) in an 
attempt to improve diversification through expansion of non-oil products after 1969. 
The government also attempted to achieve food self-reliance and self-sufficiency. In 
addition the government gave the LIS top priority and a significant budget in order to 
contribute to regional development and job creation. A total of LD6 billion 
($4.91billion) was allocated to the LIS for the years spanning 1970-2005 and actual 
LD4 billion ($3.27 billion) was spent on it. In 2005, the LIS comprising 360 
companies categorized into seven types divided under three categories of ownerships 
(Ministry of Electricity, Industry and Minerals, 2006). Libyan public companies refer 
to those in which the state represented by the LIS, is the owner of their capital while 
! ! ! !
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joint-venture companies refer to those in which the state has a share in the ownership 
along with private/public partners. On the other hand, privatized companies refer to 
small-scale companies with the inclusion of ex-state owned companies (Shareia, 
2006). An overview of the different types of companies is presented in Table 1.2. 
 
Table 1.2 
The Libyan Industrial Companies 
 
Projects 
 
 
 
Public 
project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint-
venture 
 
Privatized 
project 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
Food projects  17 35 22 74 
Textile, weaving, furniture and paper 
projects  
 
17 10 91 118 
Leather projects  
 
13 11 - 24 
Chemical projects  
 
14 25 11 50 
Metal works projects  
 
3 - - 3 
Engineering and electronic projects  
 
22 18 28 68 
Cement and house building projects  
 
 
11 6 6 23 
 
 
 
Total 
 
97 105 158 360 
Source: The Ministry of Industry, Electricity, and Minerals, (2006). 
 
The LIS hired 1721 employees in 2001 which approximately 11.80 percent of the 
aggregate labor force (IMF, 2006). Although the LIS received significant 
investments, its contribution to the country’s GDP remained under 8 percent in the 
1970s and even dropped to 5.9 percent in 2000. A further decrease was noted in 2002 
3.2 percent (Shareia, 2006). Aqadhafi (2002) contended that the actual production 
capacity in 17 out of 250 companies went over 60 percent their design capacity, 
while the remaining 233 companies ranged from 9-59 percent. The achieved 
production capacity in comparison to the design capacity in the context of public 
industrial companies is presented in Table 1.3. 
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Table 1.3 
Realized Production Capacity of Some Public Industrial Companies 
 
Company Achieved Capacity (percent) 
1.Light industries  
Fruit Company, Aljable Alakdr 13 
Tomato Paste Company, Sebha 0 
Fruit Company, Derj 1 
Dates Company, Hoon 26 
Al-Nahda Agriculture Company, Zawia 10 
Vegetable and Fruit Company, Zawia 24 
Date Syrup Company, Khoms 28 
Olive Oil extraction and Refining Company, Isbea 4 
Tin Cans Company, Zawia 75 
Flour Mill, Tobruk 0 
Automatic Bakery, Tripoli 8 
Automatic Bakery, Misurata 6 
Wall Tiles Company, Gherian 28 
Plane/Flat glass Company 29 
Clothes Company, Derna 27 
Carton Boxes Company, Nasseria 27 
Plastics Company, Benghazi 23 
Plastics Company, Beida 21 
Gases Company, Tripoli 12 
Red-Brick Company, Sawani 26 
Al-Amal Washing Machines Company, Tripoli 2 
Refrigerator Company, Rujban 0 
2.Strategic Industries  
Cement Company 0 
Gypsum Company, Sawani 22 
Metal Workers Company, Tripoli 12 
Lime Company, Suk El-khamis 19 
Filter Company, Tripoli 5 
Lime Company, Benghaz  10 
Red-Brick company,Benghazi 5 
Cement Moulds Company, Benghazi 14 
Textile National Company 60 
Furniture Public Company 60 
Trailer Manufacturing Nation Company 54 
Company for Soap and Cleansing Materials 33 
Aman Company for Tyres and Batteries 33 
General Company for Pipes 33 
Arab Company for Manufacturing and Bottling 28 
National Company for Foodstuffs 24 
General Company for Paper 20 
General Company for Plastic and Artificial Sponge 12 
Libyan Company for Tractors 5 
Source: Alqadhafi, (2002). 
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Alqadhafi (2002) further contended that the actual production capacity in 11 out of 
31 most important industrial projects ranged between 5-60 percent of their design 
capacity. The achieved production capacity in terms of design capacity in the most 
significant industrial projects measured throughout a three-month period is shown in 
Table 1.4. 
 
Table 1.4 
Realized Production Capacity In The Most Important Public Industrial Companies 
 
Industrial Projects Achieved Capacity 
(percent) 
Textile National Company 60 
Furniture Public Company 60 
Trailer National Industrial Company 54 
National Company for Soap and Cleaning Materials 33 
Alaman Company for Tyres and Batteries 33 
General Company for Pipes 33 
Arab Company for Manufacturing and Bottling 28 
National Food Company 24 
General Company for Paper 20 
General Company for Plastic and Artificial Sponge 12 
Libyan Company for Tractors 5 
Source: Alqadhafi,  (2002). 
 
Additionally, not unlike other sectors, the LIS has been facing many challenges since 
the 1990s. For instance, it experienced a decrease in the state subsidies owing to the 
drop in the oil income. It was also subjected to many changes and by 2000, the 
Ministry closed down and its authority was shifted to the Production Affairs of the 
State (PAS) which was also later abolished in 2004. This was followed by the 
establishment of the Ministry of Industry and its merger with the Ministry of 
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Electricity and Minerals. As a result of these experienced changes, instability in the 
administration was noted to overlap between authority and responsibility (MEIM, 
2006). A sharp increase in the cost of public projects inputs occurred owing to the 
instantaneous exchange rate unification (Ministry of Economy and Trade, 2006). 
Specifically, January 2002 marked the unification of the rate of exchange at LD1= 
$0.608 in comparison to the special rate of LD1= $0.36 that had been in existence 
since February 1999 (IMF, 2003).  
 
Following thirty years of excessive dependence on the public sector, the Libyan 
government was dissatisfied with its performance and acknowledged that the 
inefficiency related with this sector was more significant than expected, which was 
reflected in the interposition made by Colonel Alqadhafi at the General People 
Congress (GPC) in Sirte in January 2000, where he stated that the system is finished 
and that he had to interfere to stop the operation from continuing ineffectively. 
Moreover, Alqadhafi accused GPC members of voluntarily spending the country’s 
resources indiscriminately, stating that they are holding on to outdated methods in 
order to justify oil wastage (Otman & Karlberg, 2007). It was evident that the Libyan 
nationalized and centralized government system had failed to achieve economic 
goals.  
 
In the period from 1999-2001, majority of the public industrial projects were deemed 
overstaffed, ill-equipped with outdated machinery and possessed an unstable 
management. The level of operation throughout the public industrial sector remained 
under 42 percent Majority of the companies were loss-makers as opposed to profit-
makers, because they suffered from high inventories. On the basis of the financial 
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and technical status, 30 of the large industrial companies, were categorized into 
three; the first group comprised of 18 companies with good financial status.Table 1.5 
shows that. 
 
Table 1.5  
Strategic Public Industrial Companies 
 
Source: Alqadhafi, (2002). 
 
Company Capital Profit 
(loss) 
Debt Net 
Fixed 
Asset 
Electronic Public Company  24.00 16.06  4.36  24.00  
National Public Company for Beverage  650.00  18.29  0  10.19  
Furniture Public Company   44.02 26.03  15.03  11.00  
Pipes Public Company  44.98 13.60  13.65  13.00  
Flour Mills and Fodder Company   85.96 12.23  48.66  70.00  
Wires and Electricity Tools Company 32.70  5.83  4.79  12.35  
Public Company for Chemical Products  191.00 (7.22) 5.66  65.00  
Alaman Company for Tyres  57.12 (4.87)  12.24  20.00  
Electricity Equipment  Company 11.27  37.42  23.22  6.00  
Alarabiya Company for Beverage  7.41  8.31  13.49  17.000  
Alarabiya Company for Cement  172.46 (7.81) 94.14  92.452  
Tobacco Public Company  36.00 (983)  32.27  11.742  
Libyan Company for Iron and Steel  1.25 (123.06) 85.77  879.45 
Trucks and Buses Company  87.00 (13.63)  185.16 111.50 
Scrap Public Company  10.00 (867)  3.31  4.53  
Plastics \ Industrial Sponge  Company 48.51 228  29.71  3.00  
National Company for Waste Pipes  4.50  408  5.82  2.84  
National Company for Trailer  7.60 (595)  9.65  5.39  
! ! ! !
26!
!
These companies were recommended to be retained within the public sector as they 
were considered strategic and their products were considered to be important for the 
economic development.  
 
The second group comprised five companies that had faltering development and 
showed modest profit, huge debts and lack of cash. Table 1.6 shows that these 
companies, privatization was recommended. 
 
Table 1.6 
Second Group of Public Industrial Companies 
 
Company Capital Profit 
(loss)  
Debt  Net 
Fixed 
Asset  
Textile National Company  1.500 22.024  11.576  N.A  
Spinning and Weaving National Company  113.594 (5.812)  30.911  20.000  
Alarabiya Company   136.495 (22.765)  16.423  100.00  
Cement Libyan Company  153.500 (24.790)  27.424  N.A.  
Tractors Libyan Company  7.500 (4.003)  2.913  N.A.  
Source: Alqadhafi, (2002). 
 
Meanwhile, the final group comprised 7 bankrupt companies that failed to achieve 
their targets and were making losses. These companies also reflected significant 
debts and outdated technology along with overstaffing. Table 1.7 shows these 
companies were recommended to be liquidated and their branches were to be 
privatized. 
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Table 1.7 
Third Group of Public Industrial Companies 
 
Company Capital Profit 
(loss) 
Debt Net 
Fixed 
Asset 
Al Mamura Food Company   49.029 (18.620)   7.401 1.000 
National Development Company   15.946  (7.760)  71.553  4.000  
National Company for Animal Feed  68.294  (50.931)  50.672  9.000  
Libyan Company for Building Equipment 740 (959) 18.805 2.000 
Public Company for Leather Products  38.000  (7.517)  61.231  9.500  
National Food Company  7.962  (11.766)    9.906  2.000  
National Company for Soap and Washing 
Equipment  
14.218  (2.133)  28.830  8.000  
Source: Alqadhafi, (2002). 
 
The Libyan government turned to privatization as a policy to correct errors in the 
public sector from where there is a shift in the Libyan economy–public ownership 
and experience led to efficiency and productivity reduction and multiple issues. This 
considerable privatization was focused on 360 companies including 204 industrial 
firms, 56 agricultural firms, 82 livestock firms, and 18 marine firms. Table 1.8 shows 
that. 
 
Table 1.8 
The Scope And Sectors Involved In The Third Wave of Privatization 
 
Stages First stage Second stage Third stage Total 
Industrial companies  145 41 18 204 
Agricultural companies  28 4 24 56 
Livestock companies  71 0 11 82 
Marine companies  16 1 1 18 
Total  260 46 54 360 
Source: Alqadhafi, (2002). 
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Privatization was employed based on an interlocking time schedule across three 
phases from 2004-2008. In the first phase, 260 public companies were targeted to be 
privatized from 2004-2005. This is followed by the second phase where 46 medium 
companies were to be privatized through public bidding (Sharika Musahima) from 
2004-2007. The final phase included the privatization of 54 large strategic companies 
from 2004-2006 (Aldroish et al., 2005). Because of the large investments in the 
above companies, they were confined to special bidding at the onset for holding 
investment companies and foreign investors. Some shares in these companies should 
have been transferred to residents from 2007-2008 as according to the Wealth 
Distribution Plans (WDP). Further, the first phase was divided into three (Aldroish et 
al., 2005). The first group of the phase included the privatization of 191 companies 
through employee buy-outs (Tashrukiya) and special bidding (Sharika Musahima). 
The second group of the first phase included 58 main companies while the third 
group comprised 11 companies. The companies of the latter groups were going to be 
liquidated through bankruptcy proceedings owing to their significant external debts 
and their use of outdated technologies. An overview of the above explanation is 
provided in Table 1.9. 
 
Table 1.9 
The First Stage of The Third Wave of Privatization, 2004-2005 
 
Stages Industrial 
Companies 
Agricultural 
Companies  
Livestock 
Companies 
Marine 
Companies  
Total  
A 95 22 59 15 191 
B 40 5 12 1 58 
C 10 1 N.A. N.A. 11 
Total 145 28 71 16 260 
Source: Alqadhafi, (2000). 
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The first phase of privatization was addressed in the new legislations generally for 
economic reforms and particularly for the privatization programme. These 
legislations addressed market liberalization, competition and other institutional 
issues. Reductions of tariff were included in the Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement and 
various trade agreements entered into with the European Union (EU). The average 
rate of tariff was decreased from 21.8 percent in 2003 (rates ranging between 0-425 
percent) to 17.8 percent in 2004 (a maximum rate of 100 percent), (IMF, 2007). The 
new tariff rate has only two rates, 10 percent for tobacco products and zero percent 
for the rest but imported goods are allocated a four percent service fee (IMF, 2006). 
A reduction in the dispersion of tariffs in the categories of products was also noted. 
 
Moreover, requirements for trade certification with Maghreb countries including 
Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania were summarized. The trade 
regime was further summarized in 2006 by decreasing the tax rate consumption on 
imported goods from 15-25 percent with the aim of making foreign investments and 
capitals enter the country easier. Restrictions on external trade were made 
considerably made lenient through downsizing of the list of prohibited imports from 
40 to 10 items; items that were prohibited under reasons of religion and health. 
Furthermore, the floor on foreign direct investments in the non-oil sector decreased 
from $50 million to $1.5 million (IMF, 2007). 
 
In an attempt to attract private investors, Libya deregulated their production, prices, 
wages and its national currency’s exchange rate. The privatized companies were 
excluded from the payment of consumption taxes in terms of operating equipment, 
spare parts and raw materials for a span of five years. They were also excluded from 
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the payment of income and production taxes in the hopes of encouraging the 
involvement of private investors in the process of privatization (Alfaitori, 2004). In 
addition to this, the government also arranged with domestic banks to provide the 
firms with subsidized loans at three percent per annum (Otman & Karlberg, 2007). 
 
The government issued resolution No. 100/2004 in April 2004, giving permission to 
the GBOT to transfer the ownership of 126 public companies to the private sector at 
initial fixed prices as highlighted in the resolution. The resolution also included 
details and established a series of conditions, which had to be satisfied prior to the 
firm’s privatization. GBOT was required to establish supervisory committees for 
every targeted company to monitor its privatization programme. It should also 
establish committees for the companies to acquire their final market value and 
employ a legal editor to declare its new privatization status. The target company 
shares should be offered, in whole or in part, to its employees and if they refuse to 
take up the offer, then the shares could be offered to the public. In order to obtain 
shares in the company that was targeted for privatization, employees could withdraw 
and utilize the accumulated 1.5 percent salary contribution, which was mandatory 
according to law No. 1/1986 for shares payment. 
  
Employees can also make use of their unpaid salaries, wages, or vacation salaries to 
obtain company shares. They have the right to keep what they wanted from the 
current assets including spare parts and raw materials and to own real estate and land. 
A specific albeit flexible time period was offered for buying company ownership 
ranging from 5-8 years. In situations where the employees accept the offer, their 
cooperation with legal editors is required to create a new company established to take 
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over the old one. Employees who refuse to buy their company shares are offered a 
combination of options including self-employment program, transfer to other 
government agencies and benefits of early retirement. Furthermore, it is important 
for established committees to conduct stock taking activities to assist GBOT to 
determine the final market value of the firm to be privatized and the issue of surplus 
workers has to be handled before privatization is realized. 
 
The business environment can be enhanced through the revision of the existing 
investment laws that govern the country’s economic activities. Accordingly, in 
Libya, changes have been undergone in the administrative procedures including the 
opening of 51 offices throughout the country for the simplification of the procedures 
of business application. More importantly, a single stop window and a month 
application approval limit have been set for administration to relay their refusal via a 
notary public. The aim is to enable and motivate the creation of businesses (IMF, 
2006/136). Meanwhile, the Stat’s import monopolies were minimized to only 
petroleum products and weaponry where the goal was for the private sector to 
autonomously import and generate goods that were under the control of the state 
(IMF, 2007). 
 
However, the aim behind GBOT is to create an entity that can propose which public 
companies should be privatized and how the company’s restructuring should be 
carried out. GBOT is also responsible for the supervision of public firms following 
their privatization for their facilitation in various areas. 
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Along with the above measures to liberate markets and to maximize competition of 
players, the Libyan government passed legislation for the creation of new 
institutional infrastructure and for the stimulation of market exchanges. In addition to 
this, it also established the Domestic Manufacturing Fund (DMF) to provide funds 
for the restructuring of activities for public companies preparation for privatization. 
DMF also ensures short-term loans to assist privatized companies. The Libyan 
Government established the Libyan Stock Market Exchange, the board in order to 
liquidate public firms and the fund to support exports. 
 
The government of Libya, in their quest to implement the privatization programme 
and as a requirement of the economic system transformation, also attempts at 
improving and promoting economic efficiency. The government has redefined the 
roles of both sectors (Public and private), boosted non-oil sector and extended the 
production and export bases through the privatization policy. 
 
1.2  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The 1970s witnessed a huge increase in the number of public sector companies that 
existed in all economic areas. This policy was initiated a strategy adopted by most 
developing countries in 1960s, mainly based on the complete reliance on the public 
sector for development process.   
 
However, the public sector is an essential element in the development of the national 
economy. It is, in fact, responsible for the greatest part in economic and social 
development in the country. It is the main source of several basic products and/or 
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industries such as steel and iron, aluminum, metal, engineering and chemical 
industries. In addition, the public sector plays a vital and essential role in alleviating 
the suffering of the people through making available of the necessary commodities 
and/or goods with proper prices and in particular with respect to food security,!
clothes and medicine.  
 
Libya, like many developing countries, in its development strategy has been 
characterized by the dominance of the public sector as the major agent of growth, but 
the private sector was relegated to a subsidiary role mainly with regard to agriculture 
and small services. Economic performance is mainly driven by the oil sector, while 
production in the non-oil sector has been evolving at a relatively weaker pace. 
 
After three decades of excessive reliance on the public sector, the government 
became dissatisfied with the performance of the public sector and learned that the 
inefficiency associated with the public sector was higher than expected. This was 
clear evidence in the interposition made by Libyan President at the General People 
Congress (GPC, parliament) in January 2000, “The system is finished. I have to step 
in today to stop this wheel from spinning in a rut and wasting fuel”. Further, he 
accused members of the GP Congress of deliberately wasting the country's resources, 
saying “you are holding onto obsolete methods in order to justify wasting oil” 
(Otman & Karlberg, 2007). 
 
The Libyan government seems to have accepted the view of economic efficiency of 
the private sector over the public sector. After evidence revealed that a variety of 
solutions to the problem of managing the public sector failed to produce an 
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improvement in the performance of the public sector companies. As Libyan 
President stated “this system has failed the same as happened in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe because it depended on unqualified workers who do not 
care about their country’s interests. The economy has no place for sentiments, 
niceties and therefore, this sector has to be reviewed as there is no one who 
understands it in Libya (Arabic News, 2003).  
 
Even though, the Government of Libya (GOL) has implemented the privatization 
programme, the national phenomena of lower production levels of SOEs, in addition 
to higher production costs, lower quality of products are considered as inevitable 
results of misuse of economic resources on the one hand, and bureaucracy and 
administrative corruption on other hand.   
 
During 2001-2002, following the speech by Colonel Algathafi at the GP Congress in 
Sirte in January 2000, the Libyan government created a number of evaluation 
committees to examine the public industrial projects in particular for 1999-2001. The 
conclusions of the committees can be briefly summarized that the most of the public 
industrial projects during the 1999-2003 period, were overstaffed, equipped with old 
machinery, and suffered from a lack of stable management. The operation level 
across the public industrial 19 sector did not exceed 42 percent. Most of the 
companies were loss-makers as they were suffering from high inventories.!According 
to the financial and technical status, 12 companies that failed to realize their targets 
and were loss-making. Table 1.10 shows the low performance of some public 
industrial companies that. 
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Table 1.10  
Low performance of Some Public Industrial Companies 
 
 Source: Alqadhafi, (2002). 
 
These companies had large debts and old technology and were overstaffed and 
recommended that these companies be liquidated and their branches privatized. 
 
Despite all the advantages and facilities offered by a state to individuals, but the 
dominance of central or misuse of economic resources to make many of the cases of 
economic activity in Libya represented in the form of public sector suffers from 
serious problems such as low levels of efficiency and productivity in public 
enterprises, lack of administrative, organizational and training efficiency – limitation 
of financial surplus. In addition, the latest report by Global Competitiveness Report, 
Libyan economic performance was ranked 91 out of 134 countries. Its economic 
performance was assessed as excellent in the macro-economy, health and primary 
Company Capital Profit 
(loss) 
Debt Net Fixed 
Asset 
Textile National Company  1.500 22.024  11.576  N.A  
Spinning and Weaving Company  113.594 (5.812)  30.911  20.000  
Alarabiya Company   136.495 (22.765)  16.423  100.00  
Cement Libyan Company  153.500 (24.790)  27.424  N.A.  
Tractors Libyan Company  7.500 (4.003)  2.913  N.A.  
Al Mamura Food Company   49.029 (18.620)   7.401 1.000 
National Development Company   15.946  (7.760)  71.553  4.000  
National Company for Animal Feed  68.294  (50.931)  50.672  9.000  
Building Equipment Company  740 (959) 18.805 2.000 
Leather Products Company  38.000  (7.517)  61.231  9.500  
National Food Company  7.962  (11.766)    9.906  2.000  
National Company for Soap  14.218  (2.133)  28.830  8.000  
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education, but poor to average in institutions, infrastructure, technological readiness, 
business sophistication, innovation and marketing efficiency (Porter & Schwab, 
2009). These phenomena represent indicators of default in the economic 
administration, which can only be eliminated by radical reform of such management. 
For example, it is noted from the report of the People’s Board for follow-up 1990, 
there were high production costs of some of SOEs those pertaining to the strategic 
industries sector such as Trucks Co., Abu Kammash Complex and National Smelting 
Co. Furthermore, most of the SOE’s Industrial Companies suffer from many 
problems which were reflected directly or indirectly on their lower performance.  
 
Firstly, the industrial sector in which the investments allocated for it exceeded LD 
4.315 million, including more than 250 companies and employs more than 47,000 
workers; it is noted that excluding 17 locally manufactured commodities achieving 
production exceeding 60 percent of maximum capacity of the producing companies 
thereto, the production rates in other industries ranged between 9-30 percent of the 
maximum capacities. Also, lower rates occurred in the production quantities realized 
in certain products of strategic industries.  
 
Table 1.11 revealed data of production capacities utilization in the SOE’s industrial 
Companies whose actual productive capacities did not exceed 30 percent of 
maximum capacity in 2000. 
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Table 1.11 
Production Capacity of SOE’s Industrial Companies 
 
Company Achieved Production / Maximum 
Capacity (Percent) 
Tomato Paste Company 0 
Al-Nahda Agriculture Company 10 
Vegetable and Fruit Company 24 
Date Syrup Company 28 
Olive Oil Company 4 
Automatic Bakery Company 8 
Wall Tiles Company 28 
Clothes Company 27 
Plastics Company 23 
Plastics Company 21 
Gases Company 12 
Red-brick Company 26 
Refrigerator Company 0 
Metal Workers Company 12 
Lime Company 19 
Filter Company 5 
Lime Company  10 
Red-Brick Company 5 
Cement Moulds Company 14 
National Company for foodstuffs 24 
General Company for Paper 20 
Plastic and Artificial Sponge Company 12 
Libyan Company for Tractors 5 
Source:  The People’s Board for follow-up, Annual Report submitted to the People’s 
conferences in their second ordinary session for 1999. 
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There is an arbitrary selection of locations of certain companies and unobservant of 
co-ordination between them in terms of specialization and lack of environmental 
compatibility of such projects.  
 
Secondly, the oil sector itself, despite the possibilities it enjoys, was not shielded 
from the problems encountered by other sectors as a result of improper management 
and its centralized and bureaucratic nature. The number of faulty rigs was about (14) 
at a rate of 41 percent of the total number of (34) operating rigs. This situation in oil 
companies has its adverse effects on the exploration and production activities within 
the sector. 
 
In general, it is noted that there is a lack of integrated planning for specifying the 
need of the national economy for companies and productive units for the industries 
sector during developments and extensions of the existing companies or in the 
construction of new companies. All that is noted trinities in this sector.  
 
Despite the lower production rate progressively in some companies and economic 
establishment, and keeping the number of workers there in unchanged or increasing 
it in certain cases, is considered an adequate indicator for lower productivity of labor 
as an economic resource. However, it is noteworthy that certain studies conducted on 
certain companies indicated lower labor productivity level from one year to another. 
Regardless, the shares of producers \ workers and their salaries remained fixed and 
were not affected by lower productivity level. This is a clear example of low 
performance of companies. 
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Alqadhafi (2002), stated that the public sector in Libya suffer from weak control. The 
control as a management task is not less in important than the planning, supervision 
task or other management functions. Thus, it is considered as a means of avoiding 
problems and bottlenecks, which may occur during production or provision of 
commodity or services. Hence, control is considered as an important means of 
avoiding increase in production costs by ensuring the task for achieving production 
plans in the manner envisaged thereto.  
 
To indicate the phenomenon of weak control in the public sector establishments, we 
give some examples mentioned in (Ministry of Economic and Trade, 2006). It is 
noted, for instance, that in the Arab Cement Co., the Management Committee for the 
Company lacks control over running and control of work in the factories, and 
absence of coordination between the production units, especially with respect to 
purchase operations from abroad, in addition to lack of discipline among the 
employees of the Company, thus resulting in, and for other reasons, stopping 
production in certain factories. Moreover, according to (Ministry of Economy and 
Trade, 2006) low quality products from industrial products was not in conformity 
with the approved standard specifications in the production units and lack of 
necessary analysis. Therefore, as a result of the liberalization of the economy many 
Libyan industrial products were unable to compete with international products, even 
at the local market (Abusneina et al., 2003).  
 
In the past twenty years, several countries have successfully adopted privatization 
programs and consequently, a significant body of literature has been dedicated to the 
impacts of privatization on the performance of the firm in developing nations. 
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However, many enterprises, public and SOEs have been privatized due to  the 
experience of other countries that gain positive results over privatization. Libya has 
also embarked on privatization prgramme for the SOEs, in the hope that the 
enterprises might be restructured into more efficient, profitable, competent, and 
value-creating private enterprises. To date, there is no work done to assess the post-
privatization performance of these enterprises in Libya. Also there is lack of 
sufficient studies on the performance of the privatized enterprises. Abstracting this 
deficiency, this study intends to bridge the research gap by assessing the firm 
efficiency, labor market, and fiscal impact of the privatization program in Libya and 
contributes to literature in the following three pertinent ways; 
 
First, the study provides an overall privatization picture and analyzes the impact of 
privatization on the performance of the firms with the help of data obtained from the 
industry companies in Libya. Second, the research analysis conducted examined the 
privatization impacts and further explored the way privatization functions in Libya. It 
answers the questions of whether the changing objectives stem from private 
ownership or the competitive environment changes lead to efficiency gains. The 
answers to these questions provide novel insights into both researchers and Libyan 
policy makers when they analysis or design privatization programmes. Finally, this 
field of study is of utmost significance in Libya, particularly as it reflects new ideas 
and content enabling the provision of recommendations to policies for Libya’s long-
term privatization plans. Accordingly, this study focuses on the main factors 
influencing the Libyan firms’ performance following privatization. 
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In sum, the research problem lies in the fact that privatization may be the right exit 
into correction of the defect in existence in public sector from where there is a 
transfer into the Libyan economy, where public ownership experience has proven to 
cause a reduction in performance as well as other multiple problems. Privatization 
entails change in ownership as well as the emergence of competitive powers. Hence, 
This study attempts to understand the various aspects of privatization in general and 
argue that the private-public ownership factor should be differentiated from other 
factors that also influence the effect of privatization on firms performance of Libya 
in particular, thereof and its effect on the future of the Libyan economy.  
 
In view of this fact, this study informs policy makers and the public at large about the 
real picture of the Libyan Privatization by assessing the effect of privatization on the 
financial performance of SOEs and the firms. The study also makes the concerned 
bodies alert about privatization. By doing so, this research is believed to shed some 
light on the future trend of the enterprises 
 
The analyses of this study will provide an evaluation of the effects of privatization on 
the performance of firms that are located in all of the different states and operate at 
different types of industrial company. It also gives some recommendations on how 
Libyan states can derive the greatest benefits from privatization.  
 
1.3  RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
 
i. How privatization effectively works in the industrial companies in 
Libya? 
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ii.  Is it the changing objectives due to private ownership that causes 
possible effectivnes efficiency gains? 
iii. What are the main obstacles that hinders the privatization programme 
in Libya? 
 
1.4  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The general objective of this study is to investigate the impact of the privatization on 
the firm performance. The specific objectives of the study are as follow:  
i. to explore effectiveness of privatization program in the industrial companies. 
ii. to evaluate the privatization effects on the firm performance in the industrial 
companies. 
iii. to identify the important obstacles that hinders the privatization programme. 
 
1.5  SIGNIFICANT OF THE STUDY  
 
The SOEs has over time been a big and important issue in the growth and 
development of the economy. After decades of poor performance and inefficient 
operations by state-owned enterprises, governments all over the world earnestly 
embraced privatization. Thousands of state-owned enterprises have been turned over 
to the private sector in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern and Western Europe. 
This trend was spurred by the well-documented poor performance and failures of 
SOEs and the efficiency improvements after privatization around the world (Chong 
et al., 2004). 
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Privatization began in Germany in 1961 with the German Government’s sale of its 
majority stake in Volkswagen but was popularized in Britain by the Margaret 
Thatcher government in the 1980s with the successful privatization of British 
Telecom. It then spread through the rest of Europe to Japan, the rest of Asia, Latin 
America, Africa and the former Soviet-bloc of countries Central and Eastern Europe 
were the last to adopt it (Megginson & Netter, 2001). In the 1990s, global 
Privatization proceeds amounted to US $145 billion with Latin America and the 
Caribbean contributing the most to the proceeds (Kikeri & Nellis, 2002).  
 
Privatization has since been perceived as a tool to improve Public Enterprise 
performance and reduce the budgetary burden caused by their inefficiencies. 
Privatization is necessary not simply to improve the performance of Public 
Enterprises but it’s essential contributions are to consolidate gains achieved in 
reforming Public Enterprises, to distance the firm from the political process and 
inoculate it from interference by owners who have more than profit on their minds.  
 
In addition, privatization has been an interesting issue in almost all developed and 
developing countries; it is become a central feature of the economic policies of 
nations in the countries. Experience, however, has witnessed that the effectiveness of 
privatization all over the world has been a mixed blessing or is inconclusive. 
Moreover Private sector is now being considered by most countries around the world 
as a viable alternative to government in its traditional role as a provider and/or 
producer of public goods and services.  
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One of the most significant economic phenomena of recent years has been the 
privatization of SOEs all over the world. According to Megginson and Netter (1998), 
the amount raised by all governments during the last two decades, considering only 
public offers, is over $400 billion, a figure that would be considerably surpassed if 
direct sales were also taken into account. 
 
 Libyan government has adopted a privatization program for SOEs in order to 
restructure the enterprises into a more efficient, competent, profitable, and innovative 
and private enterprises that are capable of creating value. This study’s findings 
contribute to literature concerning privatization, particularly the issues existing in the 
developing nations. Specifically, the findings concentrate on shedding an insight into 
the complex environment of Libya and highlight the impact of privatization in the 
post-privatization period in the country.  
 
The findings also assist in providing the government and ministry with invaluable 
information concerning the impact of the programme on the industries performance 
on the whole, and to motivate the companies’ efficiency and increased profits. 
Through the assessment of the post-privatization performance of these firms and 
through the identification of the challenges that they are facing can assist in 
providing an insight into the main policy lessons and commitments of the 
government and ministry in their industrial policy.  
 
 
 
! ! ! !
45!
!
1.6  SCOPE OF THE STUDY  
 
This study concentrates on the analysis of the effect of privatization on the firms’ 
performance in Libya. 13 companies are studied in detail to understand the impact of 
the privatization on the firm’s performance. The study focuses on privatization of the 
public industrial sector (PIS) because it was the first sector that was exposed to the 
privatization programme. 
 
The data set for this study was obtained from Libyan firms that had been privatized 
in the industrial company sub and had at least four years of both pre- and post- 
privatization data. 
 
1.7  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY  
 
The study was divided into seven chapters. Chapter One provides the introduction of 
the study, it discussed the background of the subject, identifying problem statement, 
objectives of the study, research objectives, significance of the study and finally 
scope of the study. 
 
Chapter Two includes the study of the economic performance of Libya, the problems 
of slackness of public projects and the attempts to reform such problems. Chapter 
Three provides the literature review of the research, which covers the theoretical 
aspects of the privatization, empirical evidence, and alternative theories of the 
privatization.  
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Chapter Four addressed the research methodology of this study it includes the 
introduction, research methods, theoretical framework, research strategy, data 
collection, study samples, and data of analysis. Chapter Five provides the discussion 
on the results of the analysis. It includes the study through the interpretation of data 
that delineates major issues related to the testing of the hypothesis, and Chapter Six 
contains the general summary of the findings, also the limitation and implications of 
the study, in addition the main recommendation that must be considered in this study 
is the basis for research in future studies and conclusion. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
!
THE REALITY OF THE LIBYAN ECONOMY 
AND ITS PROSPECTS 
!
!
2.0     INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter introduces general information about Libya presented to describe 
Libya's image internationally, which necessitates an explanation of economic trends. 
The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 presents the!economic background 
of Libya. Section 2.2 discusses the role of the public sector in the Libyan economy. 
A discussion of the slowdown in public projects is presented in!Section 2.3.  Section 
2.4 presents the privatization and economic liberalization policies introduced in 
Libya, and, finally, Section 2. 5 presents the conclusions.  
 
2.1     ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF LIBYA   
 
Before the discovery of oil, Libya was poor and underdeveloped. Libya's poverty 
was due largely to its historical lack of a viable agricultural base, because of its 
desert environment (Gheddafi, 1978). Libya's prospects seemed much discouraging. 
Cultivation was strictly limited to two physically separated coastal belts constituting 
less than 3 percent of the country's total land area.  
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The combined effects of out-dated agricultural techniques and the hostility of dry soil 
resulted in low productivity in agriculture. Opportunities for development of other 
economic activities were few and not very promising (Heitmann, 1969). Then, black 
gold in the form of oil emerged from the Libyan desert, which was exported to 
international markets from 1961 onwards. Libya has a large strategic reserve of oil, 
which, according to optimistic estimates, is 90 billion barrels (Wilkinson, 2004). 
Libya’s reserves are the largest in Africa and among the top ten in the world. The oil 
boom that resulted from the discovery and export of oil helped public sector activity 
and provided the Libyan government with substantial financial resources. These 
resources allowed for the financing of large-scale projects that otherwise were 
sometimes not economically feasible (Higgins, 1959, cited in Gurney 1996).  
 
After the revolution in 1969, Libya saw new investments, which clearly influenced 
the economic and social development of the country. Many business plans, which 
depended on the oil revenues to achieve sustainable economic development, were 
created to increase the capacity of key sectors such as agriculture and industry. These 
were serious attempts to diversify sources of national income in Libya, which would 
reduce dependence on oil as the country’s main source of income. 
  
Since 1970, Libya has created three development plans (1973-1975) (1976-1980) 
(1980-1985). The key objectives of these various plans were to expand the base of 
the Libyan economy by developing production structures of non-oil sectors such as 
basic industries, agriculture and electricity. These socio-economic development plans 
resulted in structural changes in the local economy in which the share of 
manufacturing in GDP rose from 5 percent in 1970 to about 15.1 percent in 2005. 
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The share of the agricultural sector increased from 6 percent in 1970 to 9 percent in 
2005, real GDP increased sharply from $4.380 millions in 1970 to $44.820 millions 
in 2005.  
 
According to Libyan state figures (2006), Libya has one of the highest average per 
capita GDPs in Africa. However, this figure is distorted because little of this income 
flows down to lower classes of society. The weakness in world hydrocarbon prices in 
2009 reduced Libyan government tax income and constrained economic growth. 
Substantial revenues from the energy sector coupled with its small population 
resulted in Libya’s GDP per capita increasing from $14,593 to $15,709 in 2008, 
which made Libya rise to number 57 in the world in GDP per capita (PPP) in US 
Dollars in 2008 (CBL, 2009). Non-oil manufacturing and construction sectors, which 
account for more than 20 percent  of GDP, have expanded from processing mostly 
agricultural products to include the production of petrochemicals, iron, steel, and 
aluminium.  
 
Libya imports about 75 percent of its food because unfavourable climate conditions 
and poor soils severely limit agricultural output. The proceeds from oil and gas 
exports have enabled the maintenance of a large public sector with extensive 
government investments in health, education, agriculture and non!oil related 
industries. Table 2.1 below shows the contributions of the various sectors to the 
economy.  The oil sector provided about 70  percent of the GDP in 2007, having 
risen from 50 percent in 2002 reflecting rising oil prices. Whereas the share of other 
sectors conspicuously fell. 
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 Table 2.1 
 Distribution of GDP At Current Prices of Libya, 2002-2007 (Percent) 
 
Source: CBL, (2009). 
 
2.2  THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE LIBYAN ECONOMY 
 
In Libya, the public sector has controlled most economic activities, which is a 
characteristic of the economic situation of a country that has undergone a socialist 
transformation.  
 
2.2.1   Public Sector and the Economic Trends  
 
The emergence of the public sector control over the economy was a direct result of 
the Libyan revolution, which nationalized some private projects and constructed new 
projects to control the production and distribution of goods and services. Invariably 
the roles of the private sector were reduced. In the 1970s and early 1980s, a series of 
laws were enacted and a set of economic decisions were taken that gave the public 
sector complete control over all economic activities with exception of some simple 
   2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Oil sector 50.1 57.6 64.1 69.5 72.3 71.6 
Agriculture, fishing, and forestry 4.3 3.6 2.8 2.2 2.0 2.0 
Manufacturing 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.2 
Electricity, gas, and water 2.2 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 
Construction 6.4 4.8 4.5 4.0 3.9 4.3 
Trade, hotels, and restaurants 5.7 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.4 
Transportation, communication / storage 5.0 4.7 3.9 3.5 3.3 3.3 
Financing/ insurance/ business services 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Housing 12.5 10.0 8.0 6.3 5.6 5.2 
Public services 9.9 9.0 07.7 6.8 6.2 6.8 
Other services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
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marginal activities. Under this legislation, the private sector was marginalized. 
Therefore, the major tasks in production and service were assigned to the public 
sector. 
 
Public sector investments comprised about 85 percent of the total national 
investments recorded during the 1980s. The public sector also employed about 87 
percent  of the workers in the economy in 1980 (Shamia, 1999). In particular, the 
state not only invested in infrastructure sectors, but also entered directly into the 
agriculture sector, manufacturing, domestic trade (all stages) and foreign trade, 
restaurants and hotels, transport and storage, transportation and home ownership 
services, finance and insurance. The public sector covered the domestic supply of 
basic goods and services, and other activities, both large and small (Al-Sharif, 2002).  
 
The public sector therefore became the main engine of the national economy, which 
witnessed the nationalization of banks and foreign institutions, and contributed to the 
creation of national companies. In general, the public sector provided all the needs of 
the community, The public sector is sometimes referred to as the state sector and is 
part of the state that deals with the production, delivery and allocation of goods and 
services by and for the government or its citizens, whether (national, regional) or 
(local, municipal) that is dominated by absolute control of the public sector.  
 
Sanctions from the United Nations allowed limited economic openness in which 
private activity was permitted in certain fields such as trade and some light industries 
and fishing. Certain laws and decisions were issued in this respect such as law No. 9 
for 1992 for practicing economic activity. However, this openness emerged in a 
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disrupted form, as monopolistic institutions supported by laws for maintaining their 
monopoly continued. The powers of certain institutions controlled many policies and 
decisions affecting the moral fibre of the economy. 
 
2.2.2  The Main Problems of the Public Sector 
 
Despite advantages and facilities the state might have offered, the dominance of the 
centre over the economy caused the misuse of resources in the economic activity of 
Libya. Serious problems were the low levels of efficiency and productivity, 
employment of unqualified personnel, lack of follow up processes, budget deficits, 
lower returns on capital, distortion of the inflation index, shortage of cash flow, and 
monopoly of ideas and weak attention to the market. 
 
Low levels of efficiency 
 
Low levels of efficiency and productivity in public enterprises resulted from a 
combination of factors such as lower yield productivity that reduced energy 
production and led to weak oversight and difficulty in managing raw materials. Low 
yield production turned into realized losses. The reduction of actual operational 
activities compared to designed output led to the failure to achieve savings in 
production and failure to achieve production targets. Achieving these targets were 
drivers for achieving economical operation and the shortfall in production outputs 
created difficulties, leading to higher costs. 
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The phenomena of lower productivity levels in addition to higher production costs 
and lower quality of products are considered to be the inevitable results of the misuse 
of economic resources and bureaucracy and administrative corruption. For example, 
a report of the People’s Board for 1990 showed that the production costs in Trucks 
Co, the Abu Kammash Complex and National Smelting Co. were high compared to 
similar imported products. Often higher costs are indicators of deficiencies in the 
economic administration, which can only be eliminated by radical reform of the 
management. 
 
Issues such as low levels of efficiency and high costs maybe be attributed to several 
factors including the establishment of certain industries without conducting adequate 
economic and technical feasibility studies; lower operating capacity as compared to 
designed capacity; lack of the optimal use of machinery; a shortage of operational 
equipment; lack of spare parts; failure to conduct active maintenance work; shortage 
of training and rehabilitation programs; a higher rate of administrative and service 
manpower as compared to workers in production; large dependence on foreign 
manpower; and finally, a lack of attention to cost accounting systems and elaboration 
of appropriate budgets. 
 
Most Libyan state-owned companies suffered from many problems reflected either 
directly or indirectly by lower production capacities and higher production costs. In 
general, a lack of integrated planning for specifying the needs of the national 
economy for companies and productive units existed in the industrial sector during 
development and extension of the existing companies or in the construction of new 
companies. 
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Employment of unqualified personnel 
 
Employment of unqualified personnel resulted in losses to the state and the 
emergence of a black market due to the shortage of commodities. Non-viable market 
sources and methods of provision of goods resulted in losses to the state. These were 
also related to whether the commodity was locally produced or imported. A lack of 
qualified personnel can create lower production levels of locally produced 
commodities, as a result of the stoppage of production lines, a shortage of the 
necessary raw materials for production, closing of the factories and even the exit of 
the industry from the market.  
 
Lack of credit facilities 
 
Also the stoppage of imported commodities or the fluctuation of import operations 
due to a delay in obtaining credits for imports, the lack of necessary foreign 
exchange for financing the expense, or  commercial policies can lead to either a 
shortage of imports or complete prohibition of the necessary imports.  
 
Marketplace disruptions 
 
Other problems include interference in the market by specifying a legal price for a 
commodity lower than that of the market price as a price subsidy for consumers and 
improper display/supply of the commodity as a result of lower efficiency of 
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distribution channels. Such problems can suggest the existence of shortage to the 
consumer and create an atmosphere of anxiety and uncertainty, leading to purchase 
of all commodities displayed in sale centres and creating a crisis in providing the 
commodities.  
 
Economic mismanagement 
 
Many problems are attributed to economic mismanagement and lack of incentives for 
those in charge of production, importation or distribution of commodities. In addition 
bureaucracy and centralization play an important role in creating such difficulties 
including a lack of information on the market and subjecting the distribution of 
various commodities to many restrictions in terms of quantity and quality.  
 
Lack of follow-up processes 
 
Alqadhafi (2002) stated that weak control and the lack of follow-up processes in 
Libyan public sector companies resulted in low productivity. Control as a 
management task is no less in important than the planning, supervision of the tasks or 
other management functions. Thus, control is considered as a means of avoiding 
problems and bottlenecks, which may occur during production or provision of 
commodity or services. Hence, control is considered as an important means of 
avoiding an increase in production costs ensuring that  production plans are 
completed in the manner envisioned.   
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For instance, the Management Committee of the Arab Cement Company lacks 
control over running work in its factories. This lack of control has meant an absence 
of co-ordination between the production units, especially with respect to purchase 
operations from abroad, and, in addition, a lack of discipline among company 
employees (Alqadhafi, 2002). A lack of discipline has resulted in production 
stoppage in certain factories. Additionally, despite lower production rates, the 
number of workers employed therein has often remained unchanged or actually 
increased in certain cases. Regardless of productivity, the number of 
producers/workers and their salaries often remain fixed and unaffected by lower 
productivity levels. This is a clear example of the misuse of economic resources.  
 
Budget deficits 
 
Deficits in the general budget and an increase in the public debt are often the result 
of the public sector playing a role in economic activity, as losses resulting from the 
ownership of the public sector must be covered. For example, the final accounts for 
the 2003, which were submitted in 2006, displayed an account deficit amounting to 
1.974089 Billion Dinars for the year. These phenomena of continual deficit in the 
general budget and aggravated public debt are considered to be indicators of the 
problems encountered by the general financial administration and weak accounting 
systems adopted by the Secretariat of Treasury. 
 
In view of the expanded range of the public sector over the production and service 
sectors and the absence of a role of private sector, which utilizes individual 
initiatives, a deficit in general financial administration will continue and public 
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sector companies and institutions might suffer from defaults in their financial 
structures. This problem may exist as long as the public treasury finances all 
activities, irrespective of the returns achieved. At the same time, numerous bodies at 
the municipal level and centralized bodies will suffer from lower revenues due to 
their inability to collect taxes and fees due. In turn, such shortfalls will mean a 
continual deficit in the General Budget, unless the nature of economic management 
and the financial system of the State are reformed. 
 
Lower returns on capital 
 
Continual lower returns on capital are connected to the utilization of economic 
resources. Failure to maximize utilization of the various resources leads to the 
lessening of employment opportunities. The investment of resources in businesses 
with low production capacities (less than the maximum capacity) results in higher 
production costs and lower economies of these projects in general. Often issues 
include embarking on projects without conducting the necessary feasibility studies or 
implementing projects irrespective of the results of an economic feasibility that has 
been carried out. In the latter instance, the project is justified on the basis of social or 
political factors, despite knowing its unfeasibility from an economic perspective. The 
outcome is projects that lose money in their early stages, have no potential for 
success in future, or would achieve small returns in proportion to what would have 
been invested. If public funds have been exhausted on such projects, they cannot be 
invested in alternative uses.  
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Several examples of low rates of return on capital investments in industrial and 
agricultural companies exist in Libyan governmental reports. These include: 
1) An examination of the assets of 170 general companies indicated a low 
contribution of these companies to the general budget of the state in the form 
of transfers of their production (surplus or at least non-dependence) to the 
public treasury for covering the expenses for their activities.  
2) The Real Estate Investment Bank, Libyan Insurance Company, Partnerships/ 
joint-ventures of the Development Bank, Savings and Libyan Arab 
External/Foreign Bank as well as certain commercial banks were 
characterized as being stagnant and achieving small returns, causing the 
demise of certain joint-ventures (General People’s Committee for the control 
and follows up, 1989).  
3) The proper scientific assessment of investment companies would require 
information about their financial situations for several consecutive years so as 
to obtain a time series of data indicating the returns of their activity. Thus, 
decisions would not depend upon one or two years. However, such data is 
often unavailable. 
 
The most important indicators for lower return rate are: lower actual production 
capacities as compared to designed capacities, higher production and operating costs 
as compared to designed capacities, suspension of production in some factories and 
fluctuation of production in other factories, difficulties in marketing products and an 
inability to compete with imported products as a result of higher production costs and 
lower quality, weakness of financial structures, and an inability to overcome the 
encountered debt problem. 
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Distortion of the inflation index 
 
One metric for measuring measurement uses the consumer price index. The 
consumer price index describes the changes in the price to consumers of a basket of 
different articles over a certain period. In the Libyan economy, the categories used 
are distributed into seven commodities and services. These include: foodstuffs, 
beverages and tobacco; housing and its adjuncts; clothes; transport; entertainment, 
educational and cultural services; medical treatment and medicine expenses; and 
other expenses. The articles comprising the index were adapted to suit national 
accounting systems under the “Third Adjustment of the UN.” However, the figures 
for Libya are out of date and not countrywide. Therefore, computing these figures 
across the entire country and its highly populated main cities are necessary for results 
of the analysis to be applicable.  
 
Shortage of cash flow 
 
A shortage of cash flow exists in most public sector projects. The non-existence in 
the financing structures of the public sector companies and projects is one of the 
most vital problems encountered in such projects; thus, the possibility of success in 
achieving their objectives is low. Moreover, the shortage of positive cash flows is 
considered to be a feature of economic mismanagement and a method of 
differentiating between the various public sector units. The most important reasons 
for a shortage of positive cash flow are: 1) non-liquidation of dues curbs the 
capability to implement import budgets, thus leading to a reduction in their activities 
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and depletion of their capital resources, and 2) expenditure of most of their funds on 
salaries and running services without a corresponding production return.  
 
A shortage of cash flow in agricultural projects has led to their inability to meet their 
obligations and pay salaries and wages of employees in a timely manner. In turn, this 
situation has lead to financial burdens resulting from bank interest as a result of over-
drawn accounts. Also, the inability of some companies to collect their debts from 
other companies makes them suffer from a shortage of cash flow.  
 
In addition, inadequate due debt balances from one company to another or funds that 
some companies in the strategic industries sector have borrowed from commercial 
banks to cover their expenses were a result of a cash flow shortage. For example, the 
overdrawn account of the National Smelting Co. reached LD. 3.2 Million in 1990. 
The company has incurred continual losses since its establishment, with its total loss 
reaching about LD. 11.6 Million in 1992 , which exceeded its capital.  
 
Monopoly of ideas and weak attention to the market 
 
The emergence of a monopoly of ideas, goods and services and weak attention to 
market studies and a lack of adequate attention to research and development causes 
problems as well.  When the public sector dominates all aspects of economic life, 
laws prohibit the practice of certain economic activities by individuals or the private 
sector and confine such practice to public bodies and companies. When the 
monopolist activities include distribution and marketing of minor consumer 
commodities, the daily needs of an individual are less likely to be met. Hence, the 
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disadvantages of government, centralization and administrative corruption imbued in 
many practices made under the umbrella of the public sector are transferred from the 
monopolist institutions to the individuals and directly affect their daily lives. If 
production and distribution of commodities and services are under the monopoly of 
public sector institutions, citizens must submit to the conditions and restrictions 
dictated by these institutions and employees can take advantage of situation by 
obtaining the particular commodity or service.  
 
When certain subsidized commodities are scare, citizens must search for them and 
bear the problems associated with their scarcity; they often resort to obtaining them 
from the black market.. Besides, the quality, quantity and the manner of distribution 
are no longer in the hands of the consumer, in as much as they are controlled by the 
monopolies and used as a sword on the neck of the consumer. That consumer is 
obliged to buy the available quality and quantity in accordance with that which is 
required, irrespective of his actual needs and in the time and manner the monopolist 
has specified.  
 
Furthermore, domination of the monopolist institutions over importation of certain 
goods necessary for production of intermediate commodities or capital equipment 
and machinery directly affects the production process in a way unlike that of non-
monopolist establishments. Often monopolistic establishments produce lower quality  
local products, have lower production levels, have higher production costs and 
cannot compete with imported products. A monopolist enterprise may not engage in 
necessary research and development projects for reducing production costs and 
increasing returns. Instead, that enterprise raises the price of the commodity by 
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various means, thus consumers must bear the output disadvantages of monopolist 
activity. A monopoly and its effects may even occur in activities without being 
announced or legalized. This is for the simple reason that the state owns the factory 
or the marketing channel, which is managed in accordance with the laws and 
regulations for organizing the public sector.   
 
Both underproduction and overproduction in many public companies is attributed to 
inadequate market studies and not knowing the tastes and desires of the consumers. 
Moreover, lower quality products resulting from the absence of research and 
development units and quality control makes them undesirable and likely to be 
substituted for by foreign imported products, if available. Negative results emanating 
from economic policies such as continuing to depend on oil as nearly the only source 
of export revenues have influenced the whole economy of the state.   
 
2.3  SLOWDOWN IN PUBLIC PROJECTS 
 
The public sector in Libya became accountable for the management and financing of 
most production-related projects, and this development coincided with rising oil 
revenues. In the 1970s, these revenues were adequate to finance expansion needs of 
the state's role in economic activity to correct the economic structure that had 
prevailed before the discovery of oil. 
 
Unfortunately, adequate levels of communication were unable to be maintained as 
the public sector grew and such growth also proved to be unsustainable over the long 
term. The 1980s oil glut had clear consequences on the Libyan economy during the 
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application of five-year plan, which ended in 1985. Therefore, Libya was unable to 
complete her line of programs and projects for development. The declining oil 
revenues resulted in an accompanying decline in funds flowing outward from the 
treasury and affected the performance levels and production rates of the projects. 
Additionally, most investment projects suffered from low yields due to low levels of 
productivity in most public sector projects. Libya, as a nation, suffers from low 
productivity. Actual productivity of enterprises in the public sector were rooted in 
administration, finance or marketing methods, and these was the main causes of the 
inability of manufacturers to achieve production targets.   
 
All these factors was resulted in non-optimal exploitation of economic resources and 
wastage and therefore brought about loss of income to the community, which could 
have been achieved if those resources were exploited effectively. 
 
2.3.1  Reasons for Slowing Down of Public Enterprises 
 
The several indicators revealing the poor performance of Libyan economy are listed 
and explained below.  
 
2.3.1.1   Management Efficiency 
 
Public sectors companies in Libya suffer from many problems of administrative. 
Most of those problems revolve around the efficiency of administration and the 
affects that those inefficiencies created. These can be attributed to the following 
factors: 
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1. The inability to follow standards for quality and profit led to the creation of 
inefficient management that reflected the lack of necessary capacity for 
successful management. 
2. The inability to proceed from the principle of responsibility has led to 
problems. The state meets project needs from the necessary funds and 
guarantees funds borrowed from banks, but this very process has led to a lack 
of accountability in project management. Adequate preparation of economic 
studies would ensure the return on money invested in these projects, 
especially given the commitment of the state for social dimensions, especially 
in the availability of essential goods. 
3. No clear criteria for the selection of leaders for public sector companies, exist 
which led to unproductive leadership and interests of the management in 
properly directing these companies. 
 
2.3.1.2   Pricing and Quality 
 
In line with the stated goals, the public sector in Libya was mostly successful in 
preventing class distinctions and altering the tools of production, in addition to 
developing new economic projects. The pricing of essential goods produced by the 
public sector is subject to policy support accounting for social dimensions such as 
those people with limited incomes. Hence, the actual pricing of some commodities of 
public sector was not taken into account. The conditions and the economic efficiency 
of projects was based on either identifying a certain profit margin or price caps in 
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order to protect low-income consumers often at the expense of required quality 
standards.  
 
Companies kept their public sector roles and met the pricing needs of the local 
market. Foreign markets were not defined in terms of the best interests of companies 
which led to weak export capacities of public sector companies as did the complexity 
of access to markets not subjected to the requirements of public pricing decisions. 
Nor was great interest taken in the quality of the product.  
 
2.3.1.3   Employment Policy 
 
As a result of socialist revolution, the state became accountable for finding jobs for 
every graduating student. As a result of this policy, the public sector became the 
biggest employer in Libya. However, these youth came to be considered was 
responsible for causing instability in the public sector workforce. In essence, all 
employment advantages the state granted did not lead to improved labor productivity 
or an increase in efficiency. After a period of growth and prosperity, projects 
collapsed and became a burden.  
 
2.3.1.4   Investment Policy 
 
Public sector companies in Libya have worked to support the policies of socialism 
through achieving economic development via the framework of a comprehensive 
economic plan. Moreover, the investment policy followed by public sector 
companies played a major role in the performance of those companies that invested 
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in industry. Sometimes companies did not have access to necessary materials and had 
to import raw materials from abroad. Such importation required companies to pay 
their obligations to suppliers from abroad in foreign currencies and, as a result, the 
burden of expensive often increased because of unfavourable exchange rates of a 
particular foreign currency. 
 
2.3.1.5   The Cost of Funding 
 
The cost of funding has been one of the most vital factors affecting the performance 
of public sector companies in Libya and led to lower performance for companies 
suffering from cost of funding defects. This deficiency has led an increased burden 
funding for those companies. Among the most important reasons for existence of 
disparity in the financing structures were the following:  
1. Going beyond the approved investments in budget planning of companies led 
to borrowing from the banking system to finance long-term investments, 
resulting in an imbalance of financing structures.  
2. Inadequacy of long-term funding sources to cover the fixed investment as a 
result of an increase from realized loses. 
3. Insufficient reserves from retained earnings to strengthen the financial 
positions of companies. 
4. Imposed limits on some socially supported products in the public sector 
companies led to a price/cost imbalance. As a result of prices below cost, the 
actual costs of such products reduced the liquidity positions of some public 
sector companies and forced them to resort to borrowing in an attempt to 
bridge that gap. 
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2.3.2  The Possibility of Public Sector Reform 
 
Many economic analysts say that public sector institutions have become a waste of 
national wealth and are tools for corruption, cronyism, and nepotism (Abdo, 1994). 
Some believe that, in the search for new resources and in an attempt to improve the 
use of available resources, the state should pave the way for the private sector 
through the ownership and management of public institutions (Park & Russo, 1994). 
Others feel that it is possible to overcome the large number of problems of the sector 
through the separation of ownership of public facilities. Still others feel that 
improved efficiency can be achieved by applying the principle of decentralization of 
public sector management.  
 
Among objectives of management is to provide the necessary investments and 
production required year after year, to determine manufacturing costs, and to 
determine the selling price of their products. To reconcile the labor market and the 
rules that direct administration, the market must play a role in the process and 
management must respond to distribution needs. Most attempts at economic reform 
in socialist countries are based on narrow roles and limited to a mechanical view of 
the market in some areas, though especially in consumer goods (Poole, 1996; 
Easterly, 2001). 
 
Socialism is based on the eradication of the private sector and private property and 
proponents consider the resulting socialistic system equal to the capitalist system. 
Some believe that the state ownership is the best proprietary formulation and the 
most advanced. To respond to this formulation, a large bureaucracy has emerged to 
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manage, regulate, and control the process and to achieve economic, social, and 
political objectives.  
 
2.3.3  Economic Policies for the Advancement of the Public Sector 
 
No model of economic reform can be applied to all states or in all cases, but a 
number of common elements exist that are needed for any economic reform program 
so that this particular program is capable of achieving the main goals of the reform 
process. Emphasizing the needs (and existence of) the political will of the state, 
which proposes a reform program is important as is an agreement among those 
interested in the process of economic reform. In addition, the schedule for 
implementation of reform process is a critical element in the success of the entire 
program, with a trade-off arising between progressive implementation and rapid 
development. 
 
To increase the efficiency of work and activity of public sector institutions in Libya 
and the state in general, the problems of low production efficiency in particular must 
be eliminated and the problems of development in general must be resolved 
(Alfaitory, 2004). The proposed solutions comprise the following points: 
 
1. Increasing the competition and the elimination of monopoly. This can be 
done by selling units in the public sector directly to the private sector or by 
giving the private sector the opportunity to engage in activities, which were 
previously confined to the public sector. 
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2. Improving the performance of public sector institutions. An important 
consideration in the transitioning the economy is to keep an important part of 
economic activity in the public domain. Because of this, a need exists to 
improve the efficiency institutions in the public sector through removing the 
monopolistic nature of those public sector institutions and managing these 
enterprises on the basis of sound economic principles, determining the 
economic objectives of public institutions and eliminating state subsidies.  
3. Developing and implementing sound economic policies. A large number of 
countries face severe economic problems in the instance in which an 
imbalance exists between aggregate demand and the size of aggregate supply 
in the community. Unevenness in the size of external debt increases 
inflationary pressures, produces a declining rate of growth of the national 
economy, and increases in the state budget deficit leads to reduced 
circumstances for the country. Three policies can impact the situation. 
• First are policies affecting the absorptive capacity of the economy. The 
policies associated with aggregate demand management policies contain: 
monetary policy, fiscal policy, and policy related to private consumption. 
All these policies, but in particular monetary and fiscal policy, are 
developed with the intention of controlling the aggregate demand. The 
policy of promoting private spending is aimed at developing a proper 
level of consumption.  
• Second, structural policy is interested in achieving a more efficient 
allocation of economic resources, particularly in the medium or long 
term. These policies also include those designed to increase the efficient 
distribution of resources among the many possible uses for those 
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resources in the economy and those policies to expand productive 
capacity in the economy. 
 
Despite the possible good affects of these policies, many practical difficulties 
exist in implementing them in Libya. Among those difficulties are the poor 
ability to move capital and labor between the various industries. A change in 
relative prices may lead to increased unemployment for a relatively long 
period before the required structural adjustments take affect. Another issue is 
changing the economic policies pursued earlier for non-economic goals such 
as ensuring the appointment of graduates and price supports for goods.  
Restrictions on prices or restrictions on foreign trade may also raise political 
problems and social problems. 
• Finally, exchange rate policy is designed to improve competitiveness at the 
international level and promote the production of goods that can be 
exchanged. In theory, this policy would appear to reduce demand and the 
deficit in current accounts and impact the supply side. In turn, this might 
increase the gross domestic product and reduce surplus production capacity. 
The price elasticity of both exports and imports impacts international trade. 
 
2.4    PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION POLICIES  
   IN LIBYA 
 
In Libya, a new orientation towards the policies of privatization and economic 
liberalization are urgently required by the circumstances of economy in a developing 
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country whose economy relies mostly on the natural resources. Reduced oil 
exploration has given the private sector the opportunity to engage more fully in the 
development and management of economic activity.  
 
More diverse ownership of the means of production in non-oil sectors has been 
promoted order to revive the economy of the country. In the context of economic 
changes since the revolution, the strengthening of economic freedom and working to 
raise the efficiency of production facilities and services has been made government 
policy. The General People’s Committee established the General Board of Transfer 
of Public Companies (GBOT) in 2000. The objective of the committee was to 
transfer public ownership of companies to the private sector to spur economic 
development. 
 
In 2000, the rules pertaining to partnerships created in Law No. (198/1430) contained 
provisions relating to economic activity and reflected the decision of General 
People's Committee No. (724) to transfer many publically owned enterprises to 
individuals. The policy was aimed to restructure the Libyan economy (IMF, 2003). 
 
Consequently, the privatization policy adopted to help the Libyan economy included 
the following elements: 
1. Transferring ownership from the public sector to individuals (whether 
individual or collective ownership); 
2. Separating ownership from management; and  
3. Limiting the role of the state in the output of certain commodities for strategic 
importance of economic and social development.  
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The choice of reducing state control of economic activity was the option that expert 
committees in the field of economics have recommended. The University of 
Garyounis Research Centre for Economic Sciences in Libya examined the situation 
in historical context. The Centre considered the impacts of the economic crisis in 
Libya in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the resulting instability the country had 
experienced. As a result of these shocks to the economy, the private sector had been 
nationalization, leading to the absolute supremacy of the public sector in economic 
activity.  However, by 1991,  the Centre, in coordination with the General People's 
Committee for economic planning, looked at the economy and began discussing the 
need to restructure the Libyan economy based on  liberalization to free the economy 
from the grip of the state.  
 
In spite of these moves towards a more open economy, Libya maintained several 
restrictive trade policies. A service fee of 4percent  was imposed on imported goods 
and differing levels of consumption tax existed between goods produced locally and 
those produced overseas, and this reduced the transparency of import duty regime.  
Libya also maintains trade restrictions on products for which imports are reserved to 
state enterprises and restricts competition in several economic sectors, including the 
telecommunications and transportation industries (IMF, 2005).  
 
After the lifting of sanctions on Libya in 2006, the government of Libyan began a 
major programme in infrastructural investments that included replacing its domestic 
air fleet, the expansion and modernization of ports, construction of new railway lines, 
modernization of oil installations as well as the development of a tourist industry 
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(Otman & Karlberg, 2007). A major contribution to Libya’s economy is expected 
from increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which has increased rapidly since 
2004. (See Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 below.). 
 
 
Table 2.2 
FDI Flows As Percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
 
Libya 1985-1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 
Inward 0.6 -3.7 5.5 4.8  3.9 14.4    23.0  25.3 
Outward 1.6 4.9 -5.1 2.1 1.9 1.8    -6.1   -4.8 
Inward 4.0 20.7 13.0 15.0 12.5 13.3   15.8   16.2 
Outward 1.9 3.7  2.8 1.6 4.2 5.9     9.0     9.1 
            Source: Anne, (2005). UNCTAD, World Investment Report. 
 
Table 2.3 
FDI Flows Millions of Dollars 
 
Libya 2005 2006 2007 
Inward 1038 2013 2541 
Outward 128 -534 -479 
           Source: Anne, (2008). UNCTAD, World Investment Report 
 
Increased FDI was facilitated by Section 5 on the Encouragement of Foreign Capital 
Investment in 1997, the amended Petroleum Law No. (25) of 2004, and the 2004 law  
on the Libyan Tourist Sector. The 1997 law permitted 100percent  foreign ownership 
of companies that receive a license. Under the 1997 law, an investor is entitled to 
employ foreign staff and technical expertise necessary for the establishment and 
operation of the project. According to the letter of the law, "services" are one of the 
fields in which investment is allowed. A 2003 law also introduced the concept of 
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joint or shared ownership of an investment enterprise between foreign and local 
investors in Libya. 
 
2.4.1   Obstacles to the Privatization and the Private Sector in Libya 
 
Privatization like any other process involves structural changes to the economy in 
which benefits to the community are important and the biggest problems that may 
occur can be controlled for. The number and kinds of controls may differ in their 
goals in the privatization and liberalization of the economy.  In the case of Libya, the 
direction of the liberalization of the socialist economy and state control of economic 
activity was directed towards political, social, religious, and geographical 
considerations. The objectives of economic activity in Libya included diversification 
of income sources and reduced dependence on oil, creation of production base. The 
economy would be developed through increased competition and efficiency for 
production facilities and service industries. Furthermore, contributions of Libyans to 
help achieve economic and social development plans were to be facilitated through 
their ownership of individual enterprises and the involvement of the largest possible 
number of community members and individual institutions in economic activity. This 
was seen as a way to ensure the expansion of economic activity and economic 
freedom for individuals.  
 
However, making change has been difficult. The economic policies of Libya during 
the stage of developing plans still radiated from the public sector. After a long period 
of control by the public sector, expansion of the ownership base has faced several 
obstacles. A number of problems and obstacles mentioned are listed below. 
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1. A lack of private sector confidence: The experiences of private sector in the 
past years raised large doubts about the credibility of any decisions or any 
actions taken by the state.. For instance, in the early 1970s, the private sector 
was encouraged to establish joint stock companies. However, after these 
newly established companies proved a great success, they were transferred to 
the public sector. Another example was that of cooperatives and factories that 
obtained production inputs imported from abroad. Often they had difficulties 
in obtaining the necessary materials in a timely manner, which led them to 
halt the production processes (Alfaitori, 2004).  
2. As a result of expansion of the public sector, numerous regulations were 
issued along with an increased number of institutions and sectorial and sub-
units of productivity. These led to an increased number of staff in the units. 
The growing sense of the sovereign role of public sector produced a tendency 
to resist privatization as privatization threatened the strong relationship 
between these employees and the places at which they worked for decades 
and with which they had been associated. The development and the 
expansion of the bureaucracy in each institution had social and political 
dimensions and created a large obstacle in getting free from government 
domination.  
3. A commercial institution in the private sector is not immune from 
government interference, because the government creates the legal 
environment in which it conducts business. In such an environment, laws 
could be used to control all the institution’s business aspects. The probability 
that recently privatized institutions continue to confront the government’s 
administrative or regulatory regime depends primarily on the reason for 
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which institution was subjected to government control. Sometimes 
government control was aimed at protecting the poor and needy.  
4. One important objective of the public is to fight against unemployment, 
which led to a large number of workers employed in companies and factories 
in the Libyan public sector. However, this practice led to the emergence of 
so-called “disguised unemployment.”  Disguised unemployment is when 
more people are employed than are necessary to compete the task. The 
employment of these non-productive workers taxes the budgets of those 
institutions engaging in the practice and impedes production operations. The 
problem of this surplus labor forms an important obstacle to the process of 
privatization. Most public sector schemes suffer from a huge number of 
redundant workers, which is the direct outcome of misguided recruitment 
policies placing emphasis on social and political factors rather than on real 
need. 
5. The transfer of public sector projects is characterized by monopolistic 
conditions (natural monopoly) for services such as education and health. Due 
to the absence of a competitor in the market, a transition from those 
monopolies to the private sector may occur. In this case, quality and price of 
goods become issues. 
6. Financial market regulations in Libya and limited national savings represent 
one main obstacle facing the policy of privatization.  The limited financing 
capacity means that the necessary capital is not present to buy some public 
facilities. 
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7. The problem of debt accumulated by public companies increases the 
difficulties facing the process of privatization in the Libyan economy. These 
may result in timely payments not being made.  
2.4.2   Privatization Trends in the Non-Oil Industries 
 
Among the economic sectors in Libya, industry employs almost 30 percent  of 
Libya’s total workforce, which is about 2.4 million workers. The non-oil 
manufacturing and construction sectors accounted for about 20 percent  of GDP and 
range from production of iron ore, steel, and aluminium, cement food processing and 
manufacture of textiles and handicrafts (World Report Libya, 2004). Among Libya’s 
non-oil industries, the Libyan Iron and Steel Company (LISCO) is one of the biggest 
iron- and steel-making companies in North Africa; also, cement production is one of 
the most promising industries in the non-oil and the non-fuel mineral sectors. The 
non-fuel mineral sectors include the production of ammonia and urea at the Marsa El 
Brega ammonia plant, the quarrying of clay, gypsum, and limestone near Al Khums, 
the quarrying of limestone and dolomite used in production of lime and calcite 
dolomite for LISCO as well as extraction of salt from the coastal plains near 
Benghazi and Tripoli. Other companies include: the National Company for Soap and 
Detergents; the Libyan National Textile Company; and the Assamaka Company for 
Paints & Chemical Materials. Most of these industries were supported by a 
framework limiting the quantity of importation.  
 
In general, the profitability of these industrial corporations was very low. This led to 
the public budget shouldering the burden and helping many public corporations, 
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which often were loss making. Similar to many other countries especially in the 
Middle East, Libya has been battling with productivity-related problems in its 
manufacturing industries. 
 
A number of related factors have led to this low performance. They seemed to be so 
closely related that they had been so often mentioned and cited in the annual reports 
of the Secretariat of Industry. For instance, these include: a lack of hard currency, an 
insufficiency or delays in obtaining banking credit, the difficulty of changing prices 
for the final production as a result of the Secretariat of the Economy controlling the 
level of prices, an excess of an unskilled labor force, and the lowering standards for 
managerial duties.  
 
The Libya industrial sector structure was developed during a 30-year period, 
following the Al Fatah revolution in 1969; this structure took after that of many 
socialist economies, with the main aim of a self-sufficient economy. The industrial 
sector of Libya was structured to achieve two main objectives. The first was to 
supply the Libyan market with the necessary goods. The second was to employ as 
many workers as possible.  Unfortunately, this arrangement could not be sustained, 
as production costs could not be match the actual costs of products. Thus, enormous 
debts were incurred in those companies. To this eliminate this problem, the 
government has resolved to put a halt, to this unfavourable arrangement. 
 
Today, privatization of Libyan companies remains in its infancy, and how this 
process will be structured and implemented remains uncertain. However, one thing is 
certain, that Libyan industry, which has been endowed with some enviable features, 
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must be linked to the world trade and investment flows. This is necessary if the 
dream of self-sufficiency of Libya will come to pass in the context of globalization 
(The Ministry of Economic and Trade, 2006). 
 
2.5   CONCLUSION   
 
Libya like any other oil-rich country in the Middle East and North Africa  has used 
crude oil to sustain its economy, but has suffered when the price of the crude oil in 
the world market fluctuates and, and declines.. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that 
the country has exerted remarkable efforts aimed at achieving economic 
diversification since 1970. These efforts have led to sustained investments in the 
non-oil sectors, especially in manufacturing and agriculture, among other sectors of 
the economy. The great hope is that this diversification policy will allow the private 
sector to improve efficiency. In addition the policy was put in place to increase the 
competitiveness of the national economy, to increase the degree of openness to the 
world markets, and to heighten the degree of competition in all markets.  
 
Though this policy is expected to face a series of challenges, nevertheless the process 
will definitely transform the economy and change the organizational structure and 
operating companies that were functioning in the environment of public property and 
laws before the diversification policy. It is against this background of necessary 
change that the government and the civil society are seriously pushing hard to make 
this evolution happen. 
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This chapter explained the key indicators of the Libyan economy, which determine 
Libya’s ability to keep abreast of developments and to have access to global markets, 
which are highly competitive. It also focused on the factors behind the failure of 
economic developmental projects that were critically examined, alongside with the 
resultant economic backwardness produced by poor management and state control 
over the economy both from an internal perspective and an external perspective. This 
chapter provided the fundamental base for the next chapters, in which possible 
scenarios were identified for the analysis and interpretation of results within the 
reach of the research method. Without losing the focus of the study, this chapter 
looked at the balance between the current reality of the Libyan economy and the 
ambitious future.! Therefore, on the basis of the review of literature, a conceptual 
framework for the study will be explicated in Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
!
LITERATURE REVIEW 
!
3.0 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter discussed the relevant theoretical and empirical literatures of this 
research study objectives and rationale. This chapter is divided into eight sections.  
Section 3.1 reviews the evaluating of the public and the private sector in the 
literature. This is followed by Section 3.2 witch discussion a different definition of 
privatization. Theoretical evidence of privatization is presented in Section 3.3 and 
followed by empirical evidence in Section 3.4. Effects of privatization are presented 
in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 explains the privatization and performance, and Section 
3.8 summarizes the chapter.  
 
3.1 EVALUATING OF THE PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE SECTORS IN 
THE LITERATURE  
 
Through the history of mankind, the state has always played a pivotal role in the 
economy, even though this role has varied from one state to another through their 
different stages of development. However, persistent worries about state intervention 
in economic activities have always existed. Consequently, ideas have emerged 
calling for restriction of state intervention and an absolute reliance on free 
unrestricted markets for the distribution of products, based on prevailing beliefs in 
success of private projects. For example, Adam Smith wrote in 1776 that the 
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statesman and the businessman had diversely conflicting personalities, for the simple 
reason that people would become excessively generous with other people’s wealth 
rather than their own wealth. This argument emphasizes the importance of private 
ownership and private management (Fadhel, 2004).  
 
The history of the evaluating of the public sector can be dated back to pre-market 
economic organizations, which have been widespread across the world. These 
include systems that have dominated the civilized world and that have been centrally 
controlled, which have been known in the past and the present as an “authoritarian 
economy”.  
 
Authoritarian systems were predominantly repressive in nature, ruling people 
through military power on the pretext of preventing insurgence and disloyalty. Other 
rationales have included eradicating tribal and sectarian conflicts and other matters 
that might jeopardies the safety and security of state. These potential dangers tended 
to tighten state control, enhancing its military machine, and giving it financial and 
economic powers to assist it in supplying its armies with rations.  The military was 
often given the authority use prisoners of war in all economic activities including the 
cultivation of land and construction, and occupied territories were heavily taxed. 
 
Meanwhile, the economic activities associated with private sector are usually 
controlled by the market mechanism, which aims at achieving the maximum profit 
possible (Hatem, 1994). According to Al-Robiai (2004), two kinds of private sectors 
exist. These are: (1) the organized private sector, which adopts an organized system 
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of accounts for all its activities, and (2) a disorganized private sector, which does not 
keep organized accounts and is usually associated with craft activities. 
 
The market system is the result of slow and gradual social development and a long 
history of trial and error (Al-Robiai, 2004). The market system seems as old as 
mankind itself and came into existence superseding the primitive economy of self- 
sufficiency. However, the flexibility and vitality of the market arises from its 
continuous development and adaptation to environmental conditions and 
technological changes and the changing tastes for varying forms of the market from 
time to time and from one country to another.  
 
For example, markets in the early times were different from those in middle ages, 
and also from the markets in Europe during the industrial revolution. Likewise, 
contemporary markets in countries are different from those in the past. However, 
economic history in general is about exchange, after humans had discovered the 
important of specialization and the division of labor. The market has always been the 
medium assisting in the progress and advancement of exchange activities. Moreover, 
markets and other economic tools, most importantly money, have been the most 
significant factors that have led to the development and progress of exchange 
economics (Al-Bilawi, 1998). 
 
Even in the absence of authority, the course of development of the market has not 
been characterized by chaos and disorganization. This influence of market is 
achieved at varying levels even in the absence of a higher authority or a vigilant 
administration. On the contrary, this development has been rather interactive, and the 
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market has rendered an accurate organization of economic relationships 
incorporating both the producing and the consuming sides of the society. The 
independent behaviour of all economic units, whether producing or consuming, has 
helped coordinate individual decision-making to achieve a kind of general automatic 
balance as each person responds to his own best interests and needs. Every producer 
or seller is seeking the highest possible price for his side and usually seeks the lowest 
price possible for his purchases. Therefore, this contest between producers and 
consumers tends to readjust prices to the point at which a final balance between 
supply and demand is established (Al-Robiai, 2004). 
 
Changes in the price usually constitute a good indicator of the future behaviour of 
producers and consumers as well as the amount and quality of the product in 
demand. Consequently, an automatic balance and coordination in decision-making 
will be established between the two parties without the need for a higher authority to 
dictate the relationship As a matter of fact, this sort of involuntary balance is dictated 
by technological progress from the side of producers and by the changing tastes of 
consumers.  
 
Hence, the market always plays a major role by virtue of its perfect organization of 
producer-consumer relationships without the need for the intervention of a higher 
authority or centrally issued decrees. Moreover, the role of the market is significant 
in balancing economic relationships and in readjusting the behaviour of producers 
and consumers without any initial necessity to organize production or consumption.  
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It follows that every individual is looking out for his own best interests in order to 
achieve the best possible income, the best possible price, and the highest quality. In 
his bid to achieve these outcomes, the public interest is always considered because 
the focus is on the production of items most in demand by consumers and the most 
capable producers are encouraged to provide the least expensive products while 
products that are too expensive or unworthy are eliminated.  
 
Adam Smith used the phrase “the invisible hand” to describe the process in which 
the market always serves the public interest. In other words, the public interest is 
always an inherent element with regard to consumers or producers working towards 
achieving the best result. It seems, then, that an invisible hand is pushing them 
towards achieving the public interest.  
 
According to Adam Smith, this phenomenon justifies the idea that the state should 
refrain from economic affairs (Al-Robiai, 2004). Smith created the basis and 
conditions of the market in the economic ideology in his book The Wealth of Nations 
first published in 1776. Smith called for the state to be limited to the following 
functions:  
1. Defending territories from outside invasion; 
2. Maintaining internal security to protect its citizens and their property from 
other hostile individuals; and 
3. Keeping law and order by issuing laws and regulations to organize the 
administrative and justice affairs of the state.  
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With respect to the economy, the market arrangement will be capable of organizing 
all activities including production, distribution and consumption. Moreover, the 
market has the power and the efficiency to perform and fairly distribute potential 
resources and the ideal use of these resources by the different economic sectors. An 
evaluation system would be capable of undertaking this role, including the allocation 
of resources, general budgeting and achieving economic growth. Yet, for an 
evaluation system to assume its role, a competitive market should satisfy two main 
conditions. These are: (1) free competition with regards to product marketing, raw 
materials and labor markets; and (2) money should be a means for exchange of goods 
only.  
 
The publication of The Wealth of Nations was contemporaneous with the American 
Revolution in 1776, which was followed by the French Revolution in 1789. Despite 
the fact that both revolutions were predicated on a call for liberty, nonetheless the 
nineteen-century saw the rise of calls for pluralism and the intervention of state. With 
the advent of the 20th century, plural regimes such as Fascism, Nazism and Marxism 
emerged. These regimes believed that liberalism was the legacy of the past, and that 
it was unlikely to stand the challenge of the modern age (Al-Robiai, 2004). 
 
The severe world depression in 1929 highlighted the weaknesses of liberalism, 
casting doubts on the ideas associated with the theory of the market and the 
economic neutrality of the state. In 1936 John Maynard Keynes come up with ideas 
that were opposed to most classical thinking, suggesting that state intervention was a 
precondition for any attempt to stimulate the economy. These ideas replaced the 
classical theory that had dominated economics thinking until 1929. Keynes’ ideas, 
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refuting classical thinking, received huge interest in capitalist states that particularly 
responded to his calls for state intervention through public expenditure.  
 
Hence, these states adopted Keynes’ ideas with the aim of overcoming the economic 
crisis that had hit the world in 1929. Those ideas were actually an attempt by Keynes 
to revamp the liberal system in order to avoid future crisis, allowing for the 
intervention of the state to manipulate spending when necessary. In other words, 
when the private sector could not stimulate the economy, this failure gave the state a 
pretext for intervention, expanding the economic activities of the public sector.  
 
State intervention in economic affairs led to the socialist states in Russia and the 
Eastern European countries, as well as numerous freedom movements in countries 
across the world that had long suffered from colonial or feudal rule. All these factors 
made state intervention in economic affairs inevitable for most of the world 
depending on the prevailing economic regime. For example, in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern European countries, and later in Western European and developing countries, 
the state become more significant at the expense of the private sector, which 
completely disappeared in socialist states and played a marginal role inmost 
developing countries. Yet despite losing ground, the private sector still had a role to 
play.  
 
State intervention in the economy and the subsequent expansion of the public sector 
at the expense of the private sector left most developing countries seeking external 
loans to achieve development, given their meagre resources and the financial, 
administrative and organizational problems associated with that expansion. Other 
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problems included the failure of the public sector to cope with state ambitions, the 
problems associated with foreign loans, budget deficits, and sustaining deficits in the 
balance of trade and the balance of payments, in addition to the underperformance of 
the public sector and its failure to deliver in most areas. All these problems led many 
governments to reconsider the whole process of state economic intervention, 
including the possible transfer of a number of projects to the private sector. That 
move was fuelled by the transformation of the rich capitalist states and their 
advanced executive organizations into international financial institutions. 
 
The liberal ideology that retreated during the 20th century giving way to socialist and 
totalitarian ideologies started fighting back, gaining ground and extending its reign. 
This rebirth was initiated by privatization in the context of major liberal 
transformation giving the private sector a leading role in the economy. Privatization 
emerged as an economic policy and a development programme adopted by some 
governments in the early 1980s. The United Kingdom was the first to consider 
privatization during the rule of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.  
 
Thatcher thought of privatization as a means for achieving better economic growth, 
because state ownership and its control of major projects put such projects under a 
more bureaucratically oriented management. This mentality, the argument goes, 
would not be consistent with the business administration mentality likely to be 
displayed by the private sector. This is simply because, according to the private 
sector philosophy, the principles of risk and revenue are the main factors that should 
govern business (Hasanein, 1993).  
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Accordingly, a relationship was seen to exist between risk and reward; the more 
risky the business the higher its prospective revenues would be. This relationship 
between risk and revenue was seen as likely to trigger the latent innovative powers of 
businessmen, improving their performance. It would also lead to completion among 
businessmen transforming the national economy into a dynamic entity spontaneously 
driven towards development and growth. This driving force was supported by three 
elements, which are: (1) innovation, (2) risk and (2) competition.  
 
Accordingly, the national economy would achieve higher performance for the 
welfare of the public at large. Better service, higher-quality products and the direct 
spontaneous control of production and service economic units were seen as benefits 
of private ownership and would help achieve the noble objective of economic 
prosperity. Based on these ideas, the liberal transformation took steps forward, and 
the private sector became more significant in increasing its economic contributions. 
The form of this transformation depended on the measures taken by individual states 
and the methods adopted in the process of transformation to the private sector.   
 
3.2  CONCEPT OF PRIVATIZATION  
 
The term “Privatization” has been used to express a wide range of economic and 
social policies in both developed and developing countries. This may partly explain 
why there is no single definition of the concept, since it means different things to 
different people in different countries.  
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Privatization has meant a reversal of public policy from the state domination of 
production to private ownership and operation. In the last two decades, privatization 
has emerged as powerful mechanism to reduce the role of the state in economic 
activity in developing countries. The process has redefined the role of the state from 
producer of goods and services to a facilitator of efficient production and provider of 
basic services to the poor. 
 
Privatization is not merely an economic concept; rather it is a more comprehensive 
and complicated socio-economic and political philosophy. In its simplistic meaning, 
privatization refers to increasing the role of private sector and decreasing the 
involvement of government in economic activities in particular and society in 
general.  Privatization is the strategy or the process that transfers totally or partly, an 
asset or enterprise, which is owned or controlled, either directly or indirectly, by the 
state to private organization. It is a process of empowerment that increases people’s 
economic and political participation by creating the opportunity for ownership and a 
sense of involvement in society. It also involves the rerelease of economic activities 
from legal and bureaucratic barriers and the encouragement of the free functioning of 
private enterprises. The underlying intent is to improve industrial performance by 
increasing the role of market forces (Littlechild, 1994).  
 
In the literature, privatization is defined in different ways. Some authors define 
privatization narrowly to mean the state owned assets. For example, Hurl (1995) 
argued that denationalization, deregulation and franchising are all methods of 
privatization; whereas, James (1996) defined privatization as “the divestiture” by the 
state of enterprise, land or other assets”.   
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As a basic organization policy for economic activity, where private ownership is an 
essential factor, and also where markets competition drives production, as well as 
where private initiative and risk-taking set activities in motion (OECD, 1994). This 
definition is widely accepted in the literature, from this given definition of private 
sector both political as well as economic definition of privatization can now be 
exploited in depth (Megginson, 2001).  Political and economic privatization is define 
generally as the deliberate sale of a government or (SOEs) or corporation or assets to 
private economic agents (Megginson, 2001). 
 
Another definition of privatization is that is a range of policy initiatives designed to 
alter the mix in ownership and management of enterprises away from government in 
favor of the private sector. The most common definition says that privatization 
implies permanent transfer of control as a result of transfer of ownership right from 
the public sector to the private sector of activities that are carried out, prior to the 
transfer of ownership by the public agency. Privatization and public sector 
phenomenon is considered to be “second generation” adjustment policies, in an effort 
to distinctively differentiate them from “first generation” policies, which focused 
mostly on economic stabilization.  
 
There are various ways of privatizing, either by relocation of available production 
resources, restructuring of existing institutional setting in which production take 
place and the introduction of new forms of corporate governance devoid of political 
interference. Having discussed some definitions of privatization in the foregone 
paragraph, Shehadi (2002) argues that privatization could be viewed as policy based 
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on a set of empirically supported hypotheses; The first of the hypothesis is that 
“ownership matters,” that is, economic performance is optimized when the firms are 
privately owned. Second hypotheses is that, which “management matters,” that 
private management seek its own interest and that of shareholders which is very 
paramount and therefore delivers a substantially better economic performance than 
do politicians or bureaucrats if it were to be managed by the public management. The 
third hypotheses is, that “markets matter, “That business decisions should be 
determined by the forces of supply and demand in competitive markets, rather than 
being single handily dictated exogenously by the same politics or bureaucracy with, 
at best, distorted market information. Fourthly, that “competition matters,” in that 
competition in the market is a plus to the economy though it may be disadvantageous 
to some firms in certain industries. Fifth, that “freedom to fail matters,” that there is a 
tendency of a firm going insolvent and exiting the market which is an essential part 
of a competitive and healthy market.  Last but not the least that “regulation matters” 
when markets fail because of information irregularity or monopoly power (e.g. 
cartel), that effective regulation can be put in place as to balance the interests of 
firms and consumers in markets where competition does not exist. 
 
According to Shehadi (2002) privatization is one of the economic instruments 
suggested by the WB and the IMF for many countries, especially developing ones to 
be adopted, regardless of the number of these countries economic reform and 
development.  Privatization brings about new ownership of the hitherto owned public 
enterprise and a better relationship between the agency and the management. These 
promising changes are expected to drive the firm’s objectives towards creating value.  
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To this end, it is therefore necessary to adopt a more innovative posture and 
proactive behavior, which will consequently boost the level of corporate 
entrepreneurship. In addition, privatization often opens up markets to competition, 
which should in turn raise the level of corporate entrepreneurship.  
 
In any case, the privatization of SOEs is a popular policy in advancing the frontiers 
of capitalism in many developed and developing countries (Vickers & Yarrow, 
1988). However, there is no standard definition of what constitutes privatization in 
the literature. Privatization may take a variety of forms that can be based on many 
factors, for example national socio-economic and political configurations. Therefore, 
each country may have specific forms of privatization applicable to it. For example, 
the specific forms, which may suit Libya, will not necessarily suit other countries.    
 
Summarily, under this broad definition, the objectives of privatization policy 
therefore include the enhancement of the economic performance of assets or 
services, increased expenditure or limiting of budget deficit, promotion of free 
market mechanism, and reduction of public sector size and spending (Kasperkiewicz 
& Starzyńska, 1998). 
 
3.3 THEORETICAL EVIDENCE OF PRIVATIZATION 
 
Privatization of state-owned firms are brought about by governments for the 
following reasons; to increase revenues, to promote popular capitalism, to reward 
political loyalists, to satisfy the demands of external financing agents, to minimize 
the administrative of state bureaucracy, and to shift the responsibility for needed 
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enterprise investments to the private sector (Nellis, 1991). Nevertheless, the main 
reason for privatization is to enhance the SOEs efficiency and in doing so, minimize 
the budgetary burden on the government. 
 
In this regard, different theoretical viewpoints have been proposed as to why state-
owned firms are not as effective as their private counterparts. Specifically, Shapiro 
and Willig (1990) consider state-owned firms as instruments that are capable of 
rectifying the failures in the market through the implementation of pricing policies 
that take social marginal costs into consideration (social viewpoint). In addition, the 
SOEs in ex-socialist nations often played a critical social role in providing several 
social functions and services including housing, medical care, recreation facilities 
among others. Such functions and expenses adversely impact the SOEs effective 
performance. 
 
Nevertheless, counter arguments can be made towards the above contention. First, in 
socialist nations, wages were limited and undifferentiated and in this context, 
additional social functions and services could be deemed as motivation for effective 
activities. Moreover, the relevant functions and services could act as stimulants 
during the transition period, when majority require payment, but their employees 
with developed social sphere can utilize them for free. Therefore, based on the 
political view, private firms should not be as susceptible to political influence. 
 
Political influence on the firm leads to excessive employment, negative choices of 
product and location, lack of investments and adverse management incentives 
(Schleifer & Vishny, 1994). While SOEs are more vulnerable to interest groups’ 
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pressure, private firms can concentrate on increasing profits. In this regard, private 
investors often hold a long-term perspective when it comes to assets acquisition that 
can be sold whereas the electoral assets held by politicians have a tendency to be 
temporary and confined to the short-term.  
 
On the other hand, the above argument is countered by the contention that with the 
lack of necessary institutions, private owners may not be interested in keeping the 
firm’s assets in good conditions in the long run (Nellis, 1999) as their interests are 
more short-term and speculative. In this background, political influence is for long-
term and as such, more preferable for enhancing the performance of the firms. 
 
Meanwhile, according to the incentive view, privatization generates superior 
incentives in that SOEs management may not have superior incentives or they may 
not be monitored effectively. In addition, the SOEs residual cash flow claims are not 
as easily transferable compared to private corporation shares and this leads to the 
impairment of residual claimant incentives to oversee management, and eventually to 
the negative performance of the firm (Dewenter & Malatesta, 1998). Government 
supervision has a tendency to be bureaucratic, strict and inclined to overseeing 
regulations as opposed to new opportunities (Nellis, 1991). 
 
Moreover, under state ownership, the government maintains unconditional control 
over the utilization of the assets of the firm and motivates rent-seeking behavior by 
insiders. Government is susceptible to pressure from political bodies in maintaining 
established rents such as high wages, low effort, high and secure employment among 
others – this in turn results in loss of incentives (Perotti & Guney, 1993). 
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In the context of private firms, self-interested shareholders supervise their 
management and private owners have higher incentives compared to the government 
appointees in maximizing profits as they hold equity and bear the financial outcome 
of their decision-making. Accordingly, private firms are more able to offer superior 
incentives and remuneration to management (Barberis et al., 1996). However, private 
firms face difficulty in obtaining the assistance of public entities and hence, the 
penalty for failure to maximize profits is higher and the outcome of labor is more 
significant. 
 
On the other hand, based on the agency theory and the free-rider issue, the 
government acts as a block holder in SOEs and are capable of monitoring managers 
of state-owned firms more than shareholders of privately held firms (Dewenter & 
Malatesta, 2001). It is noteworthy that in the transition of ownership changes, 
management could serve their own interests. In other words, new owners and 
managers could work to satisfy their self-interests in conditions of lack of sufficient 
legal base, legal nihilism and total corruption. Furthermore, newly appointed owners 
receive ex-state equity very cheaply and as such, may hold greater initiatives not to 
maximize profit but instead convert such equity into liquid form and privatize it by 
shifting accounts of foreign banks or by some other actions.  
 
With regards to the human capital view, private owners select the most optimum 
management to oversee the efficient running of their firms. State-firms managers are 
chosen for their prowess in getting along with politicians, handling political concern 
and lobbying for assistance. Contrastingly, private firms’ managers are chosen for 
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their ability to effectively run firms (Barberis et al., 1996). In other words, in SOEs, 
politically connected people are appointed as opposed to qualified and capable 
managers (Krueger, 1990). 
 
The above view is counter argued by the contention that if new owners are not 
interested in enhancing performance but only in quick enrichment, they will choose 
suitable managers. Contrastingly, the neo-classical economic theory postulates that 
the relationship between ownership and performance is a flimsy one. This view 
considers efficiency to be determined by the market structure and the level of 
competition and not by the owners of assets (Nellis, 1991). Competition controls the 
efficient resource allocation, minimizes managerial slack and motivates managerial 
and worker efforts and thus leading to reduction of investment costs and the quality 
improving expenditures (Koning, 1970). As a consequence of competition, more 
opportunities for performance comparison, higher response of performance to 
managerial efforts, higher probability of bankruptcy all primarily produce incentives 
for management (Nickell, 1996). The ownership structure of the firm is vulnerable to 
market pressure in that in the long run every firm who is capable of sustaining 
competition will end up with a near-optimal ownership structure (Demsetz & Lehn, 
1985). 
 
Viewed from the competition perspective, privatization reinforces competition, 
which in turn enforces the efficiency of the firm. Specifically, overextended and 
negatively performing SOEs have prevented the growth of the private sector (Kikeri 
et al., 1994). Government to minimize competition with SOEs often blocks private 
firms. Moreover, government credits to capital-intensive SOEs frequently push 
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private firms out of credit markets and bankers have a tendency to perceive an 
implicit government assurance for SOE credits. This perception leads to loss of 
credits to the private sector and added to this, the inefficient provision of significant 
inputs by adversely managed public utilities maximizes the costs of business to 
private firms and confines their expansion. Furthermore, private firms should be 
more under the control of commercial financial markets compared to SOEs as the 
latter operates under soft budget constraint as claimed by Kornai (1990)and Barberis 
et al., (1996). SOEs frequently gain capital at less rates of interest and are recipients 
of state subsidies. Nevertheless, the above argument from the competition view only 
hold true if private firms are more effective than their SOEs. Because of the 
ambiguity of this matter, from a theoretical point of view, it is unclear as to whether 
or not ownership form determines relative profitability or for that matter, efficiency. 
  
Over fifty years ago, various economists and politicians advocated that state 
ownership of firms in industries resulted in market failures. Added to this, due to the 
notable failures of SOEs the world over, and the developments of contract and 
ownership theory, the production in state owned firms along with its benefits have 
been thrown in the limelight (Shleifer, 1998). As a consequence, privatization of 
SOEs have become rampant with the aim of enhancing firm performance and 
stimulating corporate entrepreneurship; a competitive advantage that creates value in 
a firm (Baumol, 2002).  
 
According to Zahra (2000), privatization typically leads to ownership change and 
corporate governance: both having a crucial role in entrepreneurial behavior. A 
review of literature reveals two major reasons for state ownership failure: 
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i. Literature regarding management revealed that the managers of SOEs are 
recipients of poor incentives and poor monitoring which explains the 
inefficient performance of the said enterprises. On average, SOEs are not 
traded on the stock market and they are primarily controlled by the state and 
thus, no threat of takeover exists. In addition, creditor’s disciplinary 
requirements do not play a great role and as SOE loans are public debt and 
losses they are covered by subsidies. On top of the above reasons, the board 
of directors (BOD) of these enterprises fails to carry out corporate 
governance practices and management turnover is based on politics as 
opposed to market forces (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). 
ii. Literature also underscores the political economic aspects of public 
enterprises. Managers of SOEs generally pursue their objectives to achieve 
political capital and therefore, result in inefficient decisions. Due to political 
interference in the SOEs production, excessive employment, poor choices of 
products and location coupled with inefficient investment are rampant 
(Barberis & Vishny, 1996; La Porta & Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999). Moreover, 
SOEs are often exposed to soft-budget constraints that give them room to 
perform such practices as state governments do not want to risk the political 
cost owing to firm’s bankruptcy (Lopez-Calva & Sheshinski, 1999).  
 
The above two stands in literature have been backed by empirical research 
concerning SOEs and firm performance after privatization was introduced in various 
countries (Boardman & Vining, 1989).  Due to the SOEs failures, governments in 
over one hundred countries have been systematically carrying out privatization 
programs in the last two decades (Megginson & Netter, 2001). According to the 
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OECD (2001) report, all over the globe, the annual revenues resulting from 
privatization experienced a significant increase in the late 1990, peaking in 1998 at 
over US 100 $ billion.  
 
As expected, industrial countries such as US and Canada have carried out these 
activities to a lesser extent compared to developing countries. In the years from 
1984-1996, SOEs participation in industrial countries resulted in a decrease from 8.5 
to 5 percent of GDP while in the context of developing countries SOEs production 
had a gradual and steady decrease. Based on the study of Lopez-Calva and 
Sheshinski (1999), from 1980 until 1997, SOEs activities proportional to GDP 
showed a decrease from 11-5! percent in middle-income countries and from 15-3!
percent in low-income countries. However, the scenario was more aggressive in the 
developing countries as unemployment became rampant. In middle-income 
economies SOE employment decreased from 13-2!percent of the total employment 
and finally, in the low-income economies, it went down from 20 to 9!percent. These 
numbers encompass regional differences in both size and economic importance of 
the state owned production.  
 
In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, a few states have a gradual SOEs eradication 
strategy. Up until the current times, African privatization activities has only been 
notable in a few states while state owned production constitutes over 15!percent of 
the region’s GDP. On the other hand, in Asia, several states have not aggressively 
pursued any privatization strategy. For example, China is still in the early stages of 
privatization and has only, in recent times, allowed the privatization of stated owned 
enterprises with a significant concentration on the largest ones. India has primarily 
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ignored privatization as based on a report, 43!percent of the country’s capital stock is 
state-owned. However, based on multinationals and private equity funds in the 
country, it seems that state owned enterprises will have a shorter life than expected 
although contrary to this expectation various governments in the region still opt for 
controlling their assets in the energy, telecommunications, transportation and 
banking sectors.  
 
As evidenced by the results of Kikeri’s (1999) study, the movement towards 
privatization is slow in some Asian regions, which leave ample control to 
administrators. SOEs were reported to contribute 20!percent of GDP and 5!percent of 
employment. On the other hand, the urgent movement towards privatization of SOE 
in Central Asia, Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union resulted in the voucher-
based mass privatization strategies. In addition, Bolivia and Zambia have been 
reported to pool equity and distribute them to citizens in a non-voucher variation of 
privatization.  
 
Other countries have made use of discounted public offerings to garner worker 
participation in privatization, the case for broad-based privatization strategies: 
 
A.  Politically popular 
 
The broad-based ownership strategies attempt to spread share ownership to the whole 
population and including particular parts of the population such as the poor or the 
ethnic minority. 
 
! ! ! !
102!
!
Privatization is generally hindered owing to the popular belief that its benefits are 
only leveraged by the powerful few or the foreigners but through share ownership, 
policy makers and legislators have the political veneer to create reforms convincing 
resistant legislative entities and due to broad based ownerships resulting in major 
public participation during privatization, it provides support for a sustainable agenda. 
 
B.  More redistributive 
 
Contrary to traditional privatization methods, broad based ownership programs 
enable governments to resolve concerns regarding wealth distribution through 
voucher’s, discounted shares, and limited participation in collective investment 
programs to low-income groups.  
 
For instance, in the context of Malaysia, a collective investment program is carried 
out to redistribute wealth to a poor and unrepresented ethnic group. Also, in Korea, 
where public offerings are made, low-income groups are offered deep discounts on 
share purchase. The vouchers’ impact on incomes is quite significant as evident in 
Czech Republic and Mongolia where the market value of vouchers are received by 
every participant with half the annual per capita income. 
 
C.  Helps capital market development 
 
Majority of the under-developed countries are unable to make use of public offerings 
due to weak or no capital markets. Broad-based ownership programs carry out its 
role in developing and developing the capital markets and related institutions.  These 
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strategies offer citizens the right to share ownership and encourage trading, savings, 
and an investment environment. Voucher based programs generally lead to the 
establishment of mutual funds offerings risk wary citizens the chance to invest in 
various portfolios. Share sales and trading among the funds lead to secondary trading 
within equity markets and initial public offerings of state-owned equity may lead to 
the effective deepening of capital markets. 
 
D. Voucher-based programs Voucher programs 
 
This type of programs are rampant in the Czech Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Romania and Russia and are popular to policy makers due to its simplification and 
acceleration of the privatization of various SOEs, resulting in the attraction of foreign 
and local investors. Vouchers were first introduced as a tool to facilitate privatization 
programmes, although they are also useful in various kinds of programmes. For 
instance, they can be used in forcing social and political entities to distribute wide 
ownership or to use privatization benefits for the betterment of the disadvantaged 
portion of the population.  
 
In the context of Estonia, trade sales are now used with voucher auctions as voucher-
based programs normally distribute certificates or coupons to participants to the 
programs. When the participants exchange them for shares in SOEs in financial 
intermediaries, these will bid their accumulated vouchers for SOEs shares and in 
majority of cases, it is allowed to trade vouchers for cash freely.  
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The extent of privatization differs from one nation to another and as the assets 
controlled by the state lead to inefficiency, both unemployment and low 
productivity/efficiency gives credence to the importance of privatization and related 
information for the development of future programs. This information also plays a 
part in the development of markets and therefore, differing strategies of privatization 
are now being utilized in least developed nations which may help them to initiate 
their stalled programs. 
 
Several established theories, the property rights theory, the principal agent theory, 
the public choice theory, and competition theory (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988) amongst 
others, predict privatization will bring improvement on firm performance. These 
theories are a portion of a big body of economic knowledge of ownership and role 
for government ownership of productive resources (Megginson & Netter, 2001).  
 
The reason behind the idea of privatization may encapsulate any or all of the 
following; financial, political and economic motivations. Based on the study by 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988), financial motivations are considered as revenues 
acquired by the country as a result of the sale of ex-SOEs or SOEs and the benefits 
arise from the eradication of government subsidies from the said enterprises. 
 
The revenues acquired through privatization eventually contribute to the 
minimization of the public deficit of the economies that started the privatization 
programme. Politically, privatization of SOEs is justified as the state lacks the skills 
in effectively managing public enterprises; the enterprises have ambiguous goals and 
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the market’s great appropriation of resources to privatized firms. In addition, 
privatization usually brings about the inflow of foreign investment to the country.  
 
Hence, when privatization is carried out, it is akin to promoting what is termed as 
‘popular capitalism’. As for the economic motivations of privatization, this hinges 
upon the effective performance of private firms compared to public ones. The 
advocates of privatizations are supported by the findings in many studies concerning 
private ownership’s eventual result in greater levels of productivity growth, greater 
efficiency and better firm performance (Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001).  
 
Various authors have supported that a great increase in performance has been 
observed in privatized firms (Megginson et al., 1994; D’Souza & Megginson, 1999; 
Wei et al. 2003; Boubakri, 2005; Denzin, 2005). However evidence has also been 
forwarded about privatization’s inability to lead to systematic enhancements of 
allocative or productive efficiency (Pestieau & Tulkens, 1993; Vickers & Yarrow, 
1988; and Martin & Parker, 1997). Moreover, four alternative theories are used to 
expound on the higher effectiveness of private ownership compared to public 
ownership as well as the economic efficiency gains that are expected to arise 
resulting from the transfer of ownership and control of assets from public to private 
investors. These theories are described in detail in the next sections. 
 
3.3.1  The Property Rights Theory 
 
The rationale behind the property rights theory has its basis on the incentive systems 
that are attributed to private enterprise. Property rights often influence incentives and 
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individual decision-making units and this is the reason why private enterprises are 
more superior to their public counterparts even though both are operating under 
similar profitable conditions (Shehinski & Lopez-Calva, 2003). This superior 
performance originates from the notion of ownership in private firms as property 
rights theorists posit that public owners is not as efficient as private ones (McKean, 
1972; Furuboth & Pejovich, 1972).  
 
This particular argument is attributed to three factors which are ownership 
specialization, risk bearing and ownership transferability of incentive and monitoring 
systems resulting in various factor combinations and therefore varying results. In the 
context of private enterprises, property rights can be transferred without much fuss 
but in public enterprises, this is not the case. Transferability of property rights means 
both costs and rewards of economic activities are directly received by the owner of 
the property rights and it provides comparative advantage effects through the 
development of ownership specialization activities whereby owners consider their 
valued use as inputs (Davies, 1971). The scenario can be further clarified by stating 
that in private ownership, rewards and costs are directly associated with the person 
taking the risk while in public ownership the owners do not bear the brunt of the risk 
and specialization.  
 
According to property rights theory, the distinction in the incentives between public 
and private enterprises may also explain their relative efficiency (Furuboth & 
Pejovich, 1972; McKean, 1972). In other words, private owners face incentives that 
make them monitor their managers and employees; incentives that motivate them to 
be more effective and to be disinclined to get involved in behavior that goes against 
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the maximization of the owner’s profit (Yoder et al., 1991). The effectiveness of 
private ownership of firms in comparison to public ownership can be categorized 
into five; profit-centered objectives, flexible implementation, incentive plans for 
employees, budget constraints and external control.  
 
The property rights theory asserts that the more attenuated property rights are, the 
lower will be the efficiency of enterprise production as attenuation decreases the 
rewards and penalty systems that are imperative in cost controlling behavior. In sum, 
the theory holds that private enterprises are more efficient production wise compared 
to their public counterparts because the public enterprises are not vulnerable to 
external forces in the likes of takeovers and mergers. 
 
3.3.2  The Principal Agent Theory 
 
The theory stresses on the distinction in the tools used for monitoring and the 
incentives which are offered to both public and private managers acting as 
shareholders’ agents with welfare maximization for the public managers and profit 
maximization for the private managers (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988; Bos & Peter, 
1991). 
 
The theory originates from the information asymmetries of the public enterprise and 
the reasons for a private enterprise’s efficient production (i.e. the presence of 
bankruptcy/takeover or shareholder control). The notion of agency appears when a 
principal (a shareholder), uses their delegating powers to hand over decisions 
regarding the use of their property rights to agents (managers). The agency issue 
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comes up when a distinction is made between ownership and control of enterprise, 
on the basis that owners and managers have differing objectives. In other words, the 
manager’s actions may not always be in consideration of the owner’s interest, which 
negatively affects the performance of the firm (Alexander, 2001). On the other hand, 
the principal is desirous of the agent to act in consideration of their interest but 
he/she is not well informed of the complete scenario and the agent’s behavior behind 
closed doors (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). A monitoring issue thus arises which bars 
the principal from telling the agent about the correct action to take. In addition, 
because the principal is unaware of the agent’s action, this creates problems for the 
former in finding out the incentive structure for the agent so that he may act for the 
maximum benefit of the principal. In other words, the principal-agent theory attempts 
to find out the optimal information issue. The major issues the public firms face are 
linked to both information incentives and commitment. Information imbalance 
appears due to the agent’s distinct sets of information, which they find valuable in 
order to have the upper hand. This imbalance leads to the principal’s monitoring 
problem, as it is not possible for them to observe their agent’s activities. 
 
Moreover, this information imbalance results in the negative selection and ethical 
issues that needs different incentive systems for their solution in private and public 
sector owing to their distinct performance levels. Adverse selection and ex-post costs 
are problematic to both public and private firms, as both will maximize agency cost 
in the two contexts. When this happens, the basic effective design for the agent is 
such that he acts in consideration of the principal’s interests. This encapsulates 
optimal contractual agreements and monitoring techniques. In the studies carried out 
by Yarrow and Vickers (1998) and Bos and Peters (1991) principal agent theory are 
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used in their application of privatization cases. In the context of a public firm, the 
government is the principal while in the private firm; the shareholders are the 
principals with the managers acting as their agents in both contexts.  
 
Based on principal-agent theory, principal and agents working in private firms are 
more knowledgeable of what is going on in the firm and the market compared to 
their public counterparts.  In addition, managerial effort is reported to be greater in 
the former owing to the profit incentive at work and efficient monitoring. While 
managers in private firms are selected for their efficient running of the business, 
agents in public firms or SOEs are most often than not chosen for their political 
skills, their methods of addressing political concern and how good they are at asking 
for assistance.   
Two effects have been noted in the shift of ownership from public to private sector 
and these are; a shift in the objective from one laden with welfare objectives to one 
that has profit maximization objectives and a shift in the incentive structure by 
relating reward to performance level in private ownership. The inevitable shift 
towards profit maximization may encourage higher prices and a foregone locative 
efficiency although firms are notably marked with increased operational or 
productive efficiency. Contrary to popular belief, agency problems are not confined 
to public firms. Agents managing SOEs are commonly called bureaucrats who are 
out to maximize the utility of resources while those managing private firms are called 
managers whose sole objective is to maximize profits; the difference between the 
two lies in the manager’s objectives and in their social welfare maximization 
(Shapiro & Wliing, 1990; Vickers & Yarrow, 1991). The question lies on whether 
government objectives are sold off to the private sector through an idea action 
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technique. According to Sappington and Stiglitz (1987), there are certain conditions 
that the market can go through, as there are no suitable contracts covering the issue 
in public enterprises. 
 
In the contracts between private firms, the government is usually the third party who 
makes sure the enforcement is carried out. On the other hand, public enterprises’ 
contracts with the government lack commitment, as there is no third party. This is 
further elaborated by Yarrow (1986) who emphasized on the significance of the shift 
towards privatization in light of market structure, competition and regulatory policy 
governing the shift. He argues that the market as a control mechanism is not a perfect 
one and therefore, incentive failure often appears when monitoring enterprises. In 
sum, privatization is the answer to the principal-agent issue and it creates an 
informational hindrance between public managers and ministers, which leads to 
increased efficiency. 
 
3.3.3  The Public Choice Theory 
 
The theory follows the bureaucratic approach where the public firms are viewed as 
tools that improve the utility functions of politicians; for instance, for increasing 
votes and budgets (Niskanen, 1972; Buchanan, 1983; Boycko et al., 1996). 
Advocates of the theory believe that government sectors’ aims are maximization of 
budget, risk aversion, employment and investment instead of maximization of 
profits. A model of privatization was put forward by Boycko et al., (1996) which 
falls within the ambit of the theory.  
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The model is designed to reveal that privatization will result in effective restructuring 
of public firms that are inefficiently producing at higher levels with the aims of 
maximizing employment; efficiency is only possible when cash flow rights shifts 
from government to private hands. If this happens then it will be almost impossible 
for the government to commit bribery by offering subsidies in exchange for 
inefficient production levels. In other words, eliminating the ‘soft budget constraint’ 
is imperative for performance enhancement. In addition, proponents of the theory 
believe that both politicians and state bureaucrats are characterized as self-serving 
entities maximizing their interests as opposed to the public interests. This view is 
supported by Niskanen (1972) and Buchanan et al., (1983) among others.  
 
Government failure in running SOEs owing to self-interested individuals is rampant 
in the public firms. Moreover, the agents or managers of these firms are not 
controlled by market considerations and it is easier for them to request for subsidies 
and disguise inefficient management with the fulfillment of social goals, most 
particularly in the developing countries. 
 
There are empirical evidences that point out to the fact that public enterprises are 
inefficient because of the politicians’ hand in running them as evident in excess 
labor, excess wages, imperfect input costs, ineffective marketing techniques and 
lower prices. Some proponents argue that politicians are only focused on getting 
votes and hence, they maximize employment. Owing to information imbalance 
between bureaucrats and the public, the former knows more about the results of 
budgetary change and the public is unable to monitor government spending while 
increased employment is experienced. According the proponents of the theory, this is 
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allowed to happen as government intervention in every aspect is considered effective 
because government is considered as a benevolent guardian to the masses and 
furthermore, the identification of efficient policy outcomes comes at no cost 
(Krueger, 1993). An argument against this notion cites the developing economies 
policies, which are imposed solely for strategic development (El-Naggar, 1989).  
 
The above scenarios leave bureaucrats with a lot of room to maneuver to impact 
private economic activity through their authority of providing permits and licenses; a 
phenomenon termed as rent seeking, which has been notably increasing in the public 
enterprises management. In consequence, rent seeking is evident in the form of 
lobbying efforts, activities to get a hand at decision-making and strategies to move in 
or out of the affected activity (Buchanan, 1983). Because of this, privatization has 
become recourse to government / public firms in the early 1980s. In addition, the 
neoclassical counterrevolution theory stressed on the government’s inability to 
provide goods and hence, the solution was to privatize markets where the state would 
then  facilitate production through the establishment and monitoring of institutions.  
  
Privatization involves the state’s role as a third party to the arrangement between 
private parties. The idea of privatization has been supported by the significance of 
contracting and regulating quality, healthy and ethical competition and the innovative 
potential of private firms (Shleifer, 1998). 
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3.3.4  Competition Theory 
 
Competitiveness is a central concern of both emerging and transitional economy as 
characterized by both advanced and developing countries respectively, in an 
increasingly open and integrated world economy. Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva 
(2003), suggested that, firms that belong to competitive sectors, not to utilities, show 
higher improvements in performance and efficiency. In order words, privatized firms 
during periods that coincided with expansive economic cycles also show larger 
performance improvements (Villalonga, 2000).  
 
Mostly privatization of state owned monopolies frequently occurs simultaneously 
alongside deregulation, in other words it means policies to increase the 
competitiveness of the market. This increase in competition can be the greatest 
incentive to improvements in efficiency and productivity. Conversely, it is 
noteworthy to understand that privatization does not necessarily increase 
competition; but mainly depends on the nature of the market. For instance there is no 
competition in water. But, there is competition in telecoms transportation etc. 
 
The motives behind many privatizations do not only aim at the sale of public capital, 
but it also includes various measures to increase competition. They (Vickers & 
Yarrow, 1988) argue that these measures may exponentially contribute to improving 
performance in a great deal as much as possible even more than the change of 
ownership. Previous empirical studies revealed a positive relationship between 
competition and increase in the sales of privatized firms (Megginson et al., 1994). To 
cap it up, the transfer of ownership from the public sector to the private does not 
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necessarily guarantee that privatized firms will be more entrepreneurial and 
innovative; there may be need for integrating competition for this to occur 
(Ramamurti, 2000). 
 
(Michael, 1990) postulates that after privatization, firms in more highly competitive 
industries increase their level of corporate entrepreneurship to a greater extent than 
firms in less competitive environments. In line with this some studies overwhelming 
agreed that the internationally competitive industry will increase income and quality 
of life for its employees, later expanding its horizon of influence to suppliers and 
other related firms and industries. In addition, Michael (1990) submits that in the 
conventional wisdom, competitiveness is productivity and, in business terms, 
productivity is in turn the value of the output produced by a unit of labor or capital. 
A firm that enhances the quality of its output will increase its competitiveness. 
Intuitively a firm that uses labor or capital more efficiently to produce output will be 
more competitive and highly productive. Additionally state or national governments 
can complement the effort of firms in their quest to increase the worth of what they 
produce through laws, regulations, institutions and a vibrant strategic allocation of 
national resources, all of which can contribute to a more favorable economic 
environment that allows firms to thrive well and be more productive. 
 
Competition theory, as it is known, one of the important factors for privatization’s 
success. This directly affects the firms’ behavior. Under competitive market 
conditions, private and social objectives are more closely associated, so that private 
ownership is likely to have an advantage (Vickers & Yarrow 1991). The reduction in 
government ownership is not the only factor that improves the performance of 
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privatized firms, but also competitive environment and capital market disciplines 
increase the efficiency of these firms. Competition can greatly improve monitoring 
possibilities and, hence, incentives for productive efficiency. Product market 
competition is important for performance not only for familiar reasons of allocative 
efficiency, but it also enhances productive efficiency (Vickers & Yarrow 1991). 
However, when competition increases, private ownership offers incentives and 
motivations for managers to proactively adopt profit-maximizing behavior, whereas 
this factor might be missing in their SOEs Counterparts. 
 
3.4  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF PRIVATIZATION 
 
The empirical evidence can be divided into two distinctive groups that is the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic evidence. From the empirical point of view it 
could be classified into two classes of effects; first, the effect of the microeconomic 
of privatization, because it is more common and second, the effect of the 
macroeconomics of privatization. 
 
3.3.1   Microeconomic Effects of Privatization 
 
Most of the empirical studies on privatization recur to simple microeconomic 
performance indicators; particularly they focus on changes in labor productivity or in 
profitability (Megginson & Netter, 2001). Only a very few set of authors investigate 
social costs and benefits of privatization, and particularly their impact on prices and 
redistribution of welfare: examples of such authors are Galal (1994); Newbery and 
Pollitt (1997); Lopez-dze-Silanes (1997). In accordance with the line of the trend 
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worldwide, the pace of empirical works on privatization has also increased; 
notwithstanding with a microeconomic orientation that emphasizes efficiency gains 
(La Porta & D’Souza & Megginson, 1998; Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; Dewenter & 
Malatesta, 2001). 
 
At the microeconomic level, the empirical evidence strongly revealed that 
privatization has positive relationship with profitability and efficiency. It was also 
evident that capital expenditures tend to increase after privatization. However the, 
evidence on firm-level employment is mixed – although for large firms employment 
seems to rise after divestiture. In an attempt to measure the effect, in terms of 
estimated total surplus in a counterfactual basis, welfare increases in almost all the 
cases under analysis.  We will see analyses of some important results of two authors 
in detail (Galal, 1994; Jones, 1990). The authors presented results for twelve 
privatized firms in four different countries. The methodology used is counterfactual 
and makes projections of the performance of the firms under two scenarios, the 
privatized scenario and a hypothetical “public ownership scenario”. Comparisons 
between those two situations measure the changes in welfare. The outcome of their 
study shows that in all the cases examined, except the net effect of privatization on 
welfare is positive. Astonishingly, workers welfare was tremendously improved in 
all cases investigated. 
 
As it has been established in the theoretical part above the effect of privatization on 
consumer welfare is responsive to market structure. These studies show a well-
pronounced positive effect of privatization on total welfare without negative 
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distributive consequences, (i.e. the distribution of the gains, were not compromised) 
although this result is determined by the partial equilibrium nature of the analysis. 
 
Notwithstanding there is a piece of proof of the benefits from privatization in a small 
country, like, Costa Rica (Vickers & Yarrow, 1991). The first benefit reported is the 
elimination of the cost that these money-losing companies had for the economy.  An 
estimate of the net present value (1998 prices) of the accumulated losses of the four 
companies – that is the cost for the country of the Convention for a Democratic 
South Africa (CODESA) experience, reaches an amount of USD 971.1 million, that 
is to about nine percent of Costa Rica's GDP in 1998  (Chamberlain, 2009). Since the 
private management took over, these firms have paid taxes on the profits generated, 
for about USD 10 million in total (cumulative). After being money-losing 
companies, their profitability has reached 12 percent per year (CATSA), 6.2 percent 
(FERTICA) and 7.1 percent (CEMPASA). In the case of CATSA, the capacity 
utilization increased from 57.1 percent to 92.1 percent, even after new investments in 
capacity.  
 
Also there was sales increase of 46 percent for (CEMPASA) between 1990 and 
1993. Sales per labor- which can be proxy as a measure of productivity, increased to 
92 percent in the case of FERTICA, while ALUNASA’s sales increased to 470 
percent in nine years (1989-98). Although they are firms in competitive sectors yet 
they are still protected by regulations and trade limitations, which have improved 
profitability and efficiency. This type of study focuses on one specific country and 
analyzes evidence across industries. A good example of most consistent evidence is 
that for Mexico (LaPorta & López-De-Silanes, 1999). Further earlier work by 
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Barberis (1996), provided evidence of the efficiency of privatization of retail shops 
and small businesses in Russia.  This fact was confirmed by Earle (1994), which 
show similar evidence for small businesses in Central Europe. LaPorta and López-
De-Silanes (1999), study, performance analysis of 218 enterprises in 26 different 
sectors, privatized between 1983 and 1991 was investigated. One of the most striking 
qualities of this work is that the authors decompose the changes in profitability 
observed into price increases, labor reduction, and productivity gains. Also, changes 
in taxes paid by the firms are quantified. 
 
This analysis provides clue to two criticisms usually put forward against 
privatization: i) that profitability of the firms increases at the expense of society 
through price increases, and ii) that profitability experienced in privatization comes 
at the expense of workers, whose labor contracts are less generous, and stand the risk 
of layoffs. To disabuse the views of the antagonists of privatization, available results 
show that profitability, measured by the ratio of operating income to sales, increased 
by 24 percentage points. In addition to this, it is also shown that deregulated markets 
bring about a faster convergence of the performance indicators of the privatized 
firms towards the industry-matched control groups. When competitive and non-
competitive sectors are compared, not only that the former has higher increases in 
profitability as compared to the latter, but those changes are related to higher gains in 
efficiency and lower price increases. The privatized firms went from receiving a 
positive subsidy from the government to a net tax payment after the sale. 
 
In order to review the industry-specific effects, therefore, increase in profitability 
associated with changes in the macro environment is well taken care of, in the form 
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of controlled variables. Beside this a regression of analysis, whose aim to identify the 
relationship between role of market power and deregulation in determining 
privatization outcomes, which was measured by the performance indicators were 
constructed. There were three deregulation indicators were used, these were; the 
existence of state-imposed price and quantity controls, barriers to foreign trade, and 
restrictions to foreign ownership.  
 
To understand the role of market structure LaPorta and López-De-Silanes (1999) 
used a dummy variable that was assigned the value of 1 if the “privatization 
prospectus” described the firm as monopolistic or oligopolistic, and zero otherwise. 
The outcome of the regression results shows that less regulated markets make 
possible the “draw near” of privatized firms’ performance indicators as far as market 
benchmark is concerned. However the data was not in support of the view that more 
concentrated markets bring about the firms to increase profitability by increasing 
prices and lowering quantities. Hence, market power dummy was not significant and 
therefore failed to explain the change in performance indicators. 
 
According to Smith (1996), in their study in Slovenia, he uses a countrywide time 
series data with privatized firms from 1989 to 1992. The results, however, revealed 
that there exists a positive relationship between the private ownership and 
performance of the enterprise. A further study shows that when the effects of 
different types of ownership were examined, foreign ownership has a significant 
positive effect on performance.  
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This size of the firm has negative relationship between the ownership of the firm and 
performance of the enterprise. As it was reported in that study the employee owned 
firms perform well when they are small, but the effect of this type of ownership 
diminishes with size. Employee owned firms do better when foreign ownership is 
also present in the same firm. Some studies of privatization covering cross-country 
evidence will now be discussed, starting with a pioneering work by Megginson 
(1994); researchers have been using the data available for publicly traded companies 
that have been privatized to analyze different performance indicators on a cross-
country basis. 
 
Evidence shall be discussed here from Megginsonet (1994) analyzes data for 61 
companies from 18 countries and 32 industries that were privatized between 1961 
and 1990 through public offerings. D’Souza and Megginson (1998), in their study; 
they compared pre- and post-privatization performance of 78 companies from 25 
countries including 10 companies that were privatized between 1990 and 1994 
through public offering. Their sample included 14 firms from the banking industry, 
21 utilities and 10 from telecommunications. The largest data set was used in 
Claessens and Djankov (1998), which consist of 6.300 manufacturing firms in seven 
Central and Eastern European Countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia). The performance indicators that 
are analyzed in their study are related to mean and median levels of profitability, 
sales, operating efficiency, leverage, capital expenditures, and employment. Often no 
controls were constructed as to ascertain whether the markets are competitive or non-
competitive, regulated or unregulated, and partial or full privatization. Available 
evidence shows that there was a better performance of the firms after privatization. 
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This is in agreement with the previous studies discussed above. Profitability 
increases considerably for different specifications. An appealing result was recorded 
in Boubakri and Cosset (1998), in that profitability increases more in regulated (or 
non-competitive) industries, while operating efficiency has little or no increase in 
those cases. It is, therefore become obvious that higher profitability does not 
necessarily mean higher efficiency and the connection between the two comes from 
the market structure.  
 
The substantiation is in full support of the proposal that there is a certain degree of 
market power being employed by those firms. Moreover capital spending 
(investment) systematically increases in all cases examined, reflecting effect of 
growth and the restructuring that takes place after the sale. As well as increases in 
employment in all the cases investigated, including developing countries, evidence 
on employment seems to be contradictory with the findings of LaPorta and López-
De-Silanes (1999).  
 
There are two likelihood answers to this discrepancy; first, the fact that the cross-
country studies analyzed use only data for firms that were sold via public offerings 
generates a non-negligible selection bias. One would expect those firms to be the 
ones with higher potential for profitability. Second, the country-specific study 
includes data from three years before privatization for all the firms, of which there is 
probability that the analysis may be capturing the elimination of labor redundancy 
before the sale.  Nevertheless in all the cases, evidence shows that fully privatized 
firms perform better than partially privatized ones.  This fact is also confirmed by 
! ! ! !
122!
!
Frydman (1997, 1998), in his study of economic transition also Claessens and 
Djankov (1998). 
 
3.3.2   Macroeconomic Effects of Privatization 
 
Unfortunately various discussions by the available literature on the macroeconomic 
effects of privatization are not as robust from the theoretical standpoint as that in 
microeconomics. There are few theoretical models that connect the restructuring at 
the microeconomic level such as privatization. There are, however, some country 
studies that presented data on the interaction between privatization transactions and 
macroeconomic variables.  
 
The most important cause why this work has not been done comprehensively is the 
complexity involved in isolating or distinguishing the effect of privatization from 
other events that have an influence on aggregate measures. The first interaction 
observed between privatization and macroeconomics was as a result of the macro 
instability, especially in the area of large budget deficits, which tend to accelerate 
privatization. The effect of poor public sector financial status on the willingness to 
reform and on the political acceptability of such reorganization results in a clear 
relation between higher public deficits and faster public sector restructuring.  
 
This is in line with the evidence shown in López-De- Silaneset et al. (1997), among 
some others. According to the record, Privatization database of The World Bank, 
data on SOE activity is consistently agreed with the share of SOE employment to 
GDP, analysis revealed that in low-income countries share of SOE to that of 
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employment GDP decrease from around 20 percent to 10 percent. Surprisingly a 
radical fall in the case of middle -income economies was observed which is currently 
below 10 percent, after attaining more than 14 percent. 
 
 There are various evidences supporting the argument that privatization may have 
some contributions to the reduction of the burden on public financing. The result of 
the post privatization shows that after reform, low-income countries were 
successfully eliminate net subsidies to public enterprises on the average, from almost 
six percent to only 0.5 percent of GDP.  
 
In the case of middle income countries, SOEs were expected to show a surplus in 
their operation, this giant stride record could be traced to the reforms of management 
and introduction of competition, as well as for the fact that the firms deemed “best” 
are those that have remained in the control of the government. Good examples of 
those “best” firms are oil companies and natural monopolies, like electric utilities.  
Interestingly, trend in fiscal deficit is plausible although still negative, and largely 
due to the late reformers. On a general note, the most reasonable trend is that of the 
deficit in upper middle-income economies in which the most hard-liner reformers 
can be found, examples of such are Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Malaysia.  
 
One important effect observed in all income groups is that on the financial sector 
development (Demirguc & Levine, 1994; Mclindon, 1996), their stock market seems 
not to be stable. Whereas, there is a direct opposite effect in high-income countries 
where the capitalization of the stock market remains basically stable, it was generally 
viewed that for low-income countries the impact of the reform on the indicator of 
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capital market development is considered highly reasonable. A positive trend was 
observed for all of them. With the advent of the reform, upper middle-income 
countries have also reached levels of capitalization, which have similarity of those in 
high-income economies (around 55 percent of GDP). 
 
A fairly high difference between the lower and middle-income class, was 
experienced, Lower middle-income economies are around 25 percent, and the low-
income group is about 16 percent. Unexpectedly, unemployment, conversely, shows 
a very unpredictable pattern across countries. Insistent reformers show an increase in 
the unemployment rate, as well as the late and less aggressive reformers.  Examples 
of the aggressive reformers are Argentina and Poland, where the employment rates 
shoot up to nine and eight percentage points, respectively. France and Hungary 
persistently witnessed unemployment growth of 3.5 and 3 percent, respectively, 
during the same period. Hence it is impossible to draw any concrete conclusion in 
terms of privatization on the overall unemployment rate. By and large available 
evidence indicates that structural reform has in general induced positive changes in 
key macroeconomic variables. Although not all these positive changes can be 
ascribed to privatization nor its specific contribution has been known, we can 
conclude that both the public sector's financial health and an, enabling 
macroeconomic environment have been fuelled by the reduction of SOEs activity 
around the world.  This eventually has also led to the foundation of a better 
environment for private investment to thrive well as well to compete as expected. 
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3.5 EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION 
 
Privatization is often considered as a way to enhance SOEs performance. Many 
studies conducted a comparison pre- and post-privatization performance measures in 
an attempt to examine the effect of privatization on their financial and operating 
performance (Megginson, 1994; Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; D’Souza & Megginson, 
1999). 
  
Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994) were the pioneering authors to conduct 
such comparison and to publish a study using privatization. Therefore, it is known as 
the MNR methodology (Megginson & Netter, 2001). The effect of privatization on 
the privatized firm’s performance has been gauged through the examination of the 
indicators of the firm’s performance. These include profitability, efficiency, labor 
productivity, investment, outputs, dividends, exports and financial leverage. The 
phenomenal performance noted stems from the fact that once the private sector gets a 
handle on SOE, profitability is given top priority. In addition, privatization 
frequently brings about concentration of ownership structure in the firm and the 
appointment of experienced and qualified personnel.  
 
Nevertheless, SOEs were characterized by high inefficiency and slow growth, 
excessive bureaucratic issues which prevent quick decision-making and innovative 
changes. Moreover, the constant government political intervention along with 
frequent administration changes became an issue. The labor trade union was also 
reported to over control the SOEs (Veljnovski, 1987). 
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Following the successful privatization of BT in 1984 with the help of Thatcher’s 
administration, it took the status of an economic policy that is often employed to 
minimize the financial pressure on the government budget and the concern to stop 
SOEs from failing when it comes to the inefficient employment of resources 
(whether financial or operational). Whether or not privatization could translate into 
wealth creation for investors who buy the spread and acquisition of shares 
ownership, restructuring and refocusing of SOEs economic aims and preventing 
influence of trade labor unions, will bring about maximization of operational and 
financial performance is yet to be known.  
 
The challenge in the interpretation of indicators (both operational and financial) of 
performance of SOEs after privatization, in and outside the business environment 
economy should be stressed. For instance, negative financial performance may go 
hand in hand with great internal efficiency if the performance stems from 
government policy or of price control. Nevertheless, since SOEs often respond to 
expected market failures, maximization of profit and other related measures might 
not be considered as an accurate description of their negative performance over time 
(Ramanadham, 1993). 
 
This study contends that the SOEs failure may stem from the increasing demand for 
goods and services that are faced by their steady but slow development to reach 
maximum productivity movement as opposed to the overall shift production function 
to satisfy the demands and steer clear of negative performance (operational and 
financial). 
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According to Yarrow (1986), competition and accountability are more effective 
compared to privatization in the promotion of both efficiencies (financial and 
operational) although this contention is limited to a small number of companies in 
the U.K. On the other hand, Ramanadham (1993) claimed that privatization may 
have a higher level of success within a short period of time either through the rise of 
stock market price or in the degree of efficiency or productivity which would bring 
about instantaneous economic growth and development. On the contrary, failure of 
privatization leads to the perception of its unattractiveness. It is therefore more 
feasible to re-engineer SOEs by transforming them and by establishing a transparent 
regulatory framework to counteract the failure when the privatization objectives are 
not satisfied as expected, to keep the firms operational and financial performance up 
to par following privatization. 
 
Another contention along this line was provided by Megginson et al. (1994), who 
provided evidence from the theoretical and empirical perspective and stated that 
private firms will always be better in performance compared to SOEs as privatization 
leads to increased financial and operational efficiencies regardless of the business 
environment. In addition, the privatization leads to the promotion of economic 
efficiency and public confidence (one of the main property right theory’s objectives) 
in an industrial capitalism and hence SOEs should be sold off prior to the realization 
of efficiency gains. He further added that the privatization success turns business 
attitude towards ownership, economic responsibility and the enhancement of 
corporate performance. It also enables the government to play a key role of 
regulating the business environment leaving the investors and individuals to be firm 
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owners as they will perform better when faced with limited resources and market 
forces. 
 
According to literature on privatization, not all privatization programs carried out 
around the world are successful . However, it is important to note that some of these 
successes are not achieved entirely as a result of privatization. As Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) have shown, governments efficiently restructure at least some firms 
before selling them. For example Japan National Railway reduced its workers by 
approximately 200,000 and was split into seven separate rail companies before any 
share was sold to investors. If government restructures firms and improves their 
performance before privatization, then improvements cannot be attributed to change 
in ownership. Rather, the political impetus behind privatization first impels 
governments firms to operate more efficiently. If this is the case, then what is the role 
of privatization? One is of the view that while policy changes (in the form of 
restructuring) can improve performance of government owned enterprises; such 
improvements may dissipate overtime without the added discipline of private 
ownership. There is therefore the need for privatization not only to achieve efficiency 
gains but also to sustain them in the face of changing political, social and economic 
circumstances. 
 
Many privatization studies showed positive financial results from ownership 
structure changes in SOEs. A case in point, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) analysed 
firm performance among 79 newly privatized firms in 21 developing countries with 
which most are characterized as middle income economies including Bangladesh, 
Jamaica, Pakistan, Nigeria and the Philippines from 1980-1992. The study concluded 
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that at an average rate, the firms showed significant increases in the factors such as 
profitability, operating efficiency, capital investment spending, output and 
employment and dividends, and they also showed a decrease in leverage. 
Specifically, in Bangladesh, 7 among 10 loss-making manufacturing firms revealed 
increased profitability, output, sales, and capability of use and labor productivity 
along with decrease in unit costs.  
 
It was also notable that firm privatization in developing countries has led to net 
income sales and net income stemming from assets by 100 percent and 30 percent 
respectively (Boubakri & Cosset, 1998). In addition, net profits improved from sales 
by 25 percent and net income assets by 20 percent from initial public offerings of 85 
companies from 28 countries. On this basis, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) stressed on 
the privatization advantages to the firm’s private investors who possess high 
motivations to bring about efficiency and in turn, enhance the overall organization. 
Furthermore, in developing countries, studies concerning performance in pre- and 
post-privatization, documented their improvements. Despite the fact that these 
studies report hopeful results, some other studies show negative results owing to the 
strict requirements of success such political risks and the fit of local partner. In 
particular, more than 40 percent of cooperative activities between private 
multinational companies and public companies, in the context of Central Eastern 
Europe, did not succeed.  
 
In the context of these mixed findings regarding privatization, its effect appears to 
hinge on factors that are firm-specific like external factors and those that are external 
to the firm with the former including resource allocations (human resource along 
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with innovative technology) and ownership transfer which can all ensure successful 
result. Meanwhile, external factors refer to those factors that are not present within 
the boundaries of organization; these include the competitive environment, 
regulation and capital markets. For example, the development of stock markets is an 
external factor which reinforces and provides the required environment for the 
transfer of a significant amount of government assets to the public and urges the 
creation of information and balance among private investors.  
 
In addition, a competitive industry is needed to ensure successful privatization as 
competition contributes to the privatized firm’s survival in terms of efficiency. 
Moreover, country’s characteristics may also impact privatization specifically, upon 
organizational outcomes. In other words, countries with fair regulatory and legal 
systems are capable of instilling higher confidence in private investors when it comes 
to investing in privatized firms by guaranteeing ownership rights and allocation of 
assets.  
 
On the basis of the prior argument, it can be concluded that privatization has its 
advantages and disadvantages. Private firm’s investors can bring with them 
management skills and technology enabling the firm to collaborate with governments 
and other private parties. Nevertheless private investors’ partnership with the 
government may lead to a disagreement because of the differences in culture, 
experience, technology and management style that all lead to negative outcome of 
privatization. On the other hand, privatization may change the culture, structure, 
system, strategies of the organization and decision makers which may lead to 
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advantages and disadvantages according to how flexible the organization is and how 
it’s human resource is efficient when it comes to adaptation. 
 
In the context of the fiscal impact of privatization!government’s budget is affected by 
either the direct or indirect privatization at the macro level. In state ownership, it is 
basically the government who finances the operations by the provision of subsidies, 
lending and transference of capital.  In return, the public enterprises help increase 
government revenues by paying taxes, and through dividends and debt service 
payments (Gupta, 1999). Following privatization, there will be a halt to the flows 
between the public firm and government budget and the government will instead 
obtain sales proceeds and taxes from the profits of the newly privatized enterprise. 
Moreover, there are also several interactions among state enterprises, privatization 
and fiscal policy as public firms’ losses are made one of the fiscal problems; 
privatization is usually encouraged during fiscal crises. State enterprises produced an 
average deficit of 4 percent of GDP in Less Developing Counties (LDCs) in the later 
parts of the 1970 (Floyd, 1984). !
 
Additionally, fiscal crises bar the control over state enterprises and their losses 
through owing to the weakened administrative and monitoring role of the state. And 
also, state enterprises’ investment is basically targeted for budget cuts and without 
them, the product quality, the firm’s infrastructure and the services provided by these 
firms is negatively affected. These named factors leave a negative image to the 
companies and encourage the proponents and advocates of reform and privatization. 
Therefore, privatization is more often than not a result of a fiscal crisis (Fishlow, 
1990). Hence, it is logical to state that privatization is viewed to play a huge part in 
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fiscal solution (Pinhero & Schneider, 1995) by providing huge revenue that is 
utilized on a non-permanent basis to offset the deficit and to get rid of the 
government’s burden of subsidizing public enterprises that are facing losses. This 
shows that eradicating state subsidies to public firms creates a positive effect.  
 
In most cases, governments make use of revenues of privatized firms to minimize the 
stock of public debt. Eventually, privatization revenue is utilized as a tool of the 
government’s fiscal performance. Even though revenues are primarily used to 
minimize debt stock, instability in the fiscal performance imply that revenues are 
used to indirectly finance government’s current expenditures or to enable it to 
increase its borrowing capacity.  This can be clarified in the instance of Brazil who at 
one time tried to sustain the nominal value of its currency, which was overvalued at 
that time, through reserves and privatization. The potential fiscal advantages were 
eventually lost because the Brazilian government made use of the reserves to keep 
the currency’s status. Macedo (2000) shed light on the incident by stating that the 
possibility of the development of privatization revenues in the 1990s gave Brazil the 
needed time to sustain the nominal value of its currency until the crisis in 1998.  
 
In a similar scenario but in the context of Argentina, Mussa (2000) stated that 
privatization revenues in the 1990s were crucial for three of four years during that 
decade but although with their presence, the government did not succeed in 
generating fiscal surpluses required by the nation. Therefore, both governments 
(national and sub national) continued borrowing and consequently, the privatization 
revenues disappeared altogether with the currency crises coupled with the debt 
default in the year 2002. 
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Theoretical approaches to the fiscal impulse or what is well known as the revenue 
maximization approach to privatization are coupled with empirical ones. For 
instance, in Galal, (1994) empirical study, nine out of twelve cases were revealed to 
have a positive privatization impact upon fiscal impulse. In the Malaysian context, 
the government obtained increased corporate taxes from the Kelang Container 
Terminal and took advantage of the appreciation of 49 percent share.  
 
In the context of Argentina, Shaikh (1996) revealed that five cases were revealed to 
have positive fiscal impact owing to the firm’s higher income taxes, higher indirect 
taxes, higher output and eradication of subsidies following privatization. Jeffrey 
(2000) review of eighteen countries carrying out privatization revealed increased 
gross receipts constituting two percent of the annual GDP; although the long-run 
effects on government revenue were not obtained from sales proceeds resulting from 
one time sale of an asset but from the eradication of subsidies and from increased tax 
revenues in private enterprises.   
 
Mexican, Cote’de Ivorean and the Mozambique governments obtained more from 
privatized enterprises in the form of taxes compared to direct proceeds of sales. 
Similarly, in the context of Bolivia, the first four years after sales, the government 
earned a positive financial return in the amount of US$429 million from taxes. 
However, contrasting results came from other countries like Chile and Brazil because 
support for revenue claims as a result of privatization failed to help in fiscal crises 
resolution. For example, according to Galal (1994), the Chilean treasury lost 
dividends and taxes amounting to 22 percent of the sale price of the Electricity 
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Company, Chilgener and similarly, in Mexico, the Telephones privatization’s net 
fiscal impact amounted to zero.  
 
In sum, privatization does enhance the performance of public enterprises turned 
private (former SOEs) as evidenced by researchers through performance indicators, 
firm efficiency, profitability, employment, wages and salaries, government budgets 
which have all improved following privatization.  
 
3.6 PRIVATIZATION AND PERFORMANCE 
 
The literature reviewed in the previous section generally found that governments all 
over the world have embraced privatization programs for different goals. The 
theoretical battle has been overwhelmingly in favor of private over state-ownership 
despite the lack of convincing empirical support. Recently, however, academic and 
professional researchers have been able to generate a wide range of empirical studies 
on the impact of privatization on the overall performance of the divested enterprises.  
 
This section, therefore, seeks to answer the following critical empirical questions: 
Aside from theoretical predictions, how well does privatization work in practice? 
Has Post-Privatization performance improved as expected? How does privatization 
affect the firm’s efficiency, labor market, profitability, productivity, and budget of 
the government? 
 
Most country studies are based on firm-level case studies. Some studies of individual 
enterprise behavior may compare individual enterprise performance pre-post-
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privatization; others are part of impact studies that look at labor and capital market 
effects. Most case studies of privatization are focused on process and are too recent 
to address effects or impact. Despite widespread anecdotal evidence, the number of 
success stories (or anecdotes of failure) is small and seems to be concentrated in the 
field of service provision. The reason for the paucity of industrial case studies is 
unclear. Raw enterprise-level case studies, the basic source of qualitative and 
quantitative impact information, are sparse. Studies on the question of whether 
ownership matters subject this very limited case study material to econometric 
analysis to determine whether there are differences in performance between public 
and private firms Whether ownership structure affects enterprise performance is an 
empirical matter and is testable; there is a large empirical literature on this question.  
 
Despite a theoretical presumption and casual observation that private ownership is 
more efficient, research results are profoundly divided. Initial conditions, modes of 
privatization, institutional environments, and particularly the capacity of 
governments to regulate determine efficiency outcomes. The consensus (if there is 
one) as measured by numbers of publications and conferences in the past half-decade 
stresses the primacy of competition over ownership, of deregulation over divestiture. 
However the debate continues. Galal (1994) attributes the contradictory conclusions 
to the industries studied: some studies find privatized enterprises superior because 
they illegitimately compare competitive to monopoly enterprises; others compare 
reasonably competitive firms to find private enterprises superior; and comparisons of 
monopoly enterprises get results. In almost, all but a few of the cases studied, there 
was a substantial improvement of company after privatization. 
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To corroborate this, World Bank study by Galal (1994), revealed a significant 
performance improvement in eight out of nine developing country cases studied. A 
sample of sixty company cases studied by (Megginson et al., 1994), showed a 
considerably improved performance in 75 percent of the cases investigated. By and 
large, company profitability was highly encouraging in a majority of cases and 
privatization therefore, served as an economic eye opener that removed hitherto 
constraints associated with new investment and access to capital. Although available 
records show that output growth surpasses the growth of labor and other inputs, yet 
privatization has the effect of positive contribution to productivity and efficiency of 
the enterprise. This is the situation in a number of cases of different countries where 
privatizations policy was adopted, such as Togo; in this country performance was 
observed to have improved dramatically subsequent to privatization. In this type of 
situations, enterprises are at a vantage position to adapt their production to meet real 
demand of the consumers. 
 
Case studies in this area center mainly on the competitiveness of the firms that are 
undergoing privatization. The firm's competitiveness can be judged by comparing 
with its own pre- privatization and that of other firms that were not privatized or with 
firms already in the private sector. Prior to the privatization era of the 1980s and 
1990s, most empirical studies on privatization discussed in majority the ownership 
debate and mostly relied on cross-sectional comparisons of SOEs and private 
companies. They were out to prove or disprove the idea that in competitive 
environments, ownership does matter.  
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Boardman and Vining (1989) and Vining and Boardman (1992) surveyed this earlier 
literature, the summary of the result highlights the main conclusions of these studies 
(Regardless whether the result favor private or public ownership, or if they show no 
difference or vague results). Although many studies predominantly find out that 
private companies are more efficient, a considerable number of them resolved that 
either that ownership does not matter or that public companies display superior 
performance. Nonetheless, these studies face universal methodological problems. 
Apart from ownership being endogenous, it is well known that public enterprises 
often operate in less than competitive environments. The authenticity of the results 
essentially depends on controlling for companies’ differences in term of market 
structure, in regulatory regime, and in degree of competition in both product and 
input markets, which are often not easy to control for in a cross section.  
 
As remarked by Boardman and Vining (1992). Most of the recent academic works 
shift attention to privatization rather than the ownership debate, as it was before. An 
extensive literature examines the impact of privatization on firm performance, and 
excellent surveys are presented to this effect in Meggison and Netter (2001), and 
Djankov and Murrell (2002), for transition economies.  These studies can be grouped 
basically into two: case studies of some small sample of firms, and country specific 
or multi-country studies utilizing larger and sometimes international samples of 
firms. Most empirical privatization studies make a clear trade-off between depth and 
breadth of coverage. Usually case studies are often very comprehensive, this because 
it takes advantage of access to consistent datasets, while multi-country and inter-
industry comparisons almost unavoidably settle for the lowest common denominator 
data that are generally available (Megginson & Netter, 2001). 
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Martin and Parker (1997) used several performance indicators such as profitability 
(measured as return on capital employed), efficiency (annual growth in value added 
per employee) to assess the impact of privatization on 11 major firms privatized in 
the UK in the 1980s. The outcome of the study indicates that privatization had mixed 
results in Britain. Although most of the enterprises record increased productivity 
growth after privatization, nevertheless the result is disappointing in some of the 
cases. Other performance measures followed the same trend as above.  
 
According to the authors, the underlying principle for the use of several performance 
indicators is the need to overcome measurement bias. Eckel (1997) examined the 
effect of the British Airways (BA) 1987 privatization on the stock prices of 
competitors and on fares charged in those routes where BA competes directly with 
foreign airlines. The finding shows that, there was a fall in the US competitors’ stock 
prices, which stands at 7 percentages on average point. The implication for this 
scenario was that stock trade was optimistic, that there would be a much more 
competitive BA, if it is eventually privatized. A further insight into the study shows 
that, there was a little reduction of 14.3 percent in the airfares on routes plied by BA 
relative to those on other transatlantic routes about the same time of privatization.  
 
As a control on the results, the authors went further to evaluate market reactions to 
Air Canada’s two-phase privatization around the same time of BA privatization (first 
from 100 percent state ownership to 57 percent, then to zero). At the initial phase of 
privatization, Air Canada’s fares were not declining significantly, however the trend 
changes, in the second phase of privatization recording a considerably significant rise 
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of 13.7 percent after complete privatization. In contrast to BA privatization findings, 
there was no significant competitor stock price effect; this is because Air Canada has 
no rival to compete with in many other routes. 
 
Ramamurti (1997), in a very comprehensive, though descriptive study investigates 
the impact of the 1990 restructuring and privatization of Ferrocarilla Argentinos, the 
Argentine railroad the largest of such in Latin America. The author’s findings 
revealed that there was a 370 percent improvement in productivity of labor, and 
radical decline in operating subsidies to almost zero, there is however a massive 
decline in employment from 92.000 to 18.682 workers (78.7 percent).  It was evident 
that consumers benefited from expanded and better quality services delivered at an 
affordable cost. Freight rate declines by 20 percent in real terms over 1991–1994 as a 
concessionaire competes more aggressively with trucks.  
 
In the continent of Africa, Ayee (1996) assessed the privatization of Ashanti 
Goldfields Company Limited, which was then Africa’s largest privatized enterprise, 
and Ghana Commercial Bank using several accounting ratios. Expectedly most of the 
performance indicators increased in the post-privatization period, even though some 
were statistically insignificant. Towing the same line of validity, Oyieke (2002) used 
Kenya Airways as a case study to investigate the effects of privatization on public 
sector borrowing requirements. The study documents considerable improvements in 
the public sector and the net worth of Kenya Airways as a consequence effect of 
privatization. 
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The study of the effect of privatization was examined on whether the mean and 
median firms improve financial and operating performance, measured in various 
dimensions, after being divested. The first published study in this regard is that of 
William Megginson et al. (1994). Herein after referred to as MNR Given that then at 
least 20 studies made use of the MNR methodology in various settings.  
 
The MNR methodology has become the benchmark methodology of choice for most 
of the privatization studies. In spite of obvious drawbacks – mainly associated to 
possible selection bias (in that governments may only privatize their “best” SOEs via 
share offerings) and the research necessity that call for simple, universally-available 
accounting data studies employing the MNR methodology have find to have at least 
two key advantages. First, they are the only studies known that is capable of directly 
comparing large samples of economically significant firms, from different industries, 
which were privatized in different countries, over different time periods. Since each 
firm is compared with itself (a few years earlier) using simple, inflation-adjusted 
sales and income data (which produce results in simple percentages), the beauty of 
employing this methodology is that it allows one to efficiently aggregate multi-
national, multi-industry results. Second, while focusing on share issue privatization 
(SIPs) results in a selection bias, it also yields samples that include the largest and 
most politically influential privatizations: The record however shows that Sips 
account for more than two-thirds of the over US$1 trillion of total revenues raised by 
governments since 1977. 
 
In the original MNR (1994) the study assessed the pre- versus post-privatization 
financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries (6 
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developing and 12 industrialized countries) and 32 industries that are fully or 
partially privatized through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990. 
The authors vehemently contend that subsequent to privatization exercise, the crops 
of sample firms investigated become more profitable and efficient, likewise real sales 
and capital expenditures were witnessed.  
 
The privatization policy further, strengthened these firms ability in the reduction of 
the level of their debt as well as increase dividend payments. Contrary to the 
previous finding, MNR finds no evidence that employment levels decline after 
privatization. Instead, it was revealed that there was a significant increase 64 percent 
in employment levels of the sampled companies. While the study was able to 
overcome the difficulty of obtaining comparable pre- and post-privatization data for 
large, multinational, multi-industry sample of countries, at the different period, it is 
regrettably that is limited mostly to Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and other developed countries. Since most of the cases 
reviewed are from industrialized settings, and that the IPO method is usually applied 
to high quality candidates, the positive findings might not apply in non-industrialized 
countries, or to firms divested by methods other than share issuing. The above-
mentioned review, although skeletal, suggests that there is now a growing body of 
research on all aspects of privatization.  
 
These studies provide tangible evidence that privatization “generally” works, both 
for the firms that are privatized and for privatizing economies as a whole. However, 
market institutions being in place determine the benefit of privatization. The 
countries that strive to ensure property rights protection and the rule of law, impress 
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hard budget constraints, encourage competition, and improve corporate governance 
reap the largest benefits. If appropriate institutions are not in place, definitely 
privatization often fails to improve performance at the firm level and by extension 
for the economy as a whole. 
 
These studies also shows that apart from the market institution being in place a 
country’s policies and institutional make-up strongly affect both the way in which 
privatization is designed and structured as well as how it was carried out, and the 
expected outcomes from the process. They confirmed that country conditions are 
important, and that private ownership has to be placed in an enabling environment of 
proper and economically friendly policy and institutions for it to produce the benefits 
of which it is so clearly capable. Lastly, restructuring enterprises prior to 
privatization is unlikely to yield substantial results. 
 
3.6.1 Efficiency  
 
The main objective of a privatization prgramme usually is increased efficiency 
among hitherto Public Enterprises. There is little to be gained by divestiture unless 
enterprise behavior changes in the direction of cost efficiency and heightened 
entrepreneurial efficiency (Ramamurti & Vernon, 1991). Countries that privatize 
benefit and the gains are not only kept by firm owners-they are also distributed to 
society (Chong et al., 2004). 
 
The neoclassical view prescribes minimizing public enterprise to gain efficiency. 
Privatization increases efficiency by returning firms to market pressures that induce a 
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firm to increase its productivity and lower its costs. Villelalonga (2000) discusses the 
economic efficiency gained through privatization by comparing the lower rates of 
return in government enterprises to private enterprises. He indicates that privatization 
of services increases general welfare, even when government expenditures continue.  
 
There are two types of effect on the efficiency identified are discussed; Efficiency 
and development of the economy and efficiency and development of the enterprise. 
First the efficiency and development of the economy, this is mostly concerned with 
seeking to either create or promote a market economy, with the aid of various 
macroeconomic “instruments”. Actualizing this objective may be done through a 
variety of methods, which could be in the form of promoting competition (this could 
be achieved by abolishing monopolies), the promotion of investment (either domestic 
or foreign) or the encouragement and the expansion of the private sector, including 
provision of enabling an environment for economic growth.  
 
Remarkably, it has even been found that privatization can serve as a catalyst to the 
development of institutions that improve market operations, as it was evident in 
(Megginson & Netter, 2001). Unexpectedly, There are a number of situations, 
predominantly from poorer developing countries, where performance of the 
enterprises was improved radically after privatization, this is because the enterprises 
actually closed down before they were privatized. Findings show that those 
enterprises whose production outfit could be easily adapted by the new private 
owners to meet a real demand had a better future than those, which could not 
(Boubakri, 1998).  
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Best practice function is considered as an efficient process involving inputs 
transformation to increased output. The practice reveals the ability of producing a 
certain amount of output at the lowest cost (Forsund, 1980). The question arises 
regarding the real meaning of ‘efficiency’, its various types, the differences between 
them, each type’s effect upon the company, and methods to measure them.  
Second efficiency and development of the enterprise, this impact focuses on the 
benefits to the particular enterprise being privatized. This benefit could be realized 
by freeing minimized the enterprise of government intervention, and thereby 
increasing economic flexibility, this in turn stimulates decision-making, improving 
the efficiency of the enterprise in question, productivity and quality are then 
enhanced as a result of such increased economic flexibility and decision-making. 
More commonly it is believed that a government usually does not run a good 
business, for this a government-owned business (a public enterprise) is more often 
than not less efficient than a private enterprise. 
 
Mostly this is always in harmony with the prime objective of improving the 
efficiency and development of the economy. This could be summarized in a simple 
term as a better-run business improves the economy. To corroborate this assertion, 
review of over 50 empirical studies that span through several thousand companies 
from about 50 countries finds that increases in performance that associated with 
privatization made the divested firms almost always become more efficient, more 
profitable, increase their capital base and spending, and become financially healthier 
than those firms that were not privatized. As what was cited of objective by the some 
countries legislation, the prime reason responsible for less efficiency recorded in the 
public enterprises than private sector enterprises is that fact that the expected 
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connection which is supposed to exist between the owners of the enterprise and the 
management of the enterprise as to promote efficiency was lacking (This is otherwise 
known as the principal-agent theory). Block (2008) and Dirge (2011) argued that the 
privatization of all aspects of the industry is the most effective way to ensure that the 
free enterprise market system can efficiently allocate scarce resources and maximize 
consumer and producer welfare. 
 
In a public enterprise, the management generally includes the state, as the owner of 
the public enterprise, the government and its ministers, the professional civil-servants 
who were saddled with the responsibility of overseeing the enterprise, the board of 
directors and the executive officers of the enterprise. In the event of privatization of 
such state-owned enterprises, it is highly inevitable that many levels of “middle-men 
will be eliminated” in the process, each with their own interests and with the aim of 
at least bringing the enterprise to a status where it is able to achieve, (in theory), the 
level of efficiency that any other private enterprise enjoys. 
 
In the subject of transition economics, two efficiency types of arguments are mostly 
utilized:  
i. The first one being the product efficiency that asserts the presence of 
production efficiency in a privatized firm owing to the managers and 
employees’ better incentives. The belief is that privatized firms may face a 
greater risk of liquidation compared to their public counterparts and therefore, 
managers in private firms face a greater risk of being fired from their jobs 
when they are not deemed to be suitably skillful.  
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ii. The second argument being the locative efficiency asserting that public firms 
are socially more efficient as the government is considerate of the social 
welfare and therefore, they try to internalize the externalities while in private 
ownership payoffs are just maximized. 
3.6.2 Financial and Operating Performance 
 
Privatization has been part of government policy toolkits since the past two decades. 
This provided enough time for academic researchers to generate a wide range of 
empirical studies on the effects of privatization on the post-privatization financial 
and operating performance of former state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In this section 
we shall examine some of these empirical studies in the following paragraphs. 
 
The study conducted by Megginson, et al. (1994) compared pre-privatization and 
post-privatization financial and operating performance of 61 firms that experienced 
full or partial privatization through public share offerings from 32 industries in 18 
countries (6 developing and 12 developed) between 1961 and 1990. They used 
several financial indicators such as profitability, sales, operating efficiency, capital 
investment, liquidity, leverage ratios and dividend payout figures. The study 
documents strong performance improvements achieved without sacrificing 
employment security. Specifically, after being privatized, firms increase real sales, 
become more profitable, increase their capital investment spending, improve their 
operating efficiency and increase their work forces. Furthermore, these companies 
significantly lower their debt levels and increase dividend payout. 
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An empirical study by La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) of 218 privatized firms 
in Mexico found on average of 24 percent increase in ratio of operating income to 
sales. Reviews of the post privatization performance of 28 divested firms in Egypt 
reveals that 71 percent of the sample increased their sales, 68 percent increased their 
earnings, 96 percent increased average salary per worker and 82 percent of the 
sample reduced both short and long term debt.  Dewenter and Malatesta (1998) use 
regression and time series methods to compare the pre-versus post-privatization 
performance of 63 large, high-information companies divested during the period 
1981 to 1993. These authors examine performance changes over both short time 
frames around privatization, comparing events (-3 to -1) with (+1 to +3), as well as 
examining a longer period, comparing events years (-10 to -1) with (+1 to +5). They 
document significant post-privatization increases in profitability (using net income) 
and significant decreases in leverage and labor intensity (employees/sales) over the 
period immediately after privatization. However they also find that operating profits 
increase prior to divestiture and may actually decrease somewhat afterward. Their 
results confirm the findings of Boardman and Vining (1989). The only difference is 
that they document profitability that is not only statistically significant but it is large. 
They also provide support for the view that government firms are less efficient than 
private firms at least to the extent that profitability and efficiency can be equated. 
Juliet D’Souza and William Megginson (1999) compare the pre- and post-
privatization financial and operating performance of 85 companies from 28 countries 
(15 industrialized and 13 non-industrialized) that experience full or partial 
privatization through public share offerings for the period from 1990 through 1996. 
The study documents significant increases in profitability, output, operating 
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efficiency, and dividend payments and significant decreases in leverage ratios- for all 
the sampled firms after privatization and for most sub- samples examined. Capital 
expenditures increase significantly in absolute terms, but not relative to sales. 
Employment declines but insignificantly. By and large, findings from this study 
strongly suggest that privatization yields significant performance improvements.  
In another single industry study, D’ Souza and Megginson (1998), examines 
performance changes following the privatization by share offering of 17 national 
telecommunication companies for the period from 1981 through 1994. They find 
persuasive evidence that profitability, output, operating efficiency, and capital 
investment spending, the number of access line (a proxy for units of physical output), 
and average salary per employee all increase significantly after privatization. 
Boubakri, et al. (2004) examined the post-privatization performance of newly 
privatized firms in Asia and document how the private ownership structure evolves 
overtime. The authors show that privatization leads to increase in profitability, 
efficiency, and output in former SOEs from Asia. 
 
3.6.3  Employment 
 
Evidently privatization in its entirety is in the interest of employees; however there 
are a few exceptional cases where privatization is not in favor of the employees.  The 
accrued Benefits of privatization are of three folds: 
i. Employment levels tend to increase after privatization. 
ii. Remuneration packages of the employee are always improved after 
privatization. 
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iii. Many employees enjoying the privilege of buying shares at discounted prices 
in the privatized firms and the benefit of this opportunity has been reflected 
when share prices eventually rose. 
 
In the event where employees lost their jobs due to privatization, such employees 
stand the chance to receive handsome severance packages (unemployment 
packages). These types of generous welfare packages such as Severance and 
retirement incentives buy labor support and allow privatization and its benefits to be 
fell in full force, nevertheless where unemployment insurance systems are not in 
place, mitigate the social impact of layoffs (Kikeri, 1999). It is however noteworthy 
that in some occasions, reduction in the level of employment and even downsizing of 
the work force took place prior to privatization. This could be attributed to the need 
for greater efficiency, and not just privatization itself as some studies insulated. Also 
when the shutdown enterprises were re-opened to operation by private investors, 
employees stand a significant chance to benefit directly. 
 
The evidence shows that employees benefited from privatization although not, of 
course, in every case. Employees tended to benefit in three different ways: (1) 
employment levels tended to increase after privatization; (2) remuneration packages 
tended to improve after privatization, often including performance bonuses; and (3) 
many employees bought shares in the privatized enterprises, further benefiting when 
the value of those shares increased. 
 
In some cases, such as Aero Mexico, employment levels dropped after privatization. 
However, laid-off employees generally received generous severance packages. In 
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many cases employment levels had fallen prior to privatization, so one may attribute 
this effect not just to privatization, but to the need for greater enterprise efficiency. 
 
Employees also benefited directly when shut down enterprises were privatized and 
restarted by private investors. In Jamaica, the success of the privatized hotels and 
subsequent boost to tourism had a major beneficial effect on indirect employment. In 
post-communist countries, employment levels in privatized enterprises have 
generally fallen, though wage levels have tended to increase after privatization. It 
should be noted that employment levels in SOEs have fallen even faster, which 
suggests that privatization has helped preserve employment, at least in relative terms 
(Young, 1998).   
 
Workers in factories facing privatization, and organized labor, whose leaders have 
gained both power and privileges within medium and large firms owned by the state, 
are potential opponents to privatization. Countries such as Tunisia have tried 
experiments in providing jobs specifically for redundant workers in public works 
projects. Others, such as Zambia, have proposed making available land in rural areas 
to enable displaced factory workers to return to small-scale farming. There has been 
no general evaluation of the effectiveness of these policies. Measuring the impact on 
labor of the various forms of transition from a state-owned and -directed economy to 
a free market will be neither easy nor quick. Factors to be considered (some included 
in studies such as that by Galal (1994) include income levels, acquisition of technical 
skills within the labor force, labor mobility, and the operation of the safety net.  
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For most countries, it is too soon to arrive at any firm judgment on the real impact 
that privatization and the transition to a free market will ultimately have on labor 
(Galal et al., 1994) found no loss to labor as a class in the cases studied; in 10 cases 
(in middle-income countries) the workers gained through post-privatization share 
appreciation where employees were able to buy stock in the new firm. Workers may 
also have gained, where severance pay was offered or from higher wages resulting 
from greater managerial efficiency and increased productivity. The Megginson 
research also shows that employment rises after privatization. In transitional 
countries in particular, the extent to which the workers have suffered from the loss of 
ancillary services previously offered by PEs remains unclear. Such services are less 
likely to be replaced by governments in least-developed countries (Berg et al., 1996). 
 
In a related study Stuckler and King (2007) revealed a significant positive relation 
between rapid privatization and increased social costs in the post-Soviet Union 
countries; the most significant social cost revealed is unemployment (Ramamurti, 
1997). This result is further reinforced by Nellis (2005) who reported unemployment 
and layoffs owing to privatization amounting to 150, 000 Argentine workers in the 
time frame from 1987-1997. In the same time frame, around 50 percent of employees 
in privatized firms were laid off in Mexico, more than 90, 000 in Brazilian railways, 
and finally around 15 percent of the aggregate labor force in Nicaragua. Tansel 
(1998) adds to literature by reporting that in Turkey, added to the number of laid off 
workers after privatization in the petrochemical and cement industry, is the laid-off 
workers’ decrease in earnings.  
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3.6.4  Productivity 
 
The previous thirty years have experienced a surge of privatization activities within 
public services as well as SOE in developed as well as the developing countries. This 
is because international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have made it 
their policy to recommend privatization of enterprises and services to the developing 
world. The rationale behind this recommendation lies in the belief that privatization 
generally increases the revenue for the state and enhances public finance, increases 
efficiency, improves productivity of agents and competition in the market 
environment through the minimization of government economical interference 
(Megginson, 1994).  
 
According to various researchers (Megginson, 1994; Villalonga, 2000; Megginson & 
Netter, 2001; and Sheshinski & Lopez-Calva, 2003, D’Souza, J., Megginson W. & 
Robert N. 2005), one of the aims of privatization is to increase productivity. This is 
possible through the change of ownership, which will involve new incentives to 
maximize output and reduce input as managers align the firms to the pressures 
coming from the shareholders as opposed to the social and political goals of national 
or municipal governments. In other words, improved productivity, cost reduction and 
profit maximization are the aims of privatizations. The issue that arises is the value 
of other aims and the level to which the ownership change is a necessity in achieving 
the goals.  
 
Based on empirical evidence, privatization’s aim of increased efficiency is mostly 
achieved by industries in the developed as well as developing countries. For instance 
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Ehlrich (1994) reveals that change in public ownership to a private one leads to the 
increased production of the firm. In a similar study, Vining and Boardman (1992) 
revealed that compared to public and mixed enterprises, private firms come on top 
based on profitability and efficiency.  A study by Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) on 
productivity change due to privatization showed a notable productivity increase prior 
and following privatization owing to the pre-privatization regulatory reforms. 
 
However, studies have also revealed that efficiency increases in private firms comes 
with a price. Evidences point out to mixed results regarding the macroeconomic and 
welfare impacts of privatization. Pollitt and Smith (2002) found privatization of 
British rail industry resulting in increased outcome and efficiency but decreased 
quality of outcome and government revenues. Similarly, Tyrrall (2004) found that 
the UK railway privatization exhibited increased outcome in terms of passengers and 
services but decreased infrastructure quality, speed and timely services. In a related 
study Stuckler King(2007) reveled a significant positive relation between rapid 
privatization and increase costs in the post-Sovite Union countries; the most 
significant social cost reveled is unemployment (Ramamurti, 1997). This result is 
further reinforced by Nellis (2005), who reported unemployment and layoffs owing 
to privatization amounting to 150,000 Argentine workers in the time frame from 
1987-1997. In the same time frame, around 50 percent of employees in privatized 
firms were laid off in Mexico, more than 90,000 in Brazilian railways, and finally 
around 15 percent of  the aggregate labor force in Nicaragua. Tansel (1998) adds to 
literature by reporting that in Turkey, added to the number of laid off workers after 
privatization in the petrochemical and cement industry, is the laid-off workers’ 
decrease in earnings.  
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In conclusion, it is logical to state that privatization does lead to factor productivity 
in majority of cases and is considered imperative in developing and transitional 
economies. Generally speaking, factor productivity is low owing to inefficient 
allocation of current factors and the use of outdated technology and mismanagement 
of administration etc.  
 
Privatization may be utilized as an effective tool to resolve issues and its success 
more often than not result in increased productivity and substantial growth to the 
economy as a whole. The rationale behind privatization is that incentives arising 
from the process help encourage organizations to enhance their process in such a way 
that SOEs are unable to do (Laban & Wolf, 1993). 
 
3.6.5  Capital Development 
 
Privatization has done much to strengthen capital markets and widen the ownership 
of capital, although such effects are closely related to the methods of privatization 
pursued by individual countries. Countries that have concentrated on tender sales to 
foreign investors have been unable to capture such benefits.  Other countries, such as 
Jamaica, Chile, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics, have 
strengthened their capital markets considerably and created a large group of 
shareholders. However, where ownership of an SOEs has passed to a large number of 
small shareholders, the new owners have had little influence on management.   
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The sale of shares to employees is another means of “democratizing” the ownership 
of capital that has been successfully pursued in developing and post-communist 
countries. Of course, the mass privatization schemes of the Czech and Slovak 
Republics and of Russia have created more shareholders than any other approach. 
However, the ability of shareholders to exercise fully their ownership rights in Russia 
is in some doubt.  
 
An effective legal framework and infrastructure is necessary to safeguard property 
rights and to facilitate the trading of securities (Young, 1998). On the other hand, it 
has been observed that Privatization has been the main driving force behind the 
development of capital markets. Undoubtedly privatization led to the growth (in 
terms of market capitalization) and deepening (in terms of numbers of shareholders) 
of financial markets, as well as increasing their liquidity share issue. 
 
It is notable that privatized firms are the most valuable companies in 7 of the 10 
largest non-US stock markets; the same is the case for all emerging markets 
possessing stock exchanges. Moreover, 35 of the 42 largest common stock issues in 
history are either privatizations or capital increases by recently privatized firms. 
Lastly, privatizations have not only increased the liquidity of stock markets, but they 
have radically increased the number of shareholders around the world (Megginson & 
Netter, 1998). 
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3.7  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Privatization has been a very powerful tool in economic transformation as well as 
economic liberalization for any country’s economy, suffering from structural 
imbalances or interested in a more encouraging level of economics in an efficient 
manner. This process in turn will increase performance rate, which could offer a 
prominent position to the hitherto unhealthy economy, in the rank and file of 
developed economies. In the review of literature, we have seen that privatization has 
produced mixed results, but most of the research conducted revealed strong 
performance improvements as a result of privatization. Only a few studies have 
indicated dismal performance after privatization.  
 
In the foregone discussions, it is therefore imperative to first of all have the 
definitional grasp of the subject matter “privatization”. This led us to probing into 
different definitional views of various literatures. This will also state why 
privatization is vital for the growth and development of some sectors and why, it will 
is not in some other sectors within the economy. Finally, analysis on how 
privatization affects the performance of a firm. On the above submission, this chapter 
presents a series of previous studies, which spans from the theoretical point of view 
to the practical perspectives. For meaningful information to emerge from this study, 
privatization of various aspects of economy as reported by various literatures is 
succinctly presented in this chapter of this study. 
 
This chapter was also covered four important theories related of privatization: the 
property rights theory, the principal agent theory, the public choice theory, and the 
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competition theory. This involves critically examining the theories that have been 
developed over time by different authors, and how they impact privatization as 
regards the objectives of this study. The theories highlight the changes in ownership 
of firms’ direct link to economic efficiency. All these theories emphasized differing 
points of objectives, structures and constraints that public and private firms face as 
they expound on the inefficiency of public firms.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
!
!
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter four discusses the research methodology used in this study. This chapter 
consists of eight sections. Section 4.1 explains the research framework. Then, 
Section 4.2 describes the model specification based on privatization and its impact on 
firms’ performance. Meanwhile, the justification of the variables, discussion of data, 
and elaboration of questionnaire design, and discussion of the sampling are presented 
in Section 4.3, Section 4.4 Section 4.5 and Section 4.6, respectively. Meanwhile, 
Section 4.7 explains the method of analyses. Finally, Section 4.8 concludes this 
chapter.  
 
4.1 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK  
 
According to Sekaran (2003), the theoretical framework visualizes the theorized 
relationship between several identified factors. In this study, the research framework 
has been developed based upon previous discussions in Chapter Three. The purpose 
of this research framework is to summarize the effect of a privatization programme 
on public enterprises performance. It also serves as a guideline for implementing the 
data collection and for identifying the main variables, which are part of the analysis. 
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PRIVATIZATION THEORY 
 
The research framework of this study has been developed based on four important 
theories related to privatization: the Property Rights Theory, the Principal Agent 
Theory, the Public Choice Theory and the Competition Theory. The details of these 
theories have been explained in Section 3.3. Figure 4.1 below shows the study’s 
framework. 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Graphic of Theoretical Framework 
 
In this study, the research framework develops the distinctions between the two 
dependent variables of operational efficiency and profitability, which have been 
chosen to represent public enterprises performance. Meanwhile, six main 
independent variables have been employed that comprise productivity, ownership 
structure, employment, capital, privatization and liquidity. The schematic diagram 
showing the relationship between the independent variables and dependent variables 
is presented in Figure 4.2 below. 
Property Rights Theory 
Principal Agent Theory 
Public Choice Theory 
 
Public Enterprises 
Performance 
   Competition Theory 
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All the variables shown in Figure 4.2 above were examined in the literature, which has a 
consensus that privatization results in the enhanced financial and operational 
performance of a firm. In other words, enhanced performance may be attributed to the 
fact that once the privatization is embarked upon in SOEs (State-owned Enterprise), 
profitability objectives take top priority. According to Megginson and Netter (1997), the 
amount raised by all governments during the last two decades by privatisation, 
considering only public offers, is more than $400 billion, a figure that would be 
considerably surpassed if direct sales were accounted for. While several possible reasons 
exist for why privatization may be undertaken (Yarrow, 1986), the main driver of this 
trend has been the search for an increase performance of the firms involved (Megginson 
et al., 1994).  
 
Whether privatization actually leads to improvement in performance has been the 
subject of a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical research. Most of this 
research, however, has been concerned with whether private ownership leads to higher 
efficiency than does state ownership, which answers only part of the question. As a 
consequence, empirical results do not always support the theoretical predictions. Several 
factors independent of the private-public distinction also intervene in the relationship 
between privatization and enhanced firm performance. Moreover, some of them do so in 
a dynamic way, thus influencing the timing of privatization effects. Therefore, these 
independent factors need to be controlled for, not only in empirical research, but also in 
a complete theory of privatization. 
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The Agency Theory explanation is based on the variety of agency problems and 
solutions to those problems that are associated with public and private ownership. 
Managers (The agent) in both types of firm are assumed to seek the maximization of 
their own utility rather than that of the organization or its owners (The principal). In 
private firms, this divergence is reduced through the existence of: (i) a market for 
ownership rights that enables the owners to sell if they are dissatisfied with managerial 
performance, (ii) the threat of takeover; (iii) the threat of bankruptcy; and (iv) a 
managerial labor market. In the case of state-owned firms, not only are all of these 
mechanisms absent, but also, the owner-manager relationship is broken down into two 
other different agency relationships: owner (the public)-politician, and politician-
manager. 
 
The central argument of the Public Choice Theory is that politicians pursue their own 
utility rather than that of the public interest. Accordingly, they impose goals on state-
owned firms that can help the politicians gain votes but also can conflict with efficiency. 
To the general public, who are the ultimate owners of the firm, the costs of monitoring 
this public sector behaviour (e.g., information gathering, lobbying) are likely to offset 
the benefits (e.g., less taxes, or more efficient public spending). This is not the case, 
however, for interest groups such as trade unions, which makes state-owned enterprises 
easy targets for rent-seeking activity. 
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Nonetheless, a literature review shows that the existing empirical evidence does not 
always support the positive effects of privatization on firm performance predicted by the 
different theories.. Why does such a mismatch between theory and evidence exist? 
 
The answer proposed here is that the existing privatization literature has only looked at 
part of the problem, which is whether private ownership leads to higher performance 
than does state ownership. Privatization implies a change in a firm’s ownership, from 
state to private. Hence, the superiority of private to public ownership in terms of firm 
performance is a necessary condition for a positive relationship between privatization 
and performance to exist. However, the while the condition is necessary, it is not 
sufficient for two reasons.  
 
First, public versus private ownership is primarily a static question, which can be 
typically addressed by comparing both types of firm over a given time period. However, 
privatization is by definition a change, and must be addressed dynamically by looking at 
the evolution and transition of a given firm between its private and public stages.  
 
Second, privatization has political and organizational implications that are likely to 
either positively or negatively the firm’s performance, and therefore either reinforce or 
counteract the effect of the change in ownership. The basic prediction of all existing 
privatization theories is that privatization increases firm performance. 
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Political implications of privatization include all government decisions triggered by the 
choice to privatize a given firm. These decisions may affect the firm’s performance 
either positively or negatively. A positive effect will take place if, for instance, the 
government privatizes a firm from an industry that will rapidly grow in order to make 
privatization look good. On the other hand, a negative effect is typically a consequence 
of giving priority to privatization goals other than that of performance, when the choice 
between those goals and that of performance involves a trade-off. Such would be the 
case, for instance, of privatizing a monopoly before introducing competition or an 
introducing an appropriate regulation beforehand as opposed to afterwards in order to 
increase the revenue from privatization (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). Such would also be 
the case of hastening to privatize the firm in a period of recession in the industry or in all 
of the economy, as opposed to waiting for a better time, because the government wants 
to increase its revenues in that period for political reasons. The possibility of unintended 
negative effects, such as a government’s mistakes or failure in choosing the optimal 
buyer or privatization method, also are present. 
 
Organizational implications of privatization include all the decisions the new owners or 
managers of the privatized firm take that the government cannot predict at the time of 
when the choice of made to whom to sell the firm. Again, these decisions can affect the 
firm’s efficiency either positively or negatively. As an example of a positive effect, 
consider a firm, which under state ownership is being managed through a large 
conglomerate and is privatized through its direct sale to a more specialized company. If 
the buyer can exploit synergies with its existing business, and part of the savings are 
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passed on to the acquired (the privatized) firm, privatization would have obviously 
brought about gains in efficiency but would have had nothing to do with the 
private/public distinction.  
 
Negative effects may also take place if, like government representatives before 
privatization, managers of a newly privatized firm give a higher priority to other 
objectives. For instance, consider a firm that is privatized by a direct sale and is 
maintained as a separate business unit of the acquirer. The corporate strategy of a firm 
may be such that not all business units are treated equally (Brush & Bromiley, 1997); 
thus, the case might be that the acquiring firm’s best interests as a whole are not to 
maximize the performance of the individual acquired unit. Also, as with all political 
decisions, the possibility exists of unintended negative effects from the decisions of the 
new management. Managers might find themselves unable to turn around a low-
performing firm, encounter resistance to change at some level of the organization, or 
face any other unintended situations. 
 
A typical scenario following the privatization of larger firms and those firms operating 
in monopolistic economic sectors is company specific restructuring, which may or may 
not be a part of general changes such as market liberalization in which competition 
become fierce. Usually at this stage of reform significant employment losses are noted. 
Moreover, privatization is an activity characterized by high resource intensity calling for 
worker skills and expertise not generally found in SOEs. 
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Privatization often increases employees’ insecurity, job loss, changes in working 
environment, stress owing to job insecurity, and lower wages among other negative side 
effects. However, according to Kiker (1997) and contrary to popular belief, workers 
often benefit from privatization through new investments and dynamic expansion as 
these activities lead to job creation in the enterprise and the sector. Moreover, 
productivity enhancements often result in superior service terms and conditions. In 
addition to this, privatization is in the employees’ best interests as they obtain many 
benefits from it including improved remuneration packages (Kikeri, 1997; Pamacheche 
& Koma, 2007; Khan et al., 2011) and, in some cases, wage rises and a better working 
environment (Rozana, 2000). Also, in a sufficiently competitive industry, privatization 
enhances welfare (Cato, 2008).  
Nevertheless, privatization often negatively impacts jobs owing to overstaffing of public 
enterprises (Nancy & Nellis, 2003), and, hence, employees in the privatized firm 
perceive job insecurity and fear losing their positions (Aghaei et al., 2010). In most 
privatization cases, employees are laid off, but these employees are often provided with 
generous severance packages (Pamacheche & Koma, 2007).  
 
In sum, no simple prediction of the privatization outcome exists as a particular outcome 
generally depends on at least three factors, namely, initial conditions, the sale event and 
the post-privatization political and economic environments (Birdsall & Nellis, 2003). 
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Employee productivity increases after privatization particularly in firms that employ 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), and this is why employee ownership has 
been shown to be a crucial incentive for employees to work their best. Privatization has 
been acknowledged to be related to enhanced product quality at competitive prices, thus 
maximizing a firm’s productivity. Based on the works of several authors, increased 
productivity is among the many objectives of privatization (e.g., Megginson, 1994; 
Villalonga, 2000; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Sheshinski & Lopez-Calva, 2003).  
 
Increased productivity can be realized via ownership change that involves new 
incentives to heighten output and lower input as the management maintains an 
alignment between the firm and the pressures from shareholders instead of aligning the 
firm with the social and political goals of the government. In sum, privatization aims to 
improve productivity, reduce costs and maximize profit. The issue that comes into play 
is the value of other objectives and the degree to which ownership change is needed for 
achieving those objectives. 
 
Based on the neoclassical viewpoint, the number of SOEs must be minimized to realize 
efficiency because privatization maximizes efficiency by returning firms to market 
pressures urging firms to enhance their productivity and to their minimize costs. Ehrlich 
(1994), who demonstrated that privatization results in increased firm production, 
emphasized this point Similarly, Vining and Boardman (1992) explained that, in 
comparison to public and mixed firms, private firms are superior in terms of profitability 
and efficiency. This viewpoint is also consistent with Price and Weyman-Jones’s (1996) 
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study dedicated to productivity change following privatization. Their results showed a 
significant increase in productivity following privatization due to pre-privatization 
regulatory reforms.  
 
Another expected influence of privatization comes in the form of capital investment 
spending. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2007) and several studies (Maremont 
& Cohen, 2002; & Solomon, 2002), capital expenditures constitute one of the most 
significant and riskiest accounts in corporate financial statements. These expenditures 
have long been reported to influence a firm’s value and survival (Tobin, 1969; Hayashi, 
1982; Abel, 1983). As such, investors, regulators, auditors and the public have to 
understand capital investment motivators. For example, investors are able to make more 
informed decisions about potential investments if they understand the concept of free 
cash flow with respect to different types of firms. These can include firms involved in 
environmental activities that incur considerable capital expenditures, which may 
produce lower free cash flow compared to firms without similar degrees of 
environmental concern.  
 
Generally, the expectation is that a higher stress on efficiency and profitability would 
enable privatized firms to maximize their capital investment spending. In addition, firms 
must increase their capital expenditures following divestiture as their ties to government 
bureaucratic procedures will no longer exist, and they have greater access to both private 
debt and capital markets. Furthermore, if privatization occurs along with deregulation 
and the opening of markets, SOEs will be confronted by high investment spending 
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requirements in order to have a competitive edge over their rivals. Compounding this is 
the fact that years of financial stress frequently lead to deferred maintenance, which 
must be undertaken post-privatization. Freedom from government control minimizes the 
government’s ability to bribe or coerce managers to generate politically attractive goods 
that are economically wasteful (Megginson et al., 1994). 
 
Liquidity, which is defined as the ability to convert an asset to cash, is another issue 
related to the differences between privatised firms and SOEs. Often times, a SOE faces 
liquidity issues that privatised firms do not. Illiquidity inhibits the ability of a SOE to 
conduct business efficiently. Normally, a firm that is not liquid and is unable to pay its 
creditors in a timely manner and honour its obligations to the fullest to meet its credit 
obligations and pay for services and goods from suppliers can be deemed as a 
sick/bankrupt one. Liquidity equips a firm with the negotiating abilities with lenders to 
postpone payments and leverages its liquidity in investments and provides a firm with 
the ability to acquire loans at reasonable interest rates (Kallberg & Parkinson, 1993; 
Rees, 1995). A firm might overlook incentives that good credit and services and good 
suppliers provide because of a lack of cash or liquid assets and oversight of such 
incentives may lead to greater costs for goods, which in turn, would influence business 
profitability. Therefore, the firm must consistently maintain a specific liquidity level.  
 
Each stakeholder has an interest in a firm’s liquidity. While a goods supplier is 
interested in a firm’s liquidity for selling goods on credit, employees are interested in 
knowing if the company can meet its obligations to employees in terms of salaries, 
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pensions, provident funds and others. Meanwhile, shareholders are interested in a firm’s 
liquidity through its relationship with profitability because high liquidity can signify low 
profitability and non-liquidity might limit the company in obtaining incentives from its 
bankers, creditors and suppliers.  
 
According to Maug (1998) and Kahn and Winton (1998), the higher the liquidity the 
greater the potential for large shareholders to maximize profit. Large shareholders 
monitor a company for indicators of performance, and company managers understand 
this practice. A large shareholder opts to buy additional shares when that monitoring 
reveals that a firm’s performance can be expected to become better. In this case, the 
higher the liquidity, the greater the number of share that are purchased in the market 
owing to the reasonable costs of transaction. This relationship is consistent with the 
findings of Bhide (1993) who revealed that high liquidity makes large shareholders not 
as aggressive in their monitoring, but that large shareholders are more inclined to sell 
shares upon noticing poor management performance. 
 
Liquidity is considered to be an important performance determinant because liquidity 
influences a firm’s opportunity to take up viable investments and thus increase 
performance. Enhanced liquidity contributes by providing a firm with the necessary cash 
for on going operating expenses and also increases a firm’s flexibility for capital 
investments or expenditures. Firms demand liquidity in anticipation of future financing 
needs either because getting financing now is cheaper or because a risk exists that 
financing will be unavailable if the firm waits until the need for funding arises.  
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4.2 ESTIMABLE MODEL  
 
The estimable model of this study has been established based on the research framework 
and literature review that are explicated in Section 4.1 and Chapter Three, respectively.  
Based on these sources, the two dependent variables of operational efficiency (OPE) 
and profitability (PFT) have been chosen to represent public enterprises performance 
(PEP). Meanwhile, six independent variables have been employed, which comprise 
productivity (PRO), ownership structure (OWS), employment (EMP), capital (CAP), 
privatization (PRI) and liquidity (LIQ). The general function of the relationship between 
dependent variables and independent variables is shown in Equation [1] below. 
 
[1]  
  
The specific econometric model is shown in Equation [2]. 
 
[2]  
      
 
where i represents the number of public enterprises which is 13 or i = 1, 2, …, 13,          
t = 1, 2, …, 8 ,!!! represents coefficients, and ε represents error term.  
Dummy variables (PRI) for privatization years were added to the regressions to 
determine the effect the privatization on the performance, whereby: 
( )LIQPRICAPEMPOWSPROfPEP ,,,,,=
+++++= itititititit CAPEMPOWSPROPEP 4321 ββββα
ititit LIQPRI εββ +++ 65
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      PRI = 0 before the privatization 
      PRI = 1 after the privatization. 
Four models have been formulated to show the impact of the independent variables on 
the dependent variables. These separate models have been developed to measure the 
public enterprise behaviour and performance in a broad assessment of the impact of 
privatization. These models are shown in Equation [3] through Equation [6] below.   
 
[3]  
      
[4]  
      
[5]  
      
[6]  
      
 
Equation [3] – Equation [5] utilizes return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), and 
return on equity (ROE) to represent public enterprises profitability. Meanwhile, 
Equation [6] utilizes real sales (RS) to represent public enterprises efficiency.  
 
 
+++++= itititititit CAPEMPOWSPROROA 4321 ββββα
ititit LIQPRI εββ +++ 65
+++++= itititititit CAPEMPOWSPROROS 4321 ββββα
ititit LIQPRI εββ +++ 65
+++++= itititititit CAPEMPOWSPROROE 4321 ββββα
ititit LIQPRI εββ +++ 65
+++++= itititititit CAPEMPOWSPRORS 4321 ββββα
ititit LIQPRI εββ +++ 65
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4.3 JUSTIFICATION OF VARIABLE 
 
The intention of this section is to justify the variables included in Equation [2].  
 
4.3.1 Public Enterprise Performance 
 
Two types of public enterprise performance measurements have been chosen in this 
analysis, namely, profitability and operating efficiency. The term “profit” has two linked 
but differentiated meanings in the field of economics. Normal profit refers to the total 
opportunity costs, implicit and explicit, of a venture to an investor, whereas economic 
profit is the difference between the total review and all costs of the firm with the 
inclusion of normal profit.  
 
Generally speaking, SOEs are frequently unprofitable partially owing to their major 
focus on objectives aside from profit maximization including employment 
maximization. Thus, performance of these firms is designed with several objectives like 
capital market development, improving production capacity and boosting revenues and 
minimizing costs in mind as alternatives to the single objective of profit maximization. 
 
Three indicators are utilized in this study as proxies of profitability. They are return on 
sales (ROS), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE) ratios. Such ratios 
reflect the manner in which a firm utilizes owners’ resources. Prior literature (e.g., 
Megginson, 1994; Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; D’Souza & Megginson, 1999) has 
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contended that the privatization of SOEs results in higher performance. On the basis of 
such contentions, this study hypothesizes the following: 
H1: Privatization has a significant effect on the profit of former SOEs. 
 
By privatizing former state-owned enterprises and putting them into direct competition 
with other firms, government clearly hopes that the newly privatized firms will employ 
their human and financial resources more efficiently. The shareholders (including 
employees) in a private company capture most of the benefits of efficiency 
improvements, but they also suffer most if efficiency is not improved. In removing the 
non-economic government-supported objectives of the firms, government explicitly 
states that the trade off is expected to increase operating and financial efficiencies.  
 
The literature reviewed shows that some efficiency measures and efficiency factors used 
could be further enhanced. Specifically, Megginson et al. (1994), Boubakri et al. (2005), 
Wei et al. (2003), D’Souza et al. (2001), Dockner et al. (2005), Boardman et al. (2002) 
and Boubakri and Cosset (1998) investigated the effect of privatization on the operating 
efficiency of a firm by comparing the efficiency ratios before and after privatization. In 
this study, operating efficiency was proxied by sales per employee and net income per 
employee. This metric is consistent with prior studies that utilized new 
income/employees and net sales/employees (e.g. Megginson et al. 1994; La Porta & 
Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997; Anderson et al., 1994; Frydman et al., 1997; Dewenter & 
Malatesta, 2001). Thus, this study hypothesizes the following: 
H2:  Privatization increases the operating efficiency of firms. 
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4.3.2 Privatization  
 
In a strict sense, privatization can be defined as the sale of a state-owned firm to the 
private sector. Governments attempt to privatize SOEs for various reasons. These 
include: to raise revenues, to create popular capitalism, to reward political loyalists, to 
placate the demands or suggestions of external financing agents, to decrease the 
administrative burden of state bureaucracy, and to make the private sector responsible 
for needed enterprise investments (Nellis, 1991). However, the primary reason is to 
improve the performance of SOEs and, as a result, to reduce the budgetary burden on 
the state.  
 
Comparisons have been made between the performance of privately owned firms and 
state firms. In the mid-1980s, many governments around the world reached the 
conclusion that state ownership was not working and that private ownership was much 
more productive. As a result, the global movement away from the state ownership of 
production and services towards private ownership and free enterprises has grown. One 
important aspect of this trend has been the sale of SOEs to the private sector with the 
expectations of improving their unsatisfactory performance.  
 
Many theoretical and empirical studies have examined the differences between state-
owned and private firms and what these differences imply for firm performance. Most 
studies suggest that privatizations have led to significant increases in firms’ efficiency 
and profitability as Megginson and Netter (2001), Djankov and Murell (2002), Lopez de 
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Silanes (2005), Nellis (2005) and Megginson (2005) have reported. This has been the 
case in the United Kingdom (Parker & Martin, 1995), in China (Wei et al., 2003), and in 
Romania (Earle & Telegdy, 2002.  
 
The same conclusion has been reached by multi-country studies that employ samples of 
firms privatized in developed countries (Megginson et al., 1994; D ́Souza et al., 2005), 
developing countries (Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; Boubakri et al., 2005), and East 
European countries (Claessens & Djankov, 2002). In order to capture the privatization 
effect on the firms’ performance, this current study used a dummy variable that was 
coded 1 after privatization and 0 before privatization. On the basis of the above, this 
study hypothesized the following hypothesis: 
H3: Privatization affects a firm’s performance. 
 
4.3.3 Liquidity  
 
Liquidity reflects the firm’s ability to meet its short-term objectives and is significant for 
short-term lenders, particularly for suppliers supplying goods and services on credit and 
banks and other entities providing unsecured debt. That is because creditors are 
dependent on the record of firm payments for their risk-assessment process.  
 
Liquidity also enables companies to conduct negotiations with lenders to delay payment, 
and they may leverage liquidity in investments and improve the firm’s ability to acquire 
loans at reasonable interest rates (Kallberg & Parkinson, 1993; Rees, 1995). Liquidity is 
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viewed as one of the most significant determinants of performance as it impacts the 
opportunity of a firm to obtain viable investments and hence superior performance 
through its cash contributions for continuous operating expenses. It also maximizes the 
versatility of the firm in terms of capital investments or expenditures. Furthermore, 
enhancing the ability of the firm to acquire short-term borrowing is significant in the 
short-term investment process, and firms having good liquidity have a good potential to 
receive such loans.  
 
A large  number of empirical studies have shown that an increase in profitability 
following divestment might involve some liquidity issues. The argument has been made 
that a negative trade off exists between profitability and liquidity. Focusing only on 
profitability leads to overlooking the whole picture and actual firm performance, and 
this could mean that a significant profitability increase may be coupled with a liquidity 
drop, which could eventually lead to bankruptcy if this drop off persists (Abraham, 
2006). 
 
Liquidity is considered to be an important performance determinant because liquidity 
influences a firm’s opportunity to engage in viable investments and thus performance, 
by providing firms the necessary cash for on going operating expenses. It also increases 
a firm’s flexibility for capital investments or expenditures. Firms demand liquidity in 
anticipation of future financing needs either because getting financing now is either 
cheaper or because a risk exists that financing will be unavailable if a firm waits until 
the need for funding arises. An entrepreneurial firm has an investment opportunity with 
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a known outcome, but only part of the return is pledge able to investors. When the 
pledge able income is insufficient to cover full investment costs, a firm has to cover the 
gap with funds accumulated in the past. As a result, a firm’s net worth constrains that 
firm’s investments. Therefore, this study uses current ratio (current assets to current 
liabilities) as a proxy for liquidity, which is consistent with other prior studies (Friedlob 
& Schleifer, 2003).  
 
Liquidity, as measured by the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, is expected to 
improve as a result of improving the firm performance. In developing countries, most 
assessments show that most improvement in financial performance is reflected in a 
significant increase in the liquidity ratio (Kikeri & Nellis, 2004). This discussion leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
H4: A relationship exists between a firm’s liquidity and that firm’s performance. 
 
4.3.4 Capital Expenditure 
 
Capital expenditure refers to a firm’s expenditures to either obtain or enhance 
productive assets like buildings, machinery equipment and vehicles in an attempt to 
maximize the company’s capacity/efficiency over a single accounting period. Capital 
expenditure is also known as capital spending. Governments believe that a greater stress 
on efficiency will result in an increase in a firm’s capital investment spending.  
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National governments, however, have utilized SOEs as instruments to accelerate slow 
growing economies by additional investment spending. As a result, these firms always 
have had a credit rating that allows them to borrow almost unlimited funds at prime 
rates. This would suggest that higher investment spending positively influences a firm’s 
performance (Megginson & Netter, 2001; La Porta & Lopez-De-Silanes, 1999). This 
study current assumes a relationship between capital investment spending and firm 
performance. To evaluate this relationship, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H5: The capital expenditures of a firm impact that firm’s performance. 
 
4.3.5  Employment 
 
The employment strategy in performance can be analysed through the number of 
employees. Employment can also be used to estimate whether or not SOEs are over-
staffed. Employment level is a crucial issue in a company’s performance. Enterprises 
employ people to help in carrying out daily activities, and the number of people 
employed depicts either the number or the magnitude of the tasks. However, 
employment levels are a rather ambiguous aspect of enterprise performance, depending 
on a firm’s circumstances. Thus, high employment accompanying high production may 
indicate success while high employment at other times may constitute blatant over-
manning, which has been a main prediction of the Agency Theory.  
 
The aim of this study is to examine whether efficiency gains result from reductions in 
the labor force.  Similar to prior studies by Megginson et al, (1994) and Frydman et al., 
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(1997), this study employs the total number of employees to measure employment. 
Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H6: A relationship exists between employment and a firm’s performance. 
 
4.3.6 Productivity  
 
Productivity has been defined in several ways. Roger (1998) defined productivity as 
something that people produce with minimal or no effort. Along the same lines, 
Sutermeister (1976) defined productivity as the output for every hour an employee 
works, with quality considered. Additionally, Bell (2004) defined productivity as the 
optimum function of a firm’s performance including quality. Therefore, productivity can 
affect a firm’s performance through both the quantity and quality of production, 
production costs, and labor productivity.  
 
Several practical techniques have been utilized for measuring productivity with the most 
used being partial productivity measures. Specifically, the partial productivity ratio is 
computed by dividing the total output by an input factor. For example, labor 
productivity can be measured through the ratio between total output and labor input. In 
the case in which it is challenging to calculate partial productivity ratios because of the 
lack of a total output figure, an even simpler method can be used. This metric involves 
dividing a typical output (number of serviced customers/production amount of product) 
by an essential input (machine hours/labor hours). This current study uses labor 
productivity to measure a firm’s productivity. Anderson et al. (1997) conducted a study 
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in Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia and presented an extensive analysis 
and showed that improved labor productivity resulted in considerable improvements in a 
firm’s performance. On the basis of this discussion, this study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
H7: A relationship exists between a firm’s productivity and the firm’s performance. 
 
4.3.7 Ownership 
 
Ownership is considered as rights to a firm’s control and a firm’s operation. The 
ownership structure (Private or Public) has a strong impact on a firm’s performance. 
Schools of thought and empirical studies, have pointed to improved efficiency under 
private ownership compared with public enterprises under public ownership.  
 
Theories such as the Property Rights Theory, the Public Choice Theory, the Principal-
Agent Theory, and the Austrian School of Economics, as well as some new theories like 
the new political economics, the new institutional economics and the neo-Austrian 
School of Economics generally favour private ownership and view state ownership as 
inefficient, especially when the market is characterized as competitive. Also prior 
studies such as those of Hansmann (1990) Boubkri and Cosset (1998) and Frydman et 
al. (1997) have all shown that private ownership creates considerable improvements of a 
firm’s performance in terms of most performance metrics.  
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Such improvements were related to ownership owing to the stress of the new owners on 
profit objectives and new investments that resulted in improvements. These effects were 
measured through two ownership categories: ownership type and ownership percentage. 
In this study, ownership is gauged through ownership percentage based on whether the 
ownership is either private or state. The study focuses on the sequencing of changes that 
either followed the privatization program or existed prior to the privatization program 
being implemented. Before privatization the government of Libya before controlled 100 
percent of the firms before privatization, but after the privatization program adopted by 
the government was a percent of ownership that controlled of the firms.  
 
For this reason, the percentage of ownership was chosen to measure the ownership and 
for the purpose of comparing firm performance before and after privatization to 
determine how effective of ownership has been in promoting performance improvement. 
Consistent with Kocenda and Svejnar (2004) and Kikeri et al. (1992), the contention in 
this current study is that ownership percentage plays a key role in enhancing the 
performance of the firm post-privatization. Therefore, this study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
H8: A relationship exists between firm ownership and firm performance. 
 
Table 4.1 below summarizes the selected metric for each variable discussed in this 
section. 
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Table 4.1 
Variables for Analyses 
 
Variable Metric Previous studies measuring 
performance 
 Dependent variable  
Profitability 
 
 
 
 
Return on Sales = 
Net Income ÷ Sales 
 
Return on Assets = 
Net Income ÷ Total 
Assets 
 
Return on Equity = 
Net Income ÷ Equity 
 
Megginson et al. (1994), La Porta and 
Lopez-de- Silanes (1997). Grosfeld and 
Nivet (1997). Frydman et al. (1997), 
Commander et al. (1996), Yarrow (1986), 
Boycko et al. (1996). 
Operating 
Efficiency 
 
Efficiency = Real 
Sales ÷ Number of 
Employees 
Kikeris et al. (1992), Boycko, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993), Megginson et al. (1994). 
La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997), 
Anderson et al. (1997), Frydman et al. 
(1997), Earle and Estrin (1997), Dewenter 
and Malatesta (1998). 
 Independent 
variable 
Previous studies measuring 
performance 
Capital 
Investment 
Real Capital 
Expenditures  
Megginson and Netter (2001), Nash and 
van Randenborgh (1994), and Dewenter 
and Malatesta (1998). 
Employment Number of 
employees 
Megginson et al. (1994), Frydman et al. 
(1997), La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes 
(1997), Commander et al. (1996), and 
Earle and Estrin (1997). 
Ownership  Percentage of 
ownership (private 
percentage or state 
percentage) 
Boubkri and Cosset (1998), Frydman et al. 
(1997).  Kocenda and Svejnar (2004), 
Nellis and Shirley (1992). 
Productivity  Real sales Earle and Telegdy (2002). Ehrlich et al. 
(1994), Frydman et al. (1999), Villalonga 
(2000), and Wallsten (2001).  
Liquidity  Current Ratio = 
current assets ÷ 
current liabilities 
Megginson et al. (1994), and La Porta and 
Lopez-de-Silanes (1997). 
! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! 184!
!
4.4  DATA 
4.4.1 Type and Source of Data 
 
This study has incorporated two types of data (primary data and secondary data) in the 
analysis to ensure the reliability and validity of the study (Gujarati, 2006).  In addition, 
the adoption of both types of data is important to get a clear picture of the SOEs’ 
performance before and after the privatization policy was implemented. The period of 
collected data was 2002–2010. This period is considered sufficient to cover the period 
before and after the privatization programme in Libya.   
 
The main sources of the primary data are selected SOEs and their workers. The primary 
data involved the background and financial data of SOEs. These data were collected 
through a survey that involved 13 industrial companies in Libya. The main tool used in 
this study was a questionnaire. The survey was carried out in the selected sites in Libya 
including Tripoli, Zeliten, and Sbrata. The targeted respondents were managers and 
workers.  
 
The secondary data was gathered using library research. Some examples of the 
secondary data used in this study were the financial data of the selected SOEs. The main 
sources of the secondary data were the annual reports of firms, official reports and 
books from several local and state governmental institutions (e.g., the Central Bank of 
Libya Statistical Department and the Ministry of Industry), and international institutions 
such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Development 
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Organization (WDO), the Arab Development Organization (ADO), and the Arab 
Monetary Fund (AMF). In addition, other information has also been collected from 
different international sources. 
 
4.4.2 Collection of Data  
 
In the first step, a questionnaire was developed based on previous literature and 
interview sessions with the industrial company supervisors. The questionnaire was then 
designed and improved after a pilot study was conducted. This pilot step involved 
training participants, ensuring that the questionnaire was well understood by the target 
group, and considering any comments given by this test group. In addition, this step also 
measured the test-re-test reliability of questionnaire. For the pilot study, five copies of 
questionnaire were distributed among workers in each company, giving a total of 65 
copies, of which 55 copies were completed. Only 13 copies were distributed to 
managers, all of which were completed.  
 
To test the reliability of answers the questionnaire was distributed to the same 
respondents a second time after a period of time exceeding two weeks. After comparing 
the correlations between the two scores obtained, no significant discrepancies existed, 
indicating the reliability of these answers. Once the first step had been completed, the 
questionnaire was amended to clear up any problems noted, and a comprehensive 
questionnaire was then developed for distribution to the study group. None of the 
respondents used in the pilot project were used in the study.  
! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! 186!
!
In the second stage, the questionnaire was distributed during the period from July to 
September 2012. Two groups of respondents were given the questionnaire. The first 
group comprised managers of SOEs. The respondents were asked open-ended questions 
about the process of privatisation and its progress. The second group of respondents 
comprised the workers of SOEs. They were asked questions about matters in their 
particular area of expertise. This allowed investigation of their opinions and the reasons 
for the SOEs restructuring and in turn to infer causal relationships between and among 
the variables. The process of distribution and collection of the questionnaire took eight 
weeks: four weeks for distributions and four weeks for receiving their responses. Table 
4.2 indicates the level of response obtained. 
 
Table 4.2 
Response Rate for the Questionnaire 
 
 Managers Workers 
Number of questionnaires Distributed 130 800 
Responses 113 634 
Non-Responses  17 166 
Response rate 87 percent 79 percent 
 
Table 4.2 above shows the response rate for workers and managers. A total of 800 
questionnaires were distributed to workers of which 634 were returned, giving a 
response rate of 79 percent with the non-return of 166 questionnaires, which was 
deemed relatively insignificant. A total 130 questionnaire were distributed to managers 
of which 113 were received, giving a response rate of 87 percent with the non-return of 
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17 questionnaires. Both were excellent response rates, exceeding the 25 percent to 35 
percent usable response rate Fellows and Liu (2003) suggested that was needed to be 
able to draw conclusions from the results. It also met Dillman’s criteria of an average 
acceptable response rate for a survey of between 50 percent and 92 percent (Saunders et 
al., 2009). Secondary data for each SOE were collected for the period from 2002 to 
2010; this was the third stage. It was collected from financial documents such as income 
statements, balance sheets and other supporting financial documents. These were used in 
order to assess the impact of privatization on the operating efficiency, profitability of the 
firm performance. Table 4.3 shows the sources of the secondary data gathered. 
 
Table 4.3 
Sources of Secondary Data 
 
4.5 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN  
 
The questionnaire was designed in a user-friendly multiple-choice format. The 
questionnaire was distributed to the relevant managers of SOEs and workers. Appendix 
1 and Appendix 2 show examples of questionnaires that were distributed. The 
Variable Source of Data 
Profitability Balance Sheets 
Operating Efficiency Balance Sheets, Financial Documents 
Capital Expenditure Balance Sheets 
Employment Financial Documents 
Productivity  Income Statements 
Ownership Financial Documents 
Liquidity  Balance Sheets 
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questionnaire comprised 15 questions related to the nature of privatization and the 
general nature of the company. The questions in the questionnaire focused on the 
possible problems that SOEs might face when they are transformed to the private firms 
and whether these problems prevent the success of the privatization programme. A 
semi-structured approach with mostly multiple-choice questions was selected. The 
multiple-choice questions were based on a 5-point Likert-type scale measuring the level 
of agreement with each statement. The scale ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree. The rating scale for the questionnaire is shown in Table 4.4.  
 
Table 4.4  
Rating Scale for the Questions 
 
 
The questions used in the questionnaire were selected to measure profitability and 
operating efficiency as a dependent variable, and liquidity ratio, capital expenditure, 
ownership structure, productivity, employments a independent variables. The workers 
and managers were asked to state their feelings and experiences about the privatization 
process. To encourage participation, each respondent was approached by telephone prior 
to giving them the questionnaire or personally handed over. The questionnaires were 
distributed to all sub-managers of companies, and the researcher spoke to them face-to-
Point Orientation Average  
5 Strongly Agree 4.50 ≤ Average Index ≤ 5.00 
4 Agree 3.50 ≤ Average Index ≤ 4.50 
3 Not Sure 2.50 ≤ Average Index ≤ 3.50 
2 Disagree 1.50 ≤ Average Index ≤ 2.50 
1 Strongly Disagree 1.00 ≤ Average Index ≤ 1.50 
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face in order to obtain information and to facilitate the completion of the survey study 
process. 
 
4.6  SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
 
There were 13 SOEs from Libyan industries, which were selected as samples for the 
study. Table 4.5 below shows details about the study sample. 
 
Table 4.5 
The Study Samples 
 
 
Company Name Location 
Al Murgab Cement Company 
Zeliten Cement Company 
Libda Cement Company 
Suk El Khamis Complex for Cement 
Alwatanya Company for the Feed Industry   
Al Kass Cement Company 
Libyan Tobacco Company Contribution              
Rabat's Aistoric Fish Canning 
Engineering Industries Company Contribution  
Libyan Company for Pipes Contribute 
Development Company for Vegetable Oil              
Alahlya Cement Company 
Spring Mineral Water Company 
Al Murgab    
Zeliten 
Libda 
Suk El Khamis 
Tripoli                           
Msallata 
Tripoli 
Sbrata 
Tajora 
Tripoli      
lsbea 
Alkamis 
Suke Bn Kesher 
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The total number of workers in these companies was approximately 16,000. Given the 
varying number of workers in each company, sampling error was avoided by using a 
stratified sampling technique. The first step in the process to obtain a representative 
sample from the companies was to determine the entire number of workers in each 
company and then to classify those workers separately. In order to acquire a level of 
confidence of 95 percent, a random sample of 5 percent of workers was chosen from 
each company. Table 4.6 below offers more details about the sample size drawn from 
each company. 
 
Table 4.6 
Sample Size Drawn From Each Company 
 
Company Name Population 
Size 
Percent of total each 
stratum 
Sample 
Size 
Al Murgab Cement Company 980 ×!5!!"#$"%& 49 
Zeliten Cement Company 1020 ×!5!!"#$"%& 51 
Libda Cement Company 1260 ×!5!!"#$"%& 63 
Suk El Khamis Complex for Cement 940 ×!5!!"#$"%& 47 
Alwatanya for the Feed Industry   1520 ×!5!!"#$"%& 76 
Al Kass Cement Company 1160 ×!5!!"#$"%& 58 
Libyan Tobacco Contribution  1580 ×!5!!"#$"%& 79 
Rabat's Aistoric Fish Canning 900 ×!5!!"#$"%& 45 
Engineering Industries Contribution  1200 ×!5!!"#$"%& 60 
Libyan Company for Pipes Contribute 1460 ×!5!!"#$"%& 73 
Development for Vegetable Oil  1280 ×!5!!"#$"%& 64 
Alahlya Cement Company 1340 ×!5!!"#$"%& 67 
Spring Mineral Water Company 1360 ×!5!!"#$"%& 68 
Total 16,000 ×!!!!"#$"%& 800 
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In this study, the sample was divided into managers and workers. The worker sample 
was divided into sections to proportionally disaggregate them and to solve the disparity 
of their numbers in the companies. 
 
Moreover, the researcher also used an econometric method to answer the research 
questions. Primary data was analysed using basic descriptive statistics along with 
econometric analysis using panel data. This study was as an exploratory study using 
descriptive economic analysis – a divergence from the norm of many previous economic 
studies that have focused on privatization. 
  
4.7 METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
 
This study has used both primary data analysis and microeconomic panel data analysis.   
 
4.7.1  Primary Data Analysis 
 
Primary data analysis involves analysis of data obtained from the survey. In the analysis, 
the data are summarized by using descriptive statistics and analyzed by using inferential 
analysis. The main measures of descriptive analysis are the means and standard 
deviations.  Sekaran (2003) contended that a descriptive study is conducted to determine 
and describe the variables characteristics in a given situation. Also, Hedrick et al. (1993) 
contended that a descriptive study aims to shed light on the phenomenon in its natural 
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occurrence. Other results of primary data analysis have been reported using frequency 
and percentage.   
 
Furthermore, the inferential analysis utilizes correlations and the comparison of means 
to achieve the objectives of this study. Correlation analysis examines the inter-
correlations among all variables and gives the direction and strength of a relationship 
through correlation coefficient analysis.  Correlation coefficient indicates the strength of 
the correlation between the two variables (Salkind, 2000).  Mean comparison analysis 
was also used to test the effect of the privatization programme on the firm performance. 
Basically, this analysis looks at the mean differences ( ) of two variables 
before and after privatization programme.  The null and alternative hypotheses of mean 
comparison analysis are  and , respectively. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected at 5 percent level of significance, then we can conclude that mean 
differences exist. 
 
4.7.2   Microeconomic Panel Data Analysis  
 
Microeconomic panel data analysis using a balanced panel data set of the SOEs in the 
context of Libyan industry was also conducted to show the effect of privatization 
programmes. Specifically, the panel data set was employed owing to its appropriateness 
in capturing the variation of SOEs performance indicators over time. This method is also 
capable of controlling individual, firm-specific heterogeneity and the temporal changes 
of firms operating in the market environment (Bortolotti et al., 2002). This panel data 
21 µµµ −=d
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analysis avoids problems stemming from the possible correlations between non-
observable firm features and the individual variables. Moreover, it eradicates the 
underlying heterogeneity of the sample firms (Hausman & Taylor, 1981). Underlying 
heterogeneity may lead to correlations with the dependent variables that would lead to 
coefficient bias.  
 
This study used two models to analyse panel data, namely, the fixed effects model 
(FEM) and the random effects model (REM). Prior to employing further panel data 
analysis, certain econometric assumptions have to be tested.  
Let us take the multiple linear regression models as shown by Equation [7]. 
 
[7]    ;  ,  
 
where  denotes the dependent variables or y = [ROA, ROS, ROE, RS], x'!"denotes 
a k-dimensional row vector of explanatory variables with the exclusion of the constant, α! denotes the intercept, c!denotes an individual-specific, and  denotes a k-
dimensional column vector of parameters. An idiosyncratic error term is denoted by u!"where .  The following assumptions must be fulfilled in the panel data 
analysis: 
 
 i)  and  
it
'
itiiit xcy µβα +++= N,...,i 1= T,...,t 1=
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 ii)  (Mean independent) 
 iii)   and finite (homoscedastic and no serial 
correlation).   
 iv)   (No serial correlation). 
 v)   is p.d. and finite.  
The Data Generation Process (DGP) is described by: 
 
PL1: Linearity !!" = !! + !!"′!" + !! + !!!"              where: E (!!") =!0, E (!!) = 0   
The model is linear in parameters!!,!!, individual !!, individual and error!!!" . 
 
PL2: Independence 
               !!!,!! !!!!       I.I.D. (Independent and Identically Distributed)  
While the observations are independent throughout individuals, this does mean that it is 
so throughout time and random sampling of individuals ensures this. 
 
PL3: Strict Erogeneity 
 E(!!"  \ !!, !!) = 0 (mean independent) 
The researcher assumes that the idiosyncratic error term !!" not to be correlated with all 
past, current and future time periods explanatory variables of the same individual. This 
is a significant assumption that excludes lagged dependent variables. Moreover PL3 also 
considers the idiosyncratic error not to be correlated with the individual specific effect.  
( ) 0=iiit c,X|E µ
( ) 02 >= µσµ iiit c,X|Var
( ) ts,c,X|,Cov iiisit ≠∀= 0µµ
( ) ( )ii,iii Xc,X|Var µµ Ω=
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PL4: Error Variance 
a) V (!!  | !!, !!) = !!!!! > 0 and finite (homoscedastic and no serial correlation).  
b) V (!!"  | !!, !!) = !!! !> 0 !"#!(!!" , !!"  | !!, !!) = 0∀! ≠ ! (no serial correlation). 
c) V (!!  | !!, !!) =!Ω!,! !!  is p.d. and finite.  
 
4.7.2.1     Fixed Effects Model  
 
The fixed effects specifications consider company-specific effects to be fixed 
parameters that have to be estimated. The terms of fixed effect is due to the fact that, 
although the intercept may differ across entities, each entity or individual intercept does 
not vary over time, that is, it is time-invariant. The FEM would take full count of things 
such as geographical factors, natural endowments and any other of the many basic 
factors which very between entities.  Consider the regression model in equation [8] with 
the dependent and independent variables denoted as !!"and!!!" ,!respectively.  
 
[8] !!" = !!! + !!!!!" + !!!!!! + !!" 
 
where !! !is an unobserved variable that varies from one entity to the next but does not 
change over time. The different across entity may be due to special features of each 
entity or individual. For instance, !! represents managerial style, managerial philosophy, 
or the types of market each organization is serving. All behavioral differences between 
entities referred to as individual heterogeneity. We want to estimate !! is the same for 
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all entities. Because !! varies from one entity to the next but is constant over time, the   
population regression model in Equations [8] can be interpreted as having n intercepts, 
one for each entity.  Specifically, let !! = !! !+ !!!!!. The Equation [8] becomes; 
 
[9] !!" = !! + !!!!" + !!!" ;!!!!!! = 1,2,3,4,…… ..N  and  ! = !1,2,3,4,…… ..T 
 
Equation [9] is known as Fixed Effects Model (FEM), in which !!" denotes the 
dependent variable, i denotes the firm, t is the time, and α denotes individual effect that 
can be separated into fixed individual effect and considered constant over time, and is 
unique to the !th firm. Moreover, ! denotes explanatory variables vector, β denotes the 
parameters and !!" represents random unobserved component that comprises of 
unobserved shocks influencing firm performance.  
 
Before assessing the validity of FEM, we need to apply test to check whether fixed 
effect should indeed be included in the model. To do this, the standard F-test can be 
used to check fixed effect against the simple common constant OLS method. The null 
hypothesis is that all the constants are the same (homogeneity), and that therefore the 
common constant method is applicable: 
 
[10] H0 : !! = !!! = !… = !!! 
      
 
The F-statistics is:  
! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! 197!
!
[11] F = (!!"!! !!!!! )/(!!!)(!!!!"! )/!(!"!!!!) !~!!(!!!,!"!!!!) 
 
where !!"!! is the coefficient of determination of the fixed effects model and !!!!  is the 
coefficient of determination of the common constant model. The null hypothesis is 
rejected if F-statistical is bigger than the F-critical at five percent level of significant.  
 
To estimate the fixed effect take the data on individual !: 
 
[12] !!! = !! + !!!!" + !!!"  ; != 1,2,...,T 
 
Average the data across time, by summing both sided of the equation and dividing by: 
 
[13]    !! ! (!!!! !!" = !! + !!!!" + !!!") 
 
Using the fact that the parameters do not change over time, we can simplify this as:  
 [14]   !! = !! ! !!"!!!! = !! + !!! !!! !!" + ! !!!!!! ! !!"!!!!  
               = !! + !!!!!! + !!! 
 
The ‘bar’ notation !! indicated that we have averaged the values of !!" over time. Then 
subtract Equation [14] from Equation [12], term by term, to obtain: !!" = !! + !!!!" + !!!"  
! ! ! ! ! ! !
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    (-) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!= !! + !!!!!! + !!!  
 
[15]  !!" − !!! = !!! !!" − !!! + ! !!" − !!!  
 
In Equation [15], the intercept parameter has fallen out. These data are said to be in 
‘deviation from the individual’s mean’ form. If we repeat this process for each entity, 
then we have a transformed model: 
 
[16]  !!" = !!!!!!" + !!!" 
 
The ‘tilde’ notation !!" = !!" − !!! 
 
Indicates that variables are in deviation from the mean form. Based on Equation [14], 
the coefficient estimates depend only on the variation of the dependent and explanatory 
variable within individuals. Thus, when estimating the effect of X on Y, for example, it 
is only the variation in Y and X over time for each entity that contributes to the 
estimated coefficients. The variation in Y from different entity with different X does not 
play a role. 
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4.7.2.2     Random Effects Model 
 
Random effects model (REM) is based on the rationale that the variation throughout 
entities is deemed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor/independent 
variables in the model. Green (2008) stressed that the significant difference between 
fixed and random effects is whether or not the unobserved individual effect signifies 
elements that are correlated with the repressors in the model as opposed to whether or 
not they are stochastic. Hence the variability of the constant for each entity comes from 
the fact that: 
 
[17] !! = !! + !!! 
 
Where !! !is a zero mean and constant variance, !!!. The term !! is not directly 
observable; it is what is known as an unobservable or latent variable. The REM therefor 
takes the following form: 
 
[18]    !!" = ! ! + !!! + !!!!!!" + !!!" 
[19] !!" = ! + !!!!!" + !! + !!"  
[20] !!" = ! + !!!!!" + !!" 
 
The composite error term, !!"!consists of two components; !!which is the cross-section 
or individual specific, error component, and !!", which is the combined time series and 
cross-section error component and is sometimes called the idiosyncratic term because it 
! ! ! ! ! ! !
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varies over cross-section (i.e. entity) as well as time. The usual assumptions made by the 
REM are that:  
 
[21] !!~! 0,!!!  
[22]   !!"~! 0,!!!  
[23]    E !! !!!" = 0;! !!!! = 0! !! ≠ !  
[24]    E !!"!!!" = ! !!"!!" = ! !!"!!" = 0! !! ≠ !; !! ≠ !  
 
That is, the individual error components are not correlated with each other and are not 
correlated across both cross-section and time-series unit. It is also very important to note 
that !!" is not correlated with any of the explanatory variables included in the model. As 
a result of assumptions stated in Equation [21] – Equation [24], it follows that: 
 
[25]   E !!" = 0 
[26]   !"#! !!" = !!!! + !!!! 
 
As Equation [26] shows, the error term is homoscedastic. However, it can be shown that 
two different time error terms, !!" and !!" ! ≠ !  are correlated; that is, the error terms 
of a given cross-section unit at two different points of time are correlated. The 
correlation coefficient, corr !!"!!" , is as follows: 
 
[27]    ! = !"##! !!"!!" = ! !!!!!!!!!! ; !! ≠ ! 
! ! ! ! ! ! !
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Notice two special features of the preceding correlation coefficient first, for given cross-
sectional unit, the value of correlation between error at two different times remains the 
same no matter how far apart the two time periods are, as is clear from Equation [27] 
remains the same for all cross-sectional units is, it is identical for all subjects.  
 
 
The magnitude of the correlation ! in Equation [27] is an important feature of the REM. 
If !! = 0 for every individual then there are no individual differences and no 
heterogeneity to account for. In such case the pooled linear regression model is 
appropriate and there is no need for either a FEM or REM.  
  
We can test for the presence of heterogeneity by testing the null hypothesis against the 
alternative hypothesis. The test stat statistics is based on the least square residuals for: 
[28] H0 : !!! = 0 (there is no random effects) 
[29] H1 : !!! ≠ 0 
 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, then we conclude there are random individual 
differences among sample members, and that the REM is appropriate. On the other 
hand, if we fail to reject the null hypothesis, then we have no evidence to conclude that 
RE are present.   
 
! ! ! ! ! ! !
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 The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests of Breusch and Pagan (1980) can be used to test the 
present of RE. The test statistics is based on the least square residuals. The test statistics 
for balanced panel is: 
 
[30]  LM= !"! !!!  !!"!!!! !!!!! !!"!!!!!!!! − 1  
 
If we do not take this correlation structure into, the estimate Equation [20] by OLS, the 
resulting estimators will be inefficient. The most appropriate method here is the method 
of generalized least square (GLS).  
 
4.7.2.3    Hausman Test 
 
In the determination of the more preferable model, this study made use of the Hausman 
test to identify whether or not the unobservable heterogeneity is correlated with the 
explanatory variables as recommended by Hausman (1978). This indicates that 
coefficients estimated with the help of fixed-effects estimator and those by random 
effect estimator are not statistically different. A significant result of the Hausman test 
calls for the use of the fixed effects model but an insignificant result calls for the use of 
the random effect model. In other words the null hypothesis that  the random effects are 
consistent and efficient or the random effects are inconsistent and inefficient (as the 
fixed effects will be always consistent) that calls us to use the fixed effect model. 
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The test developed by Hausman has an asymptotic !!distributions. If the null hypothesis 
is rejected, the conclusion is that the random effects model is not appropriate because 
the random effects are probably correlated with one or more repressors. In this case, 
fixed effects model if preferred to random effects model. If the null hypothesis were 
true, we can reject the random effects model in favor of fixed effects model. The 
estimates are reached with the help of STATA 11.0, which is described as an 
econometric package that enables corrections that involve error term heteroscedasticity 
and auto-correlation.  
 
4.8  CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter summarizes the research methods employed, specifically the quantitative 
methods utilized in the economic reality of Libya through the application of the 
privatization policy. The study used statistical method (SPSS) to analytically interpret 
the economic phenomenon, and a panel data analysis and equation [2] estimation to 
analyze the financial data. The estimates were drawn through STATA 11.0, an 
econometric package that enables corrections that involve heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation of the error term. The analysis was conducted by controlling various 
variables addressed in literature that could shed a light on the influence of SOEs 
privatization. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
!
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION  
!
Chapter Five reveals the research findings of primary and secondary data analysis. The 
results of primary data analysis are reported in Sections 5.1- 5.4. Meanwhile, the results 
obtained from the microeconomic panel data analysis are discussed in Section 5.5 and 
Section 5.6. Finally, conclusion is provided in Section 5.7.   
 
5.1 RESULTS OF PRIMARY DATA ANALYSIS 
!
This session discusses the profile and attitude of respondents toward privatization and its 
impact of privatization on the firm’s performance. The constraints of the implementation 
of privatization program in Libya have also been discussed.  
 
5.1.1 Profile of Respondents 
!
This section provides the profile characteristics respondents, managers and workers, 
who participated in the survey. Their profiles include education level, occupation, and 
experience. The profile analyses are reported in frequencies and percentages. This 
! ! ! ! ! ! !
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analysis is considered as vital in this study because it helps us to understand the actual 
players in the implementation of privatization program. 
!
5.1.1.1   Occupation of Respondents 
!
Table 5.1 shows the different types of respondents’ occupation. The managers as writers 
and auditors are the highest percentage of respondents. This group represents 16.8 
percent of the total respondents. Meanwhile, the highest percentage of respondent 
among workers is classified as general worker, which involve 20.7 percent and followed 
by officer (19.6 percent). Therefore, general workers dominate the types of occupation 
in the selected SOEs. This excess of workers was a result of the government 
employment policy. 
 
Table 5.1 
Occupation Profile of Managers and Workers 
  
 
Types of Occupation Manager Worker 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Accountant 18 15.9 45 7.1 
Engineer 18 15.9 38 6.0 
Writer 19 16.8 24 3.8 
Auditor 19 16.8 33 5.2 
Supervisor 16 14.2 57 9.0 
Administrative Assistant 13 11.5 83 13.1 
Technician 10 8.8 59 9.3 
Human Resource Management   10 1.6 
Quartermaster   8 1.3 
Interpreter   15 2.4 
Officer   124 19.6 
General Worker   131 20.7 
Legal Consultant   7 1.1 
! ! ! ! ! ! !
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5.1.1.2   Experience of Respondents 
 
Furthermore, Table 5.2 exhibits years of experience of respondents. The results reveal 
that 35.0 percent of respondents have more than 26 to 30 years, which is the highest 
percentage of respondents. This indicates that the majority of the responding managers 
had sufficient experience in managing SOEs.  
 
They can provide adequate and accurate information to the researcher. It was also 
noticed that all managers in the selected companies had worked in these companies for 
more than 25 years. On the other hand, the results of analysis reveals that more than 58 
percent of respondents among workers have experience of five to 10 years and less than 
five years. Thus it was concluded that the SOEs had many young productive workers 
with reliable working experience.  
 
Table 5.2 
Experience Years of Respondents 
 
 
 
 
Experience (years) Manager Worker 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Less than 5  2 1.8 167 26.3 
5 to 10  31 27.4 202 31.9 
11 to 15  4 3.5 139 21.9 
16 to 20  17 15.0 67 10.6 
21 to 25  18 15.9 42 6.6 
26 to 30  40 35.0 13 2.1 
More than 30  1 0.9 4 0.6 
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5.1.1.3   Educational Level of Respondents 
 
Table 5.3 displays educational level of respondents. Among managers, the sample 
indicates that 74.2 percent and 19.5 percent of respondents possessed undergraduate and 
master degree, respectively. It is estimated that more than 93 percent of the managers 
were skilled. In contrast, the percentage of workers who have secondary, intermediate 
and diploma is the highest (87.12 percent) This result explains that the government 
employs more skilled workers in the selected companies. 
 
Table 5.3 
Educational Level of Respondents  
 
 
5.1.2   Attitudes of Managers Toward Privatization  
 
Management support and cooperation of the respondents or workers to achieve the 
target of organization are generally acknowledged as a significant factor in the success 
of privatization programmes (Hawadana, 2003; Hall et al., 2005). This is due to the fact 
that managers in the big organizations have direct responsibility in the privatization 
Educational Level Manager Worker 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Little Formal  - - 3 0.5 
Elementary - - 50 7.9 
Secondary 1 0.9 95 15.0 
Intermediate 6 5.3 242 38.2 
Diploma - - 215 33.9 
Undergraduate                        84 74.2 28 4.4 
Masters   22 19.5 - - 
Doctorate - - 1 0.2 
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process, and some of them may continue in their positions following privatization. In 
fact, Table 5.4 shows that 65.5 percent of respondents among managers prefer 
privatization programmes.  
 
Table 5.4 
Attitude of Managers Toward Privatization 
 
 
Furthermore, additional questions were asked to the respondents concerning their 
preference toward privatization programme and their responses are displayed in Table 
5.5. This table shows that 31.9 percent of managers agreed that they fear production 
may not continue, 33.9 percent of them fear about inadequate capital, and 30 percent of 
them fear for their job loss following privatization.  
 
5.1.3   Attitudes of Workers Toward Privatization  
 
The fear perceived by the workers as far as privatization is concerned stems from the 
notion that privatization may result in their job loss. This notion holds some truth as 
shown by companies in both the U.K. and Thailand (Van de Walle, 1994). This is 
however, not often the reality as owners are more likely to retain their old employees or 
they may even employ more to assist successful management (Tordoffa, 1994). 
 
Item Frequency Percent 
No 39 34.5 
Yes 74 65.5 
Total 113 100.0 
! ! ! ! ! ! !
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For instance, in the context of Bangladesh, the contract of sale of firms mandated the 
new owners committed to refrain from conducting redundancies, as there were other 
alternatives for the government. These actions include collaboration with private sector 
in employing workers who are fired from the privatized firms (Vuylsteke, 1988). Owing 
to the significance of this factor, it is important to determine the perception of workers 
prior to the implementation of privatization prgramme. For the case of Libya, Table 5.6 
shows that 61.5 percent of respondents were pro-privatization, whereas the remaining 
38.5 percent were against it. 
 
Table 5.6 
Workers Attitudes Toward Privatization 
 
Furthermore, Table 5.7 shows the respondents’ favor to privatization programme. The 
table clearly displays that 61 percent of the workers agreed to privatization because they 
expect to get higher salaries while 0.5 percent of them were neutral concerning salaries.   
Item Frequency Percent 
No 244 38.5 
Yes 390 61.5 
Total 634 100.0 
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With regards to promotion opportunities, 60 percent of workers agreed with this 
expectation while one percent of the respondents were neutral. Meanwhile, 59 percent of 
the workers agreed with expecting better working conditions following privatization and 
two percent of the respondents were neutral. According to these results, it is logical to 
state that workers are of the consensus that these factors are significant reasons behind 
their pro-privatization stance.  
 
On the contrary, there are 38.5 percent of respondents among workers who are against 
the privatization prgramme. Table 5.8, reflects the main reasons of workers toward their 
anti-privatization stance. Specifically, over 38 percent of respondents were agreed with 
the fearing of losing their jobs, 37.5 percent agreed (incorporated agree and strongly 
agree) with the fearing of discontinued production and finally, 37.4 percent agreed with 
the fearing of inadequate capital.  
 
5.1.4   Perception of Respondents  on Firm Performance After Privatization 
 
Normally, the primary motivation of privatization among industrial firms originates 
from the need to improve performance. However, in the context of an economic 
environment where the economic policy reforms are employed simultaneously and 
sequentially, it become difficult to distinguish the effect of privatization on economic 
performance. 
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In Libyan context, the implementation of the privatization programme is for maximizing 
production, improving workers’ income and minimizing the burden on the government 
subsidies to public firms. In this study, the firms’ performance is gauged via questions 
that addressed many performance factors after the privatization. These include 
production method, profitability, sales and capital. The following sub-sections explain 
these aspects in detail. 
 
5.1.4.1   Productivity     
 
Productivity is considered as the association between the input used and the output 
produced in the production process. It is defined as the efficient utilization of inputs 
such as labor, capital, land, equipment, power and information regarding the produced 
commodities or the efficiency of production (Lopez-Calva, 1998). In other words, 
productivity is reflected by the ratio of output and input. The greater the ratio, the 
greater will be the productivity. In this context, it can be contended that following 
privatization, firms expect to increase their output because of the dynamic competition 
and higher motivation (Megginson et al., 1994). Stated differently, privatization boosts 
efficiency and increases investment and hence output is expected to increase (Kikeri et 
al., 1994). Several questions that arise after the implementation of privatization include 
those addressing production increase, labor productivity increase, input costs decrease, 
and improvement of production methods.  Responses of the respondents to these queries 
are displayed in Table 5.9. This table shows that over 58 percent of the respondents 
agreed that the production of output increases after privatization, 56.6 percent agreed 
! ! ! ! ! ! !
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with increase in labor productivity, 52.2 percent agreed with the minimization of 
production costs, and 45.1 percent agreed with some enhancement in the methods of 
production. 
 
5.1.4.2   Profitability, Sales and Capital 
 
In the developing nations, several studies assessed the pre-privatization and post- 
privatization performance of firms and concluded that privatization does lead to 
performance improvement (Kikeri & Nellis, 2004). Theoretical and empirical studies in 
literature show that ownership transfer from public to private sector should lead to the 
increase of the firms’ profitability and efficiency as public enterprises often serve the 
objectives of politicians, which more often than not, excludes profit maximization 
(Megginson et al., 1994; Megginson, 2001; Omran, 2004). On the other hand, owing to 
the specific economic standards that the private sector is operating under, the primary 
targets are profits and revenue increase. 
 
In this study, the question Five Section [5, 6 and 7] in the survey were developed to 
cater to profitability, sales issues and capital after the implementation of privatization 
programme. The respondents’ answers are displayed in Table 5.10. Over 45 percent of 
the respondents agreed that sales of firms increased after privatization and 46.9 percent 
agreed that profitability increased after privatization. These results may be attributed to 
the adequate capital owned by the privatized firms. Moreover, 69 percent agreed with 
the capital increase after privatization. 
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5.1.5   Information, Decision-Making, Control and Supervision  
 
Lack of authentic information of internal workplace (among management and 
workforce) and external workplace (in the market) reflects among the top issues facing 
public institutions. Contrastingly, the private sector has ample access to all relevant 
information owing to the presence of accuracy and transparency. In addition, 
management’s daily supervision of staff and owner’s supervision of management leads 
to direct relationship among all the parties and this stresses on the significance of private 
ownership (Gupta, 2005).  
 
Furthermore, the changes brought about by the private sector are likely to eliminate 
restrictions and regulations that control the company and prevent quick processes of 
decision making. For instance, these centralized systems enable effectiveness of 
management as they can concentrate on the immediate business aims of the organization 
as opposed to the national objectives that has to do with social welfare.  
 
In the survey, the questions were posed to address the above factors and the results are 
depicted in Table 5.11. The results show that more than 82 percent agreed with the 
improvement in observation and supervision after privatization, the second high 
important value reflects that the 75.5 percent agreed with the decision making, that is 
mean improvements in the privatization prgramme; and finally 69 percent for getting 
information.  
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5.1.6   Impact of Privatization on Workers 
 
The great fear which most governments have expressed is that, the objectives of 
efficiency and profitability as a result of privatization can only be achieved at the cost of 
large scale job losses.  
 
In addition the main objectives of privatization also include improving conditions of 
workers, both financially and environmentally. In the context of the former, incentives 
and bonuses are offered to the employees to encourage their productivity. In the latter 
improvement, management can boost higher performance of workers by enhancing their 
working environment and condition.  
 
 
In this study, five questions were developed to determine the effect of privatization on 
the performance of workers. The results presented in Table 5.12 show that 56.9 percent 
of the workers agreed that job motivation is improved, 60 percent of them agreed with 
the improvement of working conditions, 71 percent agreed with the provision of 
improved incentives, and 61.6 percent agreed with improved health and safe workplace. 
It can thus be concluded that significant improvement took place following privatization 
in all factors as indicated in Table 5.12. 
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5.1.7  Constraints and Obstacles to Privatization Programme in Libya 
 
Private management and staff generally go against privatization programs. At the onset, 
managers are afraid that they may lose their positions because of privatization as they 
are often under qualified and lack the necessary knowledge concerning the nature of 
privatization (Hawadana, 2003). Therefore, gaining management and staff’s trust in 
public institutions is a condition to the successful process of privatization (Hawadana 
2003; Hall et al., 2005). Decision makers should thus carry out initial field surveys in 
the target firm to determine the managers and workers’ opinion and their 
agreement/objection towards privatization. In case of opposition, then decision makers 
may use various ways to approach management and staff in order to enlighten them on 
the benefits of the privatization program. The top most methods used include; 
 
i. Engaging management and staff in dialogue at the onset and providing them an 
overview of the concept of privatization, its objectives and significance, benefits 
and privileges that the workers may obtain in lieu of giving up their control over 
the institution (partially or completely) (Awamleh, 2002). 
ii. Decision makers may also stage media campaigns that feature information 
concerning the actual financial status of the targeted companies. 
iii. Another approach is to bring forward mechanisms that would secure staff rights 
of job retention after privatization like compensation payment, free or low-priced 
shares in the privatized firms, early retirement and severance benefits to bring 
! ! ! ! ! ! !
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about voluntary turnover instead of layoffs to those affected by the privatization 
prgramme (Kikeri & Nellis, 2004).  
 
It is worth noting that developing countries, like New Zealand, have employed the 
above methods before any privatization program. The New Zealand government 
published information involving damages resulting from public sector organizations’ 
under performance, which renders privatization acceptable and even necessary to the 
public (Shirley & Nellis, 1991).  
 
Another instance is SOEs employees in the context of Ghana, which were considered 
redundant. These employees were given the recourse of ten years salary (Clifford, 
1993). 
 
Table 5.13 shows the frequency and percentage of managers’ attitudes towards obstacles 
to privatization in Libya. From Table 5.13, the field survey pointed out that all the 
obstacles mentioned having percentage responses of less than 25 percent  (agree or 
strongly agree).  As a result of that, privatization in Libya has faced small difficulties 
according to the views of the managers. 
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5.2  DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS  
 
Table 5.14 displays a summary of the main variables and some of its statistical 
characteristics. The total observations are 104. This table shows that the mean of PFT 
variable is extremely high, but its standard deviation is extremely small. These results 
indicate that there is stability in the profit maximization during the study period.!!
!
Meanwhile, OPE shows an extremely high mean and extremely high standard deviation, 
which indicate that the whys of OPE are tableted away from mean during the period of 
study. Furthermore, other variables except PFT, OPE, LIQ and EMP show low mean 
and low standard deviation. 
 
Table 5.14 
 Summary Statistics for the Variables 
 
 
5.3  CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
 
Correlation measures the strength of the relationship among variables. The result of 
Pearson correlations of all variables is displayed in Table 5.15. Specifically, the results 
show that there is positive correlation between OPE and all variables except LIQ and 
Variable          Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
OPE 101055.1     329714.8 0.94 1864234.0 
PFT 5003093 1.544407 -3.36 5.011107 
LIQ 44.6938     246.0469 0.39 2148.0 
PRO 1.688807     3.911107 334392 2.11108 
CAP 14.25641            8.873447 1.00 29.0 
OWS 3.794872     3.220708 1.00 11.0 
EMP 607.0513    438.9051 100.0 1682.0 
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EMP. A positive correlation indicates that OPE increases as these variables increase. 
The strongest significant correlation exists between OPE and OWS. Meanwhile, PFT 
has positive correlation with other variables except PRO and LIQ. Among these 
variables, the strongest significant correlation is between PFT and PRI with the 
coefficient correlation value 0.56. Among all variables, the correlation between PRI and 
OWS is the highest since the correlation value is 0.79. The lowest correlation is between 
EMP and LIQ with the negative coefficient correlation value -0.14.   
 
5.4  MEAN COMPARISON ANALYSIS 
 
The mean comparison analysis was carried out to find whether there are any significant 
differences between mean of each variable before and after privatization prgramme. The 
analysis involved two samples, pre-privatization and post-privatization samples. The 
paired-samples !-test for mean difference has been used to tests the data. Table 5.16 
shows the results of paired-samples t-test using the mean comparison analysis of each 
variable. The results show that the mean difference values of PFT, OPE, CAP, OWS, 
PRO and EMP are significantly different from zero since all the corresponding two-
tailed p-value are less than 0.05. These results indicate significant difference in the mean 
values of these variables in the pre- and post-privatization, except variable EMP. We 
can conclude that the mean values of PFT, OPE, CAP, OWS, PRO in the post-
privatization are higher than pre-privatization. In contrast, the mean of EMP in the post-
privatization is lower than pre-privatization.  
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5.5  THE RESULTS OF MICROECONOMIC PANEL ANALYSIS 
!
The analysis consists of three main sections. The first section reveals the results of the 
fixed effects estimation results, the second section revels the results of the random 
effect estimation results and the third section presents the Hausman test results. 
!
5.5.1 Fixed Effects Estimation Results  
!
Before estimating, the verification of the models FEM has been done using F-test for 
model 1- model 6. The F-statistics results are presented in Tables 5.17 and Table 5.18. 
The results of verification show that the prob. (F) for these models are less than five 
percent, it means that FEM can be used to estimate the models.   
 
Using FEM estimation, Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 have been estimated with OPE 
as dependent variable. Model 1 is considered as a basic model, which include PRI, PRO, 
CAP and EMP as independent variables.  In addition to these variables, OWS and LIQ 
are also included in Model 2 and Model 3, respectively. Furthermore, Table 5.18 
displays FEM estimation results using PFT as dependent variable. In this table, three 
alternative models, Model 4, Model 5, and Model 6 have been estimated with PFT as 
dependent variable. Model 4, is the basic model, which includes PRI, PRO, CAP and 
EMP as independent variables. Model 5 and Model 6 include OWS and LIQ, 
respectively as an additional variable in each model. 
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5.5.2 Random Effects Estimation Results 
!
The alternative model for panel estimation is REM. Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test has 
been conducted to verify using REM.!This test also helps us to decide between a random 
effects regression and a simple OLS regression. The results of LM tests are shown in 
Table 5.19 and Table 5.20. These results prove that the null hypothesis can be rejected 
and suggest that REMs is appropriate. Furthermore, Table 5.19 presents the results of 
random effects estimation of Model 7, Model 8, and Model 9. In these models, OPE 
represents the dependent variable. Model 7 is basic model, which includes PRI, PRO, 
CAP and EMP as independent variables. Model 8 and Model 9 include OWS and LIQ, 
respectively as an additional variable in each model. 
 
Table 5.20 explains random effects estimation results of panel data using PFT as 
dependent variable. In this table, three alternative models, Model 10, Model 11, and 
Model 12 have been estimated.  Model 10, is the basic model, which includes PRI, PRO, 
CAP and EMP as independent variables. Model 11 and Model 12 include OWS and 
LIQ, respectively as an additional variable in each model.  
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5.5.3  Hausman Test  
!
The null hypothesis of the Hausman test states that REM is more appropriate than FEM. 
The results of the Hausman test of three models (Model 13, Model 14, Model 15) with 
OPE as the dependent variable are shown in Table 6.21. Prob. ( ) values of Model 13 
(FEM1 and REM7), Model 14 (FEM 2 and REM 8), and Model 15 (FEM 3 and REM 9) 
are 0.801, 0.827 and 0.655, respectively. These prob. ( ) values are more than five 
percent level of significance, which means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Thus, the REM is the most robust model. 
 
Table 5.21 
Hausman Test Estimation Results: Operating Efficiency 
 
2χ
2χ
Model 13 
 (b) Fixed (B) Random (b-B) Difference sqrt(diag(V_bV_B)) 
PRI 223203.1 142454.9 80748.2 84937.1 
PRO 0.003 0.003 0.0001 0.0003 
CAP 4470.0 4309.3 160.8 1105.4 
EMP -241.5 -225.2 -16.3 29.8 
Prob ( ) = 0.801 
Model 14 
PRI 16523.8 -82544.8 99068.6 84570.7 
PRO 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.0003 
CAP 3939.5 3986.8 -47.3 1122.4 
OWS 43832.4 45555.3 -1722.9 6411.4 
EMP -251.1 -245.1 -6.0 29.1 
Prob ( ) = 0.827 
Model 15 
LIQ -131.2 -77.9 -53.2 54.5 
PRI 219541.2 145635.0 73906.2 84835.9 
PRO 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
CAP 3778.3 33963.2 -184.9 1179.0 
EMP  -227.5 -16.0 29.1 
Prob ( ) = 0. 655 
2χ
2χ
2χ
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The results of the Hausman test of three models (Model 16, Model 17, Model 18) with 
PFT as the dependent variable are shown in Table 5.22.   Prob. ( ) values of Model 16 
(FEM 4 and REM 10), Model 17 (FEM 5 and REM 11), and Model 18 (FEM 6 and 
REM 12) are 0.530, 0.586 and 0.697, respectively.  These prob. ( ) values are more 
than five percent level of significance, which means that the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. Thus, the REM is the most robust model. 
 
Table 5.22 
Hausman Test Estimation Results: Profitability 
 
 
2χ
2χ
Model 16 
 (b) Fixed (B) Random (b-B) Difference sqrt (diag(V_bV_B)) 
PRI 1.5 1.8 -2512150.0 3900876 
PRO -0.02 -0.01 -0.001 0.01 
CAP -270158.8 -279889.8 9730.9 46162.4 
EMP 8585.3 9762.6 -1177.4 1259.7 
Prob ( ) = 0.530 
Model 17 
PRI 1.3 1.3 -266673.9 3971451.0 
PRO -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0147603.0 
CAP -276023.7 -286382.7 10359.02 49495.7 
EMP 8479.2 9362.4 -883.2 1286.3 
OWS 484506.2 917186.8 -432680.6 284001.5 
Prob ( ) = 0.586 
Model 18 
LIQ 755.3 654.0 101.3 2413.5 
PRI 1.5 1.8 -2464372.0 3920421.0 
CAP -266175.0 -276984.9 10809.9 51345.2 
EMP 8597.1 9781.9 -1184.9 1265.2 
PRO -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.0 
Prob ( ) = 0.697. 
2χ
2χ
2χ
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The estimation result of the Hausman test as presented in Model 16, shows Prob. ( ) = 
0.5299 which is more than five percent for both models, FEM 4 and REM 10. That 
means the null hypothesis, which says random effect model is more appropriate, cannot 
be rejected. Then we reject fixed effect model with this result therefore, one can 
conclude that random effect model is the most appropriate and robust model.  
 
The Hausman test of Model 17 shows that Prob. ( ) = 0.589 is more than five percent 
for both models, FEM 5 and REM 11. That means the null hypothesis, which says 
random effect model is more appropriate, cannot be rejected. Then we reject fixed effect 
model with this result therefore, one can conclude that random effect model is the most 
appropriate and robust model. 
 
In Model 18, Hausman test shows Prob. ( ) = 0.6973 is more than 0.05 percent for 
both models (FEM 6, REM 12). That means the null hypothesis, which says random 
effect model is more appropriate, cannot be rejected. Then we reject fixed effect model 
with this result therefore, one can conclude that random effect model is the most 
appropriate and robust model. 
 
5.5.4  Diagnostic Checking Results  
 
This study has employed several diagnostic tests such as Pesaran’s (2004) cross-
sectional dependence (CD) test, serial correlation check, Pair-wise Pearson correlation 
2χ
2χ
2χ
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matrix for multicollinearity and homoscedasticity test was also carried out to assuming 
homoscedastic disturbances. The results of diagnostic checking are shown in Table 5.23 
and Table 5.24. 
 
Table 5.23 
Diagnostic Checking Results 
 
 
FEMs 
Pesaran’s (CD) Test Homoscedasticity Test 
 Prob. ( )  Prob. ( ) 
Model 1 0.726 0.4678 0.18 0.7238 
Model 2 0.237 0.8129 0.14 0.7131 
Model 3 0.429 0.6678 0.92 0.3368 
Model 4 1.396 0.1628 0.22 0.6399 
Model 5 1.878 0.0604 0.41 0.5210 
Model 6 1.766 0.0774 0.21 0.6490 
 
Since this study used a small sample, there was no need to check for evidence of serial 
correlation. Serial correlation is suitable for macro panel analysis with long time series, 
for instance more thane 20 years. It is not a problem in micro panels with very few 
years. The impact of cross-sectional dependence in estimation naturally depends on a 
variety of factors, such as the magnitude of the correlations across cross-sections and the 
nature of cross-sectional dependence itself. Assuming that cross-sectional dependence is 
caused by the presence of common factors, which are unobserved (and as a result, the 
effect of these components is felt through the disturbance term) but they are 
uncorrelated with the included repressors, the standard FEM and REM estimators are 
consistent, although not efficient, and the estimated standard errors are biased.  
2χ 2χ 2χ 2χ
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This study has used Pesaran’s (2004) cross-sectional dependence (CD) test to check the 
null hypothesis if that residuals across entities are not correlated. . In other words the 
null hypothesis that  the cross-sectional independence. The results of CD test prove that 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and suggest that there is no cross-sectional 
dependence. 
 
Moreover, FEM models were tested for assuming homoscedastic disturbances, because 
when heteroscedasticity if present, results in consistent estimates of regression 
coefficients but these estimates are not efficient (Baltagi, 2001). In this study, 
heteroscedasticity in all FEMs have been tested using Breusch-Pagan-Cook-Weisberg 
test. Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg tests the null hypothesis that the error variances are 
all equal versus the alternative that the error variances are a multiplicative function of 
one or more variables. It means the alternative hypothesis states that the error variances 
increase (or decrease) as the predicted values of Y increase, e.g. the bigger the predicted 
value of Y, the bigger the error variance is.  
 
A large ( ) would indicate that heteroscedasticity was present. For example in Model 
1, the results of Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg tests show that the Prob. ( ) value is 
small (1) = 0.18 and Prob. ( ) = 0.7238, indicating that heteroskedasticity was 
probably not a problem. However results of testing Model 1 - Model 6 are shown in 
Table 6.23. These results indicate that heteroskedasticity was probably not a problem (or 
2χ
2χ
2χ 2χ
! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! 240!
!
at least that if it was a problem, it was not a multiplicative function of the predicted 
values), and ( ) value was small for each model. 
 
Finally, this study was tested for multicollinearity to check if there was near linear 
perfect relationship among the explanatory variables. It means that observations or 
independent variables must not be influenced by other independent variables (Pallant, 
2005). High multicollinearity results in the regression coefficients being unstable and 
the standard errors for the coefficients can get wildly inflated, making precise estimation 
difficult. We used correlation matrix to check for multicollinearity. This test is based on 
Pair-wise Pearson correlation matrix for the variables and the results of the test indicates 
that multicollinearity is not a problem as the correlations between all variables are 
relatively low. The results are shown in Table 5.24. 
 
Table 5.24  
Result of Multicollinearity Test using Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable PRI PRO CAP WOS LIQ EMP Cons 
PRI  1.0000         
PRO 0.1316 1.0000      
CAP -0.0247 -0.0808 1.0000     
WOS -0.7922 -0.0580 0.0259 1.0000    
LIQ -0.0609 -0.0643 0.2097 -0.0102 1.0000   
EMP 0.1350 -0.3970 -0.2541 -0.1616 0.0748 1.0000  
Cons -0.1409 0.0848 -0.5402 -0.1534 -0.2116 -0.3727 1.0000 
!
2χ
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According to Gujarati (2003), multicollinearity could be a problem when the correlation 
exceeded 0.80. This test shows low inter-correlation among the explanatory variables 
used in the regression indicating no reason to suspect serious multicollinearity. 
!
5.6  DISCUSSIONS OF THE RESULTS 
This section analyses the result of the 12 models presented above in order to show the 
impact of privatization in the context of Libya economy. In all the models, six 
independent variables were employed which consist of PRO, OWS, EMP, CAP, PRI 
and LIQ, while the two dependent variable are OPE and PFT. Both the random and 
fixed effects were estimated. The fixed effect model has constant slopes but vary 
intercepts according to the cross-sectional (group) unit and constant overtime. Although 
there are no significant temporal effects, there are significant differences between firms 
in this type of model. The intercept in random effects model is random, where the 
random outcome is a function of a mean value plus a random error (Manez, Rochina, 
and Sanchis, 2004). 
 
The Hausman test is a tool used to identify whether the fixed or random effects model 
should be chosen. The question is whether there is a significant correlation between the 
unobserved (unit of observation) specific random effects and the explanatory variables. 
If there is such a correlation, fixed effects model is the consistent model. If there is no 
such a correlation, the random effects model is the consistent and robust model (Manez; 
Rochina & Sanchis, 2004). The study uses Stata 11.2 software as a tool used in 
! ! ! ! ! ! !
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estimating the study’s models. The fixed effects will have been the appropriate 
specification if we are focusing on a specific set of firms as targeted group. Hence, the 
random effects model is the most robust and appropriate specification if we are drawing 
N individuals randomly from a large population (Baltagi, 2000).  
 
In this study both random and fixed effects estimation are done. In addition, the 
Hausman test is conducted to show the most appropriate model to choose for decision 
making. The results of the test indicate that random is the most appropriate model for all 
estimation of all models. 
!
5.6.1  Discussion of Random Effect Operating Efficiency Results 
!
Flowing from the property rights and public choice literature, privatization is expected 
to increase efficiency after the organization has been privatized. After privatization, 
firms are expected to employ their human, financial and technological resources more 
efficiently because of a greater stress on profit goals and a reduction of government 
subsidies (Kikeris, Nellis & Shirley, 1992). 
 
The result of analysis shows that the coefficients of PRI in Models 7, and Model 9 are 
positively and statistically significant at five percent level of significance. Privatization 
dummy oriented is used to be equal to one if the firm is fully or partially privatized 
oriented and zero otherwise. This result shows that there is positive relationship between 
PRI and OPE, implying that the privatization implementation positively improved the 
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OPE of the firm in Libya. Because the primary aim of the privatized firm is to increase 
profits at minimum costs, it is expected that privatization can fully enhance the Libyan 
firms’ operating efficiency.  
 
There is very strong support that the PRI development leads to an important change in 
efficiency. Some studies such as Frydman (1999), Laporta et al. (1999) and Ramamurti 
(1997) found that the privatization does have a positive effect on firm performance. This 
resulted from sales efficiency showing a positive change in mean after the period 
following privatization but negatively resulted in light of income efficiency and asset 
turnover. Result of this study also is consistent with the number of previous studies 
using panel data, such as Boubakri and Cosset (1998). These studies found that 
privatization is a positive step significantly related to the efficiency.!In addition,!on the 
base of a sample of 500 companies in more than 32 countries, Dewenter and Malatesta 
(2001) present empirical evidence that SOEs firms are less efficient than private firms. 
 
The results of analysis show that coefficients of PRI in Model 8 are insignificant at five 
percent level of significance. These mean that PRI do not have any significant 
relationship with OPE. This indicates that the implementation of privatization lacks 
impact on operating efficiency. This result could be explained by the partial 
privatization effect in the Libyan economy at that period of the study. Some previous 
studies such as Boardman and Vining (1989) have found similar results where partial 
privatization may not be the best strategy for a government wishing to move away from 
reliance on state ownership and hoped to improve the operating efficiency of the firms.  
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Results also show that coefficients of PRO in all models, Model 7, Model 8 and Model 
9 are positive and significant at five percent level. The positive sign implies that when 
PRO level increases by one unit the expected value of OPE of the firm under 
privatization increases by 0.003 of sales. The significant positive sign indicates that 
PRO has a key role in increasing the OPE level of firms undergoing privatization. The 
observed increase in output seems to be the reflection of the increased productivity of 
the privatized firms. It is not surprising to expect that privatization would improve the 
firms’ profit earnings by increase in the unit of output. Governments hope and expect 
that productivity will increase after privatization because newly privatized firms now 
have better incentives, more flexible financing opportunities, increased competition and 
greater scope for entrepreneurial initiatives.  
 
Results of analysis show that the privatization has a positive effect on operating 
efficiency, when the gains in productivity will be passed to firms in the form of higher 
performance. It can be stated that improvement of OPE is realized following 
privatization. This result is consistent with the evidence provided by previous studies 
such as Megginson, et al. (1994), Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) and Boubakri and 
Cosset (1998). They found a significant increases in efficiency and real output of the 
firms’ experience in the 3 year post-privatization period as compared to the 3 year pre-
privatized period. From their survey of 118 companies from 29 countries and 28 
industries they find that the return on sales increases by 3.2 percent while labor 
productivity increases by 0.07 percent. They conclude that firms significantly increase 
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efficiency and real sales following privatization. In addition, studies of D’souza and 
Megginson (1999) have found similar results where productivity appears to be 
positively significant in impacting operational efficiency.    
 
Meanwhile, results of analysis show that the coefficients of EMP in Models 7, Model 8, 
and Model 9 are negatively and statistically significant at five percent level. Before 
discussing the statistical results of this variable, it is worth mentioning that there is 
neither theoretical nor empirical consensus with regard to the impact of employment on 
the firm performance. On one hand, privatization might lead to an increase in the level 
of employment, since privatized firms probably would target growth and expand their 
investment spending. On the other hand, it is confirmed that most SOEs tend to be 
overstaffed for many social reasons; hence, extensive layoffs would be expected.  
 
The results of analysis document significant decreases in the level of EMP at the five 
percent level after the privatization implemented , which justifies that the government of 
Libya before privatization may utilize more than what they actually need owing to 
political and social justifications and most of the time the government’s motive for 
creation of industries is not profit making rather it is to cater for the masses immediate 
needs while private firms may try to increase production efficiency  after privatization 
through various means other than increasing employment value. On the contrary, firms 
after privatization attempt at increasing OPE through other means instead of increasing 
the value of EMP. Thus, private firms attempt at maximizing profit at low cost and low 
EMP level.  
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The direction of the impact was found to be consistent with theoretical expectations for 
some previous studies such as D’Souza and Megginson (1999). Their studies found a 
negative correlation between EMP and OPE under the period of privatization. In 
addition, this result regarding employment is consistent with prior studies of Ramamurti 
(1997) and Laporta et al. (1999). These studies! found that the! ratios of investment to 
sales and investment to fixed assets significantly increase after privatization while 
employment significantly decreases. 
 
The results of analysis show that the coefficients of CAP in Models 7, Model 8, and 
Model 9 are not statistically significant. This indicates that the CAP does not have any 
significant relationship with OPE. 
 
This result may be explained by what the previous studies reported such as Earle and 
Estrin (1997). They argue that the efficiency may be poor due to measures of behavioral 
change in the short-run because many types of restructuring may impose higher short-
run costs. Therefore, one can say that capital may not really have an effect on the 
operational efficiency in the short-run but, in the long-run it is possible for the effect of 
capital to be pronounced.!However, the above view needs to be elaborated by further 
study as it is beyond the scope of this study and hence it is very hard to boldly conclude 
it as the main reason contributing to the performance of privatized firms. This may 
require long time observation beyond ten years. 
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In Model 8, the coefficients of OWS are positively and statistically significant at five 
percent level of significance. This result indicates that OWS under privatization whether 
fully privatized or partially privatized have a positive impact on the firms OPE. The 
positive sign implies that when private ownership increases by one percent the expected 
value of OPE of the firm under privatization increases by 45555.3 of sales. This result is 
in line with other previous studies such as Kocenda and Svejnar (2004) Their results 
found that majority of private ownership (50 percent and more) has a positive impact on 
firms’ efficiency, through their managerial control in reducing cost while they also 
found that the minority private ownership (10 percent to 33 percent) has a negative 
impact on efficiency. Under this study, we could not ascertain whether foreign or local 
ownership is the one performing well or not since the ownership structure is generally 
categorized.  
 
The agency theory and strategic management literature suggest that ownership 
influences firm performance because different owners pursue distinctive goals and 
possess diverse incentives. Under government ownership, bureaucrats who maximize an 
objective function run a firm that is a weighted average of social welfare and his/her 
personal agenda. Under private ownership, by contrast, the firm is run for the 
maximization of profit (shareholder value). A common-sense view is that government-
owned firms are less efficient than their private sector counterparts operating in similar 
situations. In addition, the political view of privatizations argues that politicians have a 
tendency to distort managerial objectives to satisfy political objectives, especially excess 
employment, as they do not internalize the costs of distorting firms’ objectives away 
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from profit maximization. When control rights pass from the State to private investors, 
the firms’ objectives and managers’ incentives will be redefined and, consequently, 
firms’ performance should increase (Boycko et al., 1996). 
 
Moreover, the managerial view, based on agency theory, also helps explain privatized 
firms’ performance due to changes in the firms’ ownership. It states that SOEs have 
difficulties to monitor managers because there is neither an individual owner with strong 
incentives to monitor managers nor a public price to provide information about good or 
bad managers. Our result is in line with other empirical previous evidence such as 
Kocenda and Svejnar (2004), tends to support both the political and managerial view of 
privatizations as it shows that the change of control rights from the State to private 
investors enhances firms’ performance.  
 
This is also consistent with the results of prior studies including D ́Souza and 
Megginson (1999) for a sample of firms belonging to developing countries find larger 
efficiency improvements for privatizations in which the State no longer maintains 
control. Similarly, Wei et al. (2003) for a sample of Chinese privatizations report post-
privatization increases in efficiency for privatized firms in which the State retains less 
than 50 percent of the capital.  
 
On a final note, the result shows that the coefficients of LIQ in Model 9 are statistically 
insignificant. This indicates that LIQ does not have any effect on OPE. This result 
contrasts with the expected outcome and also it is not supported by Kikeri and Nellis, 
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(2004). Their findings on assessment of financial performance before and after 
privatization concluded that privatization improves liquidity ratio significantly. 
 
5.6.2  Discussion of Random Effect profitability Results 
!
SOEs are often chronically unprofitable, this is partly because they are charged with 
objectives (such as maximizing employment) other than the objective of profit 
maximization. Privatization therefore, is designed to substitute the single objective of 
profit maximization with the many other objectives. It is also expected to enhance the 
development of capital market and focus employees on raising revenues and lowering 
costs. Also, government withdraws its guarantee to the enterprises debts after 
privatization, which exposes them to the real threat of bankruptcy, which leads to their 
liquidation. This inevitably makes enterprises to promote greater emphasis on profit 
maximization (Abdullahi et al., 2012).  
 
In Model 10, Model 11 and Model 12, the coefficients of PRI are positively and 
statistically significant at five percent level of significance. These results indicate that 
increase in PFT is caused by increase in implementation of PRI programme. In other 
words, the main motivation underlying privatization was associated with the higher 
profitability of private firms, and this implies that the privatization implementation leads 
to improving its profitability level. The results lend strong support for the positive 
impact of privatization on the profitability. Privatization therefore, is designed to 
substitute the single objective of profit maximization with the many other objectives 
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such as enhancing efficiency. Analysis result is consistent with findings that are reported 
by! Narjess et al. (2004). They examine the post-privatization performance of newly 
privatized firms in Asia and document strong relationship between privatization and 
profitability. The authors show that privatization leads to increase in profitability. 
Another study by Megginson et al. (1994) found a strong significance for the return on 
sales (at the one percent level) and return on assets (at the 10 percent level) ratios. Such 
findings is consistent also with what D’Souza and Megginson (1999) have documented 
and suggested; they documented that privatization has led to significant increases in 
firms’ profitability.  
 
This result also documented very strong performance improvements following either 
full or partial privatization in Libya. This result is supported by previous studies such as 
Boubakri and Cosset (1998), Megginson et al. (1994); these studies focused on the 
SOEs that were fully or partially privatized through public share offerings and these 
firms, particularly those privatized early in the process of privatization, may be among 
the healthiest SOEs showing documented increase in the profitability after privatization. 
Also, it is not clear how much of the shares remained state-owned within partially 
privatized SOEs. If the firms with improved performance included firms that remained 
majority state-owned, then the conclusion that privatization improves performance 
becomes ambiguous. A similar previous result such as La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes 
(1999) studied former Mexican SOEs and found these rapidly closed a large 
performance gap with industry matched private firms that had existed prior to 
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divestment. These firms go from being highly unprofitable before privatization to being 
very profitable thereafter.  
 
This result is also in the same line with the results of Dewenter and Malatesta’s (2001). 
They use regression and time series methods to compare the pre-privatization and post-
privatization performance of 63 large high-information companies divested during the 
period 1981 to 1993. Both authors examine performance changes over both short-time 
frame around privatization and longer-time. They reported significant post-privatization 
increases in profitability in the period immediately after privatization. However they 
also find that operating profits increase prior to divestiture and may actually decrease 
somewhat afterward.  
 
The results of analysis also show that the coefficients of EMP in Model 10, Model 11, 
and Model 12 are positively and statistically significant at the level of five percent. It 
implies that when the employment level increases by one worker the expected value of 
profitability will increase invariably, holding all other variables constant.  
 
Interestingly, this result is in contrast with the expected result from the theoretical and 
empirical literatures concerning the impact of employment on the firm performance, 
because most of the previous studies show the decrease in the level of employment 
concerned to the increase of the level of profitability.  
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This result is true for the results reported by Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) and 
Frydman (1999). They found an increase in employment level.  
 
Results of analysis show that the coefficients of CAP in Model 10, Model 11, and 
Model 12 are negatively and statistically significant at five percent level. This result 
implies that increases in the level of CAP minimizes ones level of profit margins. The 
findings show that CAP exhibited negative associations with PFT. This usually happens 
in the short run and there is possibility that in the long-run when adequate CAP is 
employed then the PFT margin increases. That is because the general expectation is that, 
greater emphasis on efficiency and profitability will make the firms increase their capital 
investment spending.  
 
Therefore, firms should increase capital expenditure after divestiture because they are no 
longer tied to government’s bureaucratic procedures and that they have greater access to 
private debt and capital market. Moreover, if deregulation and market opening 
accompany, former SOEs will face very large investment spending needs in order to 
become more competitive with other firms. Previous studies including Boubakri and 
Cosset (1998) and D’Souza and Megginson (1999) support this result. Their studies 
show that the greater emphasis on profitability will make the firm’s increase their capital 
investment spending.   
 
The results show that the coefficients of PRO in Model 10, Model 11 and Model 12 are 
insignificant and do not affect PFT. This implies that PRO has not really impacted on 
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performance to the extent of influencing profitability positively. The result tends to 
contrast the expectation of an increase in PFT. However, this result seems to be 
consistent with Ehrlich et al. (1994). They use a sample of 23 comparable international 
airlines of different ownership categories over the period 1973-83 and previous studies 
by Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), they found insignificant between productivity 
and profitability. 
 
Similarly, the coefficients of OWS in Model 11 are also not statistically significant at 
any level. This result implies that OWS does not have any effect on PFT.!Indicating that 
there is no significant difference in firm performance between ownership and 
profitability. This result in the same line with the previous studies such as Gupta (2005), 
Wei et al. (2003) and Shleifer and Vishny (1996). These studies also find that private 
ownership has a no effect on performance of firms in China and India.  
 
Finally, the results of analysis show the coefficients of LIQ in Model 12 remains 
insignificant influencing PFT. This result shows that LIQ does not impact performance 
to the level that PFT is positively influenced. However, both fixed and random effects 
indicate that liquidity does not have any effect on profitability. It is expected to see 
liquidity statistically significant in influencing the profitability level, but contrary to our 
expectations, the results show that the coefficient of liquidity is positive and 
insignificant. This result in constraint with some previous studies such as Sarboland 
(2012) and Mustafa (2011). Their overall results indicated that the liquidity was 
increased meeting expectations of increased cash flows.  
! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! 254!
!
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has descriptively and empirically examined the impact of privatization 
programme on the Libyan SOEs performance. Several conclusions can be drawn from 
this study.  The results obtained from the field survey show that managers and workers 
were in favor of the privatization programme. Based on the views of the managers 
concerning the barriers and constraints faced by privatized SOEs, privatization in Libya 
has faced minor difficulties.   Meanwhile, based on panel analysis on the impact of the 
privatization on the privatized SOEs performance, the analysis shows that privatization 
has a positive and significant impact on Libyan privatized firms both on operational 
efficiency and profitability level; ownership structure significantly improved privatized 
firms’ efficiency and with the profit level it does not contribute in a negative or positive 
way; liquidity has a negative impact but not statistically significant on privatized firm’s 
operating efficiency and profit level; and employment is statistically significant both on 
operational efficiency and profitability at five percent level. It can therefore be 
concluded that privatization has played important roles in improving operational 
efficiency and profitability as a key measurement of the firm’s performance. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
!
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.0  INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents summary of research findings 
of this study. It is followed by policy implications and recommendations of this study in 
Section 6.2. Limitations of the study witch is presents in Section 6.3. Furthermore,!
Section 6.4 discusses the suggestions for future research and. Finally, the conclusion of 
this study is presented in Section 6.5.  
 
6.1  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
It is not sufficient to view the transfer of the ownership of a firm from the public to the 
private sector as an end in itself (Banerjee & Munger, 2004). As experiences have 
revealed, privatization is not always a success, and it does not guarantee performance 
improvements (Parker & Martin, 1995). It can also have adverse effects at least in the 
short term (Gupta, et al. 1999). Therefore, this study has been discussed many vital 
issues related to the Libyan economy in general and the privatization programme in 
particular. 
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The study has evaluated the SOEs performance using both primary and secondary data 
analyses. It has examined the performance of the SOEs after the privatization 
programme and compared it with the same companies before the privatization. The 
econometric analyses such as mean comparison and traditional panel models have been 
employed in this study. Findings of the study are generally backed by theories of 
privatization which indicates that it results in improving performance and working 
conditions in privatized firms. 
 
The specific objectives set out in the study are firstly: to explore effectiveness of 
privatization program in the industrial companies in Libya by providing a descriptive 
analysis of the privatization impact on the firms’ performance in Libya, comparing it 
with results of privatization developed in the literature. This is supported with the 
attitudes of managers and workers about the main barriers to the privatization in the 
Libyan economy, by undertaking a field study of the companies of the Libyan industry. 
The managerial view based on agency theory, also helps explain how the privatization 
really works on the firm, due to changes in the firms’ ownership structures. It states that 
SOEs have difficulties to monitor managers because there is neither an individual owner 
with strong incentives to monitor managers nor a public price to provide information 
about good or bad managers (Laffont & Tirole, 1993). 
 
However, this study specifically tackles both the administrative and economic aspects of 
privatization. It also focused on one of the key factors in successful implementation of 
privatization which concerns management and workers attitude towards privatization. 
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With regards to management, their attitude prior to privatization was examined and the 
results revealed that most managers advocated privatization along with their workers. 
 
The second objective of this study was to evaluate of the privatization effects on the 
firm performance in the industrial companies. This study reveals that empirical 
observations focused on the effect of privatization in Libya from 2002-2010 highlighted 
significant lessons to be learned; 
i. First, significant differences were revealed in the privatized firms’ performance 
between the pre- and post-privatization periods. These differences were with 
regards to improvements in operating efficiency, capital investment and 
profitability and the increase in aggregate employment among the privatized 
firms. In other words, from 2002-2010, privatization in Libya positively affected 
all the above factors and achieved some of the established goals.  
ii. Second, employment remains statistically significant both on operational 
efficiency and at profitability level. Looking at different aspects of the 
relationship between firm performance and employment, the theoretical view 
pointed as a priority is given to minimize the cost in the initial step, in the short 
run , the level of employments will slump. However, in the long-run as the cost 
efficiency results in lower production costs, the number of employment will 
increase and shows a total effect in the firm performance. However, in growing 
sectors, the firm could absorb surplus labor through new capital investment and 
more productive use of existing assets (Kikeri et al., 1992). It can therefore be 
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concluded that employment has played important roles in effecting the firm’s 
performance using operational efficiency and profitability as a key measurement. 
 
iii.  Finally, this study has empirically revealed that privatization of public firms can 
result in positive returns in terms of real turnover and profits in the short to 
medium term but may have some negative effects concomitantly upon 
employment over the same time period. Hence, it is recommended that 
precautions mitigating privatization’s adverse employment effects should be 
established. 
 
For addressing the third objective that explained and identify the important obstacles 
that hinder the privatization programme in Libya, and identifying problems of 
implementation, several perspectives were used. From a management perspective, 
workers perspective, and an owner perspective, the privatization can be considered a 
limited success. Although, the managers had more decision-making authority, and 
workers received salary increases, the managers were not prepared to deal with the new 
realities, many employees lost their jobs, many employees had a much less secure future 
than before privatization because of the introduction of annual contracts. Lastly, as a 
result of that, it can be concluded that the privatization in Libya has faced small 
difficulties according to the views of the managers and workers. 
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6.2  POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Privatization actually contributes a significant impact on economic performance in 
general and economic entities in particular. The evidences of this study have proved that 
the Libyan privatized firms’ operating efficiency and profitability have changed after 
privatization programmes. Therefore, the government should take appropriate actions in 
promoting privatization programme. For instance, the government can conduct special 
platforms such as conferences that can discuss the effect of privatization in the entire 
Libyan economy. 
 
Morover, Libyan government should highlight the advantages and disadvantages of 
privatization programmes to economic agents on the basis of proper scientific analysis. 
This could lead to the development of a suitable environment for economic activities, 
and various social groups or economic agents in Libya can play their role to their full 
potential. 
 
In order to achieve the objectives of privatization programmes, it is should ensure that 
managers and workers transform their ways or habits to perform their tasks.  Based on 
the findings of this study, majority of the former managers still perform their duties in a 
relatively same way as before privatization. In addition, after privatization, some 
workers still have the same mind-set which reflects their lack of understanding of the 
process of privatization. In fact, the privatized companies still operate their entity as part 
of the public sector especially in the first five years after they were privatized. 
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Therefore, the cooperation between the Libyan government, organization, managers and 
workers needs to be established and tightened. 
 
For the realization of a successful privatization program, there are many conditions that 
have to be considered. First and foremost, the privatized firms have to be fully equipped 
with effective managerial and technical capabilities. But on the basis of the empirical 
findings of this study, the following recommendations are provided to the Libyan 
government to consider when introducing a strategic shift towards actual privatization in 
the country; 
i. In spite of all shortcomings, privatization has positive effect upon performance 
of Libyan enterprises and should be proceeded as the preferred course of action. 
ii. The process of privatization should not be considered as an objective in itself but 
instead as a means to achieve other more important objectives. Stated differently, 
privatization should be considered as a means to an end instead of the end itself. 
As such, its target should not be limited to material aspects but the state should 
also focus on the significance of privatization such as encourages production 
efficiency.  
iii. The privatization process was implemented with the objective to improve their 
performance. To ensure this objective, the state should do not keep more than 50 
percent in state ownership. The later should help to appear new shareholders 
having enough stakes to monitor managers properly. 
iv. To have improvements in effectiveness of state-owned enterprises, the state 
could cooperate between the Libyan government, organization, managers and 
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workers and make a comprehensive plan to revise an unsuccessful SOE. 
v. Extensive field surveys are called for to determine the main barriers to 
privatization in the Libyan economy and their effect on various activities in 
terms of privatization outcome in the other public sectors. 
vi. prior successful experiences of privatization in other countries have to be taken 
as precedents; for instance, the Egyptian and Malaysian methods to enterprise 
reform and ownership change may be a suitable model to be employed. 
 
6.3  LIMITATION OF THE STUDY                                                                           
 
The main limitation of this study is difficulty of getting sufficient data. Data was very 
difficult to obtain as there were several firms in the industrial sector before the period of 
privatization. A total of 32 firms experienced actual privatization from the industrial 
sector with 19 excluded from the study sample owing to the challenges in gathering data 
from them particularly after they were privatized. Thus, the actual study sample 
included only 13 companies. This methodological limitations mirror those by 
Megginson and Netter (2001) who claim that data availability limitation is the topmost 
important issue because privatized firms do not readily give out their financial data. This 
study has thus taken recourse from this limitation by relying on the questionnaire survey 
along with financial data to obtain the needed information. In addition, there are only a 
few researchers who employed a panel data when studying the potential determinants of 
the post-privatization performance of the firms in the context of developing countries. 
This is especially true in Libya where performance of firms is enhanced through internal 
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efforts even when a negative environment exists. Because of the lack of empirical 
studies in the context of the North African continent, this study attempted to determine 
the impact of privatization on firm’s performance in Libya.  
 
6.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
Future studies could include a larger sample size in order to increase the potential for 
result generalizability. As the result of this privatization phase in Libya, has been 
achieved to a greater extent, the desired results for the companies have been studied, it is 
reasonable to determine whether or not deviations from the findings occur in other 
sectors. In addition, the research should be conducted to review the nature of such 
variables as corporate image, the service quality and the employee attitudes of the 
privatized companies before and after privatization programme. 
 
Moreover, to this date, there is no study dedicated to the post- privatization performance 
of the enterprises in Libya and there are not many studies focusing on privatized 
enterprises performance. With this limitation as a background, this study intended to fill 
the research gap by determining firm efficiency, labor market and fiscal impact of the 
privatization program in Libya. As such, this research is believed to highlight future 
trends of enterprises in Libya. More importantly, other extensions to this study may 
employ this study as a basis for detailed and in-depth studies.  
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6.5  CONCLUSIONS  
 
First phase of privatization noted the state’s attempt to interfere by privatizing majority 
of the companies and transferring their ownership to the existing workers and 
management. Although it appears from this study that privatization has succeeded in the 
context of Libya, if the Libyan government is interested in further enhancing SOEs 
performance through privatization, it can readily do so. But there are some concerns that 
have to be addressed. Therefore this chapter summarizes the main findings of the study, 
and discusses its policy implications and makes recommendations, and suggests areas 
for further research. 
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